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ABSTRACT 
 
Food hubs, or local food aggregation and distribution businesses, are triple-bottom-line 
firms that play an increasingly important role in connecting small and mid-sized farmers to 
wholesale and retail markets.  This paper explores how food hubs can use their financial data to 
identify and address strengths and challenges in their operations.  We propose a “dashboard” of 
key metrics and benchmarks for food hub managers, and apply it a comparative case study of 
four food hubs over three years of operations. We compare and contrast the liquidity, cash flow, 
efficiency, solvency and repayment capacity of the four cases, and analyze cross-cutting themes. 
We find that although the food hubs varied in their business structure and composition of 
sales outlets, they all faced the challenges of limited working capital, labor inefficiencies, high 
debt-asset ratios, and limited profitability.  Some firms were able to break even below the $1 
million sales level typically cited as a food hub breakeven point, but still struggled to maintain 
positive profits, suggesting that they remained in a “breakeven” phase even as they grew.   All of 
the food hubs owned relatively few fixed assets and used relatively little term debt from outside 
sources.  Modest net worth and small total asset size left each firm vulnerable to insolvency in 
years of negative profit.  However, with bootstrapping techniques such as renting or sharing 
equipment and collecting payments quickly, in general they used their assets efficiently.   
We evaluate the usefulness of our metrics and benchmarks in analyzing food hubs, and 
offer suggestions on how recordkeeping could be improved to make financial analysis easier.  
Finally, we return to the literature to make recommendations for managers on resolving 
challenges seen in the metrics, including problems with cash flow, solvency, labor efficiency and 
turnover, inventory management, and pricing. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 1.1  Background & Problem to be Addressed 
Over 260 food hubs, or local food aggregation and distribution businesses, have been 
documented in the U.S (USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, 2014). According to the USDA, 
“a regional food hub is a business or organization that actively manages the aggregation, 
distribution and marketing of source-identified food products primarily from local and regional 
producers to strengthen their ability to satisfy wholesale, retail, and institutional demand.”  These 
values-based businesses provide important services for small and mid-sized farmers by 
marketing local products to new consumer bases, brokering volume sales, coordinating 
distribution logistics, and helping producers meet industry requirements in areas such as food 
safety and packaging (Barham, Tropp, Enterline, Farbman, Fisk, & Kiraly, 2012). However, 
given the narrow margins and the economies of scale that are typical of the food wholesale and 
distribution industries, food hubs often struggle with the long-term financial viability of their 
operations.  Key challenges include accessing capital, managing cash flow and working capital, 
using labor and other resources efficiently, and obtaining sufficient prices to sustain and grow 
the business (Barham et al. 2012; Fisher, Hamm, Pirog, Fisk, Farbman, & Kiraly, 2013). 
Within the past five years, much progress has been made in providing business 
assessment guidance to food hubs and to the community of their potential funders and lenders.  
The national Food Hub Benchmarking Study, conducted through a collaboration of Farm Credit, 
Morse Marketing Connections and the Wallace Center at Winrock International, represented the 
first national effort at establishing financial benchmarks for the local food aggregation and 
distribution sectors (NGFN Food Hub Collaboration, 2015).  The 2014 study offers a list of 
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appropriate benchmarking measures, calculates average and “top 25%” figures based on data 
from nearly 50 hubs nationwide, and provides some suggestions for how hubs can utilize the 
benchmarks.  These data and the accompanying webinars provide a blueprint for hubs to 
compare their financial measures to those of their peers.  Additionally, Wholesome Wave’s Food 
Hub Business Assessment Toolkit, revised in 2014, offers a qualitative but carefully structured 
framework for evaluating food hubs’ readiness for investment (Vanderburgh-Wertz & Ram 
Moraghan, 2014).  This toolkit focuses on aspects such as strength of the business model, social 
and environmental impact potential, positioning within the market, and more. 
Even with such resources at hand, many hub managers still struggle at evaluating their 
own businesses.  Food hub outreach efforts by the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture 
and Iowa State University Extension and Outreach have suggested that managers still harbor 
uncertainty regarding how to interpret their financial measures, which measures to focus upon 
and, most importantly, how to utilize those measures in making decisions.  The benchmarks in 
the Food Hub Benchmarking Study were drawn from entities that have a very wide range of 
business models and vary in scale.  We have observed food hub managers trying to place their 
own data into the context of these benchmarks, but some have expressed confusion about how 
the numbers usefully apply to them.  There appears to be a need for further guidance to help food 
hub managers interpret their own data in the context of the benchmarks that are available.  
Food hub managers often come from the nonprofit sector or lack a formal background in 
the business of food marketing beyond the farm level.  For example, the National Food Hub 
Survey in 2013 showed that 36% of food hub managers had 2 years or less of experience in 
warehousing and distribution of food and 41% had 2 years or less of experience in food retail 
3 
(Fischer et al. 2013).   Many managers have expressed a need for training in financial analysis 
and in how to structure recordkeeping so that it leads towards analysis. 
In informal interviews with ten food hubs prior to the beginning of our formal study, we 
asked food hub managers from across the country what training or technical assistance they 
needed, and what information they wished they’d known when they launched their business.  
The following are examples of their questions:
“Which benchmarks should we be the most concerned with?  Are we focusing too much 
on sales and not enough on profits?” 
“How do large conventional wholesalers manage their finances and keep records?” 
“What are typical Costs of Goods Sold and prices paid to farmers?” 
“What are typical gross margins – overall and for different product types?”  
“How do we decide whether to charge a larger gross margin for certain products?” 
“Should gross margins be higher or lower for frozen items?” 
 “How do we know what staff salaries and laborer wages are reasonable?” 
“How should our pricing reflect the type and distance of delivery that we offer?” 
To address such questions, the present study was completed to explore how food hubs can use 
their own financial data to evaluate their businesses and to make better managerial decisions.  To 
our knowledge, no comparative case study has been conducted that actually explores how food 
hub managers could use available metrics to evaluate their operations.  The present study 
compiles a range of tools for food hub evaluation and tests them on real cases.  To the extent
possible, we try to address the questions that food hub managers posed to us in our early 
interviews. 
4 
One advantage of doing this research specifically with food hubs, rather than referring to 
research on other types of supply chain intermediaries, is the opportunity to address financial 
management within a values-based or “triple bottom line” paradigm.  First described in the 
1990’s by John Elkington, the triple bottom line approach suggests evaluating businesses’ 
success based on three different “bottom lines:” their impacts on people, their impacts on the 
environment, and their monetary profit (Elkington, 1998).  A variety of authors such as Willard 
(2002) and Savitz & Weber (2006) have documented the triple bottom line approach and the 
resulting benefits, both for firms’ own success and for society.  The missions and values of food 
hubs generally emphasize all three bottom lines, as we will see later, and so we refer to them as 
“triple bottom line businesses.”  A food hub’s commitment to such values as paying a farmer a 
fair price or paying workers a living wage will necessarily affect its management decisions, 
leading managers to look for sources of increased profitability other than reducing COGS or 
wages.  Therefore, recommendations for management of a food hub must take into consideration 
the hub’s stated mission, goals and values.  Our recommendations also incorporate a discussion 
of how to evaluate salary and wage competitiveness, which is tied to the social responsibility 
objectives shared by many food hubs. 
As evidenced by over 400 attendees at the biannual National Food Hub Conference, there 
exists a national audience of food hub practitioners and supporters who are actively engaged in 
understanding and improving food hub business models.  To reach this broader audience, some 
findings of our analysis have also been incorporated into a guide for food hub managers, The 
Managers Guide to Food Hub Financial Metrics, which employs both fictionalized and actual 
examples to illustrate how financial measures can be used to make management decisions. 
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1.2  Objectives 
The present paper provides a comparative case study, incorporating quantitative and 
qualitative elements, of four food hub businesses.  We calculate key measures of liquidity and 
cash flow, profitability, efficiency, repayment capacity and solvency for each food hub over a 
period of three years, compare them to industry benchmarks, and analyze them in the context of 
the narrative history of each food hub.  To place each hub’s performance within the context of 
the broader food system, the hubs’ financial and operational measures are compared to 
benchmark data selected from (1) the produce wholesale and broad-line food wholesale 
industries, (2) the cooperative and conventional retail grocery industries and (3) the 2014 Food 
Hub Benchmarking Study.   These data are used to determine how each food hub could have 
used (and could use) its own available information to make better managerial decisions about 
issues such as pricing, staffing structure, composition of sales outlets, billing practices and 
financing. 
The particular objectives of the study are to explore how food hubs can use their own 
financial data to identify and address the strengths and challenges in their operation.  Using data 
that most food hubs already have available in their financial records, we show how financial 
metrics can be used by managers to identify problems and risks and to make decisions.  This
research enables us to evaluate various benchmarks and indicators for food hubs, including those 
proposed in the Food Hub Benchmarking Study, as well as benchmarks from closely related 
industries.  We also seek to offer a deeper understanding of common food hub challenges and, 
where possible, to provide solutions from the literature.  
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1.3  Research Questions and Propositions 
Yin (2003) suggests that a case study research design should identify the study’s 
questions, its propositions and its units of analysis.  The research questions that we sought to
address are as follows. 
1. How can a set of financial metrics be used to evaluate the performance of a particular
food hub and to direct managerial decision-making in the future? 
2. To what extent are benchmarks from other types of food businesses, such as
wholesale distributors and retail grocers, useful for evaluation of individual food 
hubs? 
3. How do the financial histories of individual food hubs reflect characteristics
documented in the food hub and small business literature, including: 
• Constrained working capital;
• Limited access to capital and/or disproportionate use of internal over external
financing; 
• Difficulties with labor efficiency and staff retention;
• Difficulties with pricing and price negotiation;	  
• Grant dependence; and
• Difficulties achieving profitability, especially below annual sales of
$1 million for wholesale and “hybrid” hubs. 
4. What financial characteristics and challenges seem to be shared in common among
food hubs of different sizes, ages, structures, business models and geographic 
locations?  
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In this study we use literature on food hubs and from other industries to propose a common 
“dashboard” of key metrics as a starting place for food hub financial evaluation.  We then apply 
the metrics in that dashboard to four detailed food hub case studies.  The following propositions 
are explored in the studies: 
• Our proposed set of key metrics and evaluation methods reveal challenges and 
opportunities in a way that can be used by managers to make decisions and 
improve food hub financial viability. 
• A combination of internal and external benchmarks are needed to provide a useful 
evaluation of a food hub.  External benchmarks (from retail, and wholesale food 
businesses and other food hubs) provide context for interpretation of key metrics, 
but internal benchmarks (comparing the firm’s current performance to its own 
goals and past performance) are necessary for useful evaluation. 
The units of analysis in the comparative case study are the four food hub firms whom we 
have interviewed and whose metrics we have calculated.  The cases of these four businesses 
offer a lens through which to understand food hub challenges in general, a chance to experiment 
with financial evaluation methods, and a “jumping-off” point for making recommendations that 
may benefit other food hub managers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter begins with an overview of the financial state of food hubs, including 
measures of their economic viability, benchmarking data collected from existing hubs, and 
efforts to model breakeven sales levels for a “typical” food hub.  We review the challenges that 
food hub managers report facing as they pursue viability.  We then turn to a broader review of 
the characteristics of small and start-up enterprises, including how they access capital and how 
this affects their financial statements.  Finally, we review how the concept of financial evaluation 
has already been applied to food hubs.  This literature review contributes to our effort to create a 
financial evaluation tool for food hub managers. 
2.2  The Financial State of Food Hubs 
Triple bottom line businesses that aggregate and distribute local food have existed for 
some time, but the invention of the term “food hub” is relatively recent.  Up until 2010, there 
was a fairly well-developed literature referring to “food value chains,” “aggregators,” and 
values-based supply chains,” but not much of an effort had been made to document the business 
models, financial characteristics and operations of local food aggregator-distributors in the 
United States (Lerman, Feenstra, & Visher, 2012).  In 2010 the National Good Food Network 
(NGFN), a program of the Wallace Center at Winrock International, hosted the first of a long 
series of webinars explicitly addressing the topic of food hubs.  The following year NGFN 
partnered with USDA on the first National Food Hub Survey, which received responses from 45 
food hubs (Fisher, Hamm, Pirog, Fisk, Farbman, & Kiraly, 2013).  In 2011, USDA’s 
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Agricultural Marketing Service launched a resource page for food hubs (Neal, 2011) and 
thereafter released several publications on food hub business models.  These primarily described 
the characteristics of existing processors, aggregators and distributors of local food and 
documented their lessons learned (Barham, Tropp, Enterline, Farbman, Fisk, & Kiraly, 2012; 
Matson, Sullins, & Cook, 2013; Matson, Thayer, & Shaw, 2015).  
In the first of its major food hub publications, USDA defined a “regional food hub” as “a 
business or organization that actively manages the aggregation, distribution and marketing of 
source-identified food products primarily from local and regional producers to strengthen their 
ability to satisfy wholesale, retail, and institutional demand.” (Barham, Tropp, Enterline, 
Farbman, Fisk, & Kiraly, 2012, p. 4)   Authors also noted that “regional food hubs are defined 
less by a particular business or legal structure, and more by how their functions and outcomes 
affect producers and the wider communities they serve.”  Other defining characteristics given for 
regional food hubs included considering producers as valued business partners, working closely 
with producers to help them meet buyer requirements, using product differentiation to help 
farmers obtain good prices, and working towards financial viability while delivering positive 
economic, social, and environmental impacts for communities.  In the years following 2012, 
there emerged a more robust literature that continued grouping businesses under the heading of 
“food hub” because of the similarity of their missions.  USDA’s definition has been cited by 
many others, and is consistent with subsequent literature in identifying food hubs as values-based 
or triple bottom line businesses (see for example Vanderburgh-Wertz & Ram Moraghan, 2014; 
Fisher, Hamm, Pirog, Fisk, Farbman, & Kiraly, 2013).  
As suggested by USDA’s definition, the term “food hub” has been applied to a variety of 
business models, from online retail farmers markets to regional wholesale distributors, and a 
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variety of legal structures, including nonprofits, cooperatives and for-profits. The commitment to 
work closely with farmers and to pay them a “fair” price has often meant sacrificing profitability, 
especially in wholesale markets where margins are already razor-thin (Barham, Tropp, Enterline, 
Farbman, Fisk, & Kiraly, 2012). So in spite of their diverse approaches, food hubs as a group 
have faced common challenges that distinguish them from their conventional counterparts in 
food wholesale or retail.  However, the tremendous variation among food hubs also makes it 
difficult to generalize about them or to aggregate and interpret their data.  For example, gross 
margins for a food hub that sells directly to consumers are very different from gross margins in a 
food hub that sells exclusively wholesale (NGFN Food Hub Collaboration, 2015).  The 
differences among hubs remain a challenge for the authors of all the literature we reviewed, and 
help explain why a combination of statistical analyses and case studies may be necessary to 
better understand food hubs. 
Barham, Tropp, Enterline, Farbman, Fisk, & Kiraly (2012) were among the first to 
explore the conditions necessary for food hubs to be economically viable.  In the authors’ 
definition, a food hub was “viable” if “revenue generated from sales covers core operational 
costs of aggregating, distributing, and marketing food products.”  They interviewed twenty food 
hubs about their viability, the challenges they were facing, and the opportunities they saw for 
business growth. Seventeen of the interviewees self-reported that their businesses were 
economically viable or were “well on their way to achieving this.” The researchers did not see a 
link between viability and geographic location or legal structure, but they did observe that the 
median age of so-called viable food hubs was 9.5 years, compared to 5 years for food hubs that 
said they were not yet viable.  Barham et al. also observed that all of the economically viable 
hubs reported gross annual sales of at least $1 million.  The publication became the first of 
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several to identify $1 million or $1.5 million as the apparent breakeven sales level for food hubs, 
followed by Vanderberg-Wertz & Ram Moraghan (2014) and Matson & Barham in reference to 
wholesale hubs (2015). 
The National Food Hub Survey in 2013 collected a larger data set via an online survey of 
107 food hubs (Fisher, Hamm, Pirog, Fisk, Farbman, & Kiraly, 2013).  The survey received 
responses from food hubs of a variety of business models, geographic locations and sizes.  While 
the food hubs responding to the survey reported overall average 2012 sales of $3,747,044 per 
hub, 58% of them had earned $500,000 or less in 2012.  About 51% indicated that they were not 
at all dependent on outside funding, while 32% said they were somewhat dependent and 17% 
said they were highly dependent.  The researchers found no significant relationship between 
reported degree of reliance on outside funding and location, total sales, types of products sold, 
number of full-time employees, number of producers, percentages of small and midsized 
producers and percentage of sales from products of small and mid-sized farmers.  Operating
structure, however, was significantly related to reported funding dependence (Rs = .45, p < .01).  
Nonprofit food hubs were more likely than for-profits and co-ops to report that they were reliant 
on outside funding, with 38% of the nonprofits reporting this.  64% of co-ops and 69% of for-
profits reported being not at all reliant.  Certain community services, including paid employment 
opportunities for youth, acceptance of SNAP benefits, provision of SNAP matching funds, 
nutrition or cooking education and mobile markets, had what the authors deemed a “slightly 
significant” association with reported dependence on grant funding, at a significance level of 0.1.  
The study also reported that “food hubs that participated in packaging or repackaging of products 
were far less likely to have indicated they were highly dependent on grant funding. On the other 
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hand, food hubs that offered brokering services were much more likely to have indicated that 
they were highly dependent on grant funding.”   
The authors sought to measure the financial condition of respondents in more quantitative 
terms by calculating a “business efficiency ratio” of total expenses divided by total revenue. For 
the whole population of respondents, they found an average business efficiency ratio of 1.09 
(indicating that average expenses exceeded average revenues), and a median of 1.00.  
Cooperatives were reportedly the most self-sufficient, with an average ratio of 0.94, while 
nonprofits had the highest ratio of 1.2.  Consistent with the findings of Barham et al. in 2012, 
ratios were lower for older food hubs.  Several factors in the data collection may have added 
confusion to these results.  First, the authors point out that brokerage-model firms may have 
counted only brokerage fees and not total sales as part of their revenues, while firms that took 
ownership of product may have counted all sales as revenue.  Second, when reporting the 
revenue that was used to calculate the business efficiency ratios, food hubs who took the survey 
were not asked to differentiate between business and charitable revenue.  So, the ratios 
themselves may not be a reliable indicator of the degree to which food hubs could sustain 
themselves without grants.  In any case, the data suggest that many respondents were having 
trouble covering their expenses using their own revenue.  
To date, probably the most comprehensive study on food hub finances has been the Food 
Hub Benchmarking Study conducted by The National Good Food Network’s Food Hub 
Collaboration (NGFN Food Hub Collaboration, 2015).   This study, whose second round of 
results was published in 2015, compiles financial and operational performance benchmarks 
based on income statements, balance sheets, statements of cash flows and survey data voluntarily 
submitted by food hubs.  The 2015 iteration of the study utilized data from 48 U.S.-based hubs.  
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The participating hubs had various sizes, ages, and sales channels, which the authors categorized 
as Mostly Retail (>80% of product sold directly to end consumers), Mostly Wholesale (>95% 
sold to wholesale outlets), and Hybrid (significant quantities of both direct-to-consumer and 
wholesale channels). 
The Benchmarking Study found that a typical food hub operates at close to a break-even 
level, with average profits of -2%.  The highest-performing 25% of food hubs reported a profit of 
4%.  “Mostly Retail” hubs reported a positive profit of 6%, while “Mostly Wholesale” and 
“Hybrid” hubs saw small average losses.  Calculated average profits for for-profit food hubs 
were 1%, compared with nonprofit food hubs, which saw -7% profit before grant income and 
charitable contributions.   
According to the authors, greater labor productivity may have contributed to the 
profitability of the top 25%.  They speculated that this greater productivity might have been 
related to staff compensation.  The top hubs were paying workers 39% more per full-time 
equivalent than the average.   The 25% most profitable food hubs also had a Costs of Goods Sold 
(COGS) that was three percentage points lower than the average COGS as a percent of total 
revenue.  This means that farmers and food producers selling to the most profitable hubs were, 
on average, receiving a smaller share of each sales dollar.  It does not necessarily mean that those 
farmers received lower prices; it could rather mean that profitable food hubs were charging a 
larger markup for their services than other food hubs.  
Building upon the conclusions of Barham, Tropp, Enterline, Farbman, Fisk, & Kiraly 
(2012), the Benchmarking Study authors found that average firm profits shifted from negative in 
the $750,000-$1.5 million sales bracket to positive in the >$1.5 million sales bracket.  
Confirming the importance of years in operation, they also saw profits shift from large average 
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losses in the first 0-5 years of operation to small positive profits in the 5-10 year age range.  In 
addition to benchmarking profitability, the Benchmarking Study calculated benchmarks for gross 
margin, costs of sales, net worth, Current Ratio, blended debt term, blended effective interest 
rate, customer and vendor concentration, labor as a % of sales and revenue, sales and revenue per 
worker equivalent, and labor expenses per FTE.  Some of these figures are reflected in the 
benchmarks that we chose for our own case studies (see Chapter 3). 
After the release of the first Food Hub Benchmarking Study, an unpublished work by 
Matson and Barham attempted to model food hub financial growth in order to determine a 
“viable” scale for food hub business models (2015). The authors developed a set of assumptions 
about “typical” food hubs and created a framework dividing food hub development into four 
stages: startup, breakeven (covering operating expenses but not necessarily interest or 
depreciation), growth (becoming “cash flow neutral” with no money set aside for growth or 
unexpected events) and viability (yielding a 5.5% return for investors or for reinvestment in the 
food hub).  Arguing that the best way to categorize food hubs is by the markets they serve, the 
authors structured their analysis to address three distinct operational models: a wholesale 
operational model, a direct-to-consumer operational model, and a “hybrid” model serving both 
wholesale and consumer markets. Projections of fixed and variable expenses were drawn from 
the authors’ previous food hub research and from the Food Hub Benchmarking Study.  These 
were used to conduct a breakeven analysis of each model and to create pro forma financial 
statements.  Based on this process the authors proposed sales levels for breakeven and viability, 
shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1:  Operational Model & Period Comparisons 
(from Matson & Barham, 2015) 
The authors point out that small amounts of outside funding, such as charitable dollars, 
would dramatically reduce breakeven sales levels due to decreased costs of capital.  They also 
point out that small changes in Costs of Goods Sold or costs of sales (such as greater-than-
expected variable labor costs) can dramatically increase breakeven.  While based on a highly 
stylized set of assumptions, this study supports the idea that breakeven for hybrid and wholesale 
food hubs could occur in the $1-1.5 million range.  However, it challenges the idea that 
breakeven sales are sufficient to sustain a food hub in the long run, and demonstrates the 
vulnerability of profits to small variations in variable costs.  The study was presented on a 
National Good Food Network webinar in April 2015 and was said to be slated for publication, 
but has yet to appear in print. 
In summary, the available data on food hub finances confirms that food hubs as a whole 
are struggling with profitability, especially in their early years.  This suggests that, like most 
startup businesses, they are at a high risk for insolvency during their startup phase unless they are 
highly capitalized at the outset.  However, business model matters.  There are large differences in 
gross margins and possibly in breakeven levels for food hubs focusing on direct-to-consumer vs. 
wholesale sales.  So, any analysis of a food hub must take place in the context of its business 
model.  Furthermore, since food hubs are triple-bottom-line businesses, expectations for their 
financial performance must take into consideration their social and environmental objectives.  
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A number of single-case and comparative case studies have delved into questions about 
food hub viability and sustainability, sometimes providing basic data about annual sales, gross 
margins, or solvency from active hubs (Stevenson, 2009; Feenstra, Visher, & Hardesty, 2011; 
Diamond & Barham, 2012; Brislen, Woods, Meyer, & Routt, 2015).  To our knowledge, 
however, none of these studies have provided a comparative analysis of food hub financial 
documents in tandem with narrative information about the history and context of each operation.  
In particular, no prior study has used a set of financial metrics to highlight and understand 
challenges and opportunities faced by particular food hub businesses.  Our study attempts to do 
this. 
2.3  Challenges in Achieving Food Hub Viability 
In developing research questions for food hub case studies, it is has been helpful to 
review how other authors have documented the challenges faced by food hubs.  Persistent
challenges cited in the 17 food hub manager interviews by Barham, Tropp, Enterline, Farbman, 
Fisk, & Kiraly (2012) included: 
• Balancing supply and demand in the face of limited local production, fluctuating
seasonal supply, and product supply mismatched to demand; 
• Price sensitivity of customers, which makes it difficult to cover operating costs and
makes customers less likely to make long-term purchasing commitments; 
• Managing growth to keep pace with market demand, which includes knowing
when to make timely investments in infrastructure; 
• Access to capital for infrastructure investments and short-term credit needed for
adequate cash flow; and 
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• Other issues including reliance on volunteer labor and in-kind contributions, finding
reliable seasonal and part-time staff, meeting buyer specifications, managing 
inventory, maintaining farm identity along the supply chain, meeting food safety 
requirements with smaller producers, and investing in additional infrastructure and 
IT platforms without external funding support.  Managers also cited the precarious 
nature of being in the low-margin food distribution business, where weather factors 
and perishability introduce a large amount of uncertainty. 
The National Food Hub Survey findings closely mirrored those of Barham et al.  
Respondents were presented with a list of potential operational challenges and asked to indicate 
their greatest, second-greatest and third-greatest operational challenge.  The six challenges 
identified by at least 10 food hubs (in a sample of 107 hubs) were: managing growth, balancing 
supply and demand, accessing capital, finding appropriate technology to manage operations, 
negotiating prices with producers and/or customers, and finding reliable seasonal and/or part-
time staff.  The eight other possible challenges in the list were selected by fewer than ten 
respondents.  These included inventory management, dependence on volunteer labor, meeting 
food safety and regulator requirements, meeting buyer specifications and maintaining product 
source identification (Fisher, Hamm, Pirog, Fisk, Farbman, & Kiraly, 2013). 
A University of Kentucky case study on the failure and shutdown of Grasshoppers 
Distribution LLC gives another perspective on food hub challenges (Brislen, Woods, Meyer, & 
Routt, 2015).  While no study has looked broadly at the reasons for food hub shutdowns in the 
United States, this case gives a specific example of what can go wrong.  Grasshoppers 
Distribution was founded in 2006 by a group of Kentucky farmers.  It served over 70 food 
producers and saw annual sales of nearly $1 million before it ultimately went out of business in 
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2013.  The business received substantial state, national and federal funding, as well as private 
investments, but experienced negative profits throughout its lifetime.  It struggled with constant 
transition and went through five different general managers.  An analysis of the business’ 
financial records, together with interviews with staff and affiliates of the food hub, was used by 
the authors to identify causal factors in the business’ collapse.  These included staff inexperience 
and staff turnover, running too many different enterprises (wholesale, aggregated CSA etc.) 
without enough focus, policies that disallowed the food hub from competing with farmers, 
growth in debt and grant obligations that led to loss of control over the firm, and inflexible 
pricing schemes that did not enable competitive or strategic pricing. After reviewing financial 
statements of Grasshoppers Distribution, authors urged other food hubs to keep separate records 
for their charitable or business development activities and their aggregation/distribution activities 
so that managers could more easily track business performance.  
Clearly the challenges experienced by each food hub are various, and dependent to a 
large extent on its structure and business model.  However, the issues of pricing, balancing 
supply with demand, staffing, and startup capital (including managing the expectations of 
charitable and non-charitable capital providers) appear to be shared across many hubs.  Food 
hubs are also likely to share the challenges of other types of small businesses.  Next we will turn 
to a broader discussion of the characteristics of small and startup businesses, since these describe 
the majority of food hubs in the National Food Hub survey (Fisher, Hamm, Pirog, Fisk, 
Farbman, & Kiraly, 2013). 
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2.4  Capital Structures of Small and Startup Enterprises 
A large body of literature has sought to shed light on the challenges and characteristics of 
small and startup enterprises.  In this section we focus on literature about their capital structure, 
which is relevant because of how it affects both financial metrics and available options for 
managers.  Undercapitalization is often given as a reason for small business failure, consistent 
with the food hub challenges mentioned in the previous section.  For example, in a review of 300 
official reports of involuntary business liquidations in England, undercapitalization was the most 
frequently cited reason for business failure, ranking above staffing issues, poor accounting 
management, rising costs, and numerous other factors (Hall & Young, 1991). Thus, 
understanding factors affecting capital structure has been a focus of small business scholars. 
Unlike larger firms, small firms and new ventures are likely to encounter imperfect 
capital markets with high transaction costs that discourage them from seeking outside financing 
(Ang, 1991; Stouder & Kirchoff, 2004).  This phenomenon is said to result in a “finance gap” for 
small enterprises.  Small business owners may have limited information about available 
financing (a “knowledge gap”), and may also encounter difficulties with finding lenders willing 
to deal with small businesses (a “supply gap”) (Groves & Harrison, 1974; Garvin, 1971).  
Furthermore, the costs of providing information to outside stakeholders can be high relative to 
the size of the transactions themselves (Holmes, Dunstan, & Dwyer, 1994; Ang, 1991).  
Functionally, the information requirements of private lenders are equivalent to small businesses 
paying a premium to obtain external funds, so the cost of capital from internal sources may be 
less than the cost of capital from external sources such as banks.  Perhaps for these reasons, 
empirical studies show that new and small enterprises tend to use internal sources of capital, for 
example from the owner or leadership team, more than external sources of funding from outside 
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investors and banking institutions (Landstrom & Winborg, 1995; Stouder & Kirchoff, 2004). In 
fact, in a survey of 74 small businesses, Stouder and Kirchoff (2004) found that 75% of their 
respondents did not use any external funding at all.  In addition to explaining the use of internal 
capital, the “finance gap” could also explain why small firms sometimes rely on short-term loans 
to finance long-term assets, because finding banks who will give them long-term loans is too 
difficult (Levin & Travis, 1987; Welsh & White, 1981).   
Providing a different perspective, Holmes & Kent (1991) argued that small businesses 
deliberately choose internal funding because it ensures that they maintain control over the assets 
and operations.  These researchers referenced the “pecking order” framework described by 
Myers (1984), who suggested that business owners seek capital based on a “pecking order” of 
most- to least-preferred funding sources based on how “safe” they are perceived to be.  In 
Myers’ pecking order framework, internal equity is expected to be at the top (safest) and external 
equity is at the bottom (least safe), with debt in between.  Holmes & Kent expanded on this idea 
by suggesting that small business operators follow a somewhat different pecking order from 
large businesses, preferring short-term debt and owner contributions to a greater extent.  The 
authors argued that small businesses choose short-term debt (including short-term bank loans and 
trade credit from Accounts Payable) because it carries fewer restrictive covenants than long-term 
debt.  The small business pecking order framework contrasts with the idea that small firms use 
owner capital and short-term debt because lenders will not make long-term loans them.   
The pecking order concept may be especially relevant to triple bottom line businesses 
that wish to protect their commitment to social and environmental responsibility.  For example, 
some food hub managers in our screening interviews expressed unwillingness to pursue equity 
financing because they did not want investor control to endanger their mission.  The case of 
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Grasshoppers Distribution suggests that even charitable external funders can influence food hubs 
in ways that divide focus and throw the business off course (Brislen, Woods, Meyer, & Routt, 
2015).  Thus, managers may have reason to be choosy about sources of capital, even when 
capital options are limited. 
One way of avoiding outside financing is to engage in “bootstrapping.”  Freear, Sohl, & 
Wetzel Jr. (1995) defined bootstrapping as "creative ways of acquiring the use of resources 
without borrowing money or raising equity financing from traditional sources."  Windborg and 
Landström (1997) distinguished between “bootstrapping measures used for capital 
minimization,” which make it possible to operate with less capital, and “bootstrapping measures 
to meet the need for capital”.  Their survey of 262 small businesses found the most popular 
strategies for capital minimization to include buying used equipment (used by 78% of 
respondents), charging interest on overdue payments from customers (used by 41%), hiring 
personnel for shorter periods instead of employing them permanently (used by 40%) and leasing 
equipment instead of buying (used by 33%).  The most popular bootstrapping measures to meet 
the need for capital included seeking the “best conditions possible with suppliers” (used by 74% 
of respondents), withholding managers’ payment for periods of time (used by 45%), deliberately 
delaying payment to suppliers (used by 44%), and obtaining payment in advance from customers 
(used by 33%).  The authors also observed differences in bootstrapping techniques among 
several different types or “clusters” of small businesses.  The “traditional trading business” 
cluster, which seems to most closely resemble food hubs and other wholesalers, was found to 
employ “relatively great use of minimizing cash management routines, focused on Accounts 
Receivable.”  Most of these bootstrapping measures turn out to be relevant in the behaviors of 
food hubs, as we will see.     
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The strategy of seeking fast payment terms on receivables and longer terms on payables, 
as suggested in the Windborg & Landström results, has been discussed in food hub literature 
(McCann & Lyons, 2015).  However, some food hubs choose to use short payment terms 
because of their mission-driven commitment to increasing farmers’ cash flow.  In fact, these 
hubs see paying farmers quickly as a part of what makes their services unique and important in 
the value chain (Rozyne & Hodges, 2012; Johnston, 2014).  Compared with other small 
businesses, hubs that operate this way are constricted in their ability to generate net cash flow 
without obtaining a line of credit.  However, they can still emphasize rapid collection of 
receivables in their strategy. 
Capital structure is important in food hub financial analysis because it impacts measures 
of liquidity and solvency as well as the potential growth trajectory of the business in general.  In 
accessing capital, we might expect food hubs to face a two-fold challenge.  First, they likely face 
the same capitalization challenges as other small businesses, including limited information about 
financing sources, high transaction costs for external financing, disinterested lenders, and the risk 
involved in trading control for financing.  Second, they have restrictions of their own, such as the 
commitment to pay growers quickly, the need to maintain control over their mission, and thin 
profit margins that are unappealing to most investors.   
Anecdotally, service providers and some food hub managers have suggested food hubs 
need to capitalize themselves more generously and make infrastructure investments earlier in 
their growth than they are currently doing.  The factors outlined in this section help explain why 
food hubs might tend to put off seeking outside capital beyond what is absolutely necessary.  
Furthermore, given their constraints, it is not surprising that many food hub managers turn to 
charitable funding as an alternative source of capital and cash, even though charitable funding 
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comes with obligations of its own.  Recall that in the National Food Hub Survey, 40% of food 
hubs reported using grant funding for startup and 49% said they were still at least somewhat 
reliant on “outside” funding (Fisher, Hamm, Pirog, Fisk, Farbman, & Kiraly, 2013). 
2.5  Interpreting Financial Measures for Small Firms  
Partly for the reasons explored in the previous section, scholars of small businesses warn 
against interpreting small business financial statements in the same way that one would for large 
businesses.  Such caveats are clearly relevant for the present study. 
Small firms may exhibit blurry distinctions between debt and equity (Ang, 1991) or 
between personally-owned and company-owned assets (Levin & Travis, 1987).  This ambiguity 
can cause confusion in interpreting financial statements.  For example, small business owners 
may make a strategic decision to make loans to their firms rather than equity investments 
(Stouder & Kirchoff, 2004; Levin & Travis, 1987).  Levin and Travis explain, 
Sometimes what appears as a loan is really an easy-to-retrieve equity investment.  
Consider the individual who wants ready access to his or her investment in the business.  
He or she could hold stock, but the bank might restrict the repurchase of shares.  And if 
the company goes under, he may come up empty handed.  If he lends the funds to the 
corporation instead, management can free the money by simply paying the debt. (1987)  
Additionally, the authors point out, owners of start-up firms are likely to pledge personal 
assets as collateral if they wish to obtain debt from lenders.  Or, in order to avoid taxes, owners 
may choose to personally own fixed assets and rent them to their company, which hides the fact 
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that those assets functionally belong to the company.  To accommodate for this, Levin and 
Travis suggest including personal financial records in the evaluation of how the company is 
doing.  This makes it possible to see changes in the equity of both the company and the 
individual, to measure the after-tax income of both, and to consider company plus personal assets 
in calculations of ROA.  While this advice may only apply directly to the ~47% of food hubs that 
are privately owned (Fisher, Hamm, Pirog, Fisk, Farbman, & Kiraly, 2013), other food hubs 
often have unusual arrangements such as rent-free borrowed equipment, private loans made 
without expectation of timely repayment, or equipment that belongs to a parent organization.  
Looking closely at unusual loans, borrowed assets, and the role of parent companies or 
organizations would make it possible to better understand these hubs’ financials. 
Levin & Travis also argue for relaxing the conventional expectation that the sources and 
uses of capital should be matched, i.e. that short-term debt should not be used to finance fixed 
assets.  A “mismatch” may be acceptable, the authors suggest, so long as managers are doing 
cash flow budgeting that will warn them of potential cash shortfalls.  Relatedly, Welsh and 
White (1981) discourage a strict interpretation of the Current Ratio in small businesses because 
small businesses rarely have the same choice of financing that large businesses do.  Debts that 
appear to be short-term may sometimes be long-term loans from banks that wish to check up on 
the status of their small creditor every few months.  If the firm negotiates long Accounts Payable 
terms, which is one way of bootstrapping to increase cash flow without loans, it makes the 
Current Ratio worse. The authors urge readers to remember that a Current Ratio of less than 1 
does not necessarily mean a business cannot service its debts, and that small, profitable, rapidly 
growing businesses often have poor Current Ratios because of the investments that they make in 
order to grow.  This logic is consistent with the observations of RSF Social Finance, a lender that
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finances food hubs, which reports that even financially strong food hubs tend to have negative 
working capital (Vanderburgh-Wertz & Ram Moraghan, 2014).  Negative working capital is 
mathematically equivalent to a Current Ratio of less than one. 
 
2.6  Approaches to Measuring and Evaluating Food Hubs 
In general, managers have two options when evaluating their business (Duffy, Edwards, 
& Kay, 2011, pp. 103-104).  They can: 
• Compare themselves to others, using individual or averaged benchmarks from other 
firms in related industries; and 
• Compare themselves to themselves, specifically by: 
o Trend analysis:  Comparing present performance to past performance, e.g. 
comparing the current month to the same month in the previous year, and 
o Budget analysis:  comparing present performance to budgeted goals and 
objectives in the business plan. 
In practice, managers are advised to use some combination of these two methods, which is what 
we will do in our analysis.  In the next chapter, we assemble benchmarks from various food-
related sectors so that food hubs can compare themselves to whichever sectors are the most 
relevant to their business model.  However, the benchmarks require care in interpretation.  
Evaluation against benchmarks may be less important than looking at the food hub in the context 
of its own business model and history, as well as its social responsibility objectives. The 
evaluation should also be done in a way that is practical and useful.  Fortunately, several authors 
provide guidance on the practical evaluation of food hubs. 
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Wholesome Wave, a socially responsible investor that works closely with food hubs, has 
created a comprehensive toolkit to help other lenders, investors and funders evaluate hubs.  
Wholesome Wave’s framework provides specific measures within all of the following 
categories: business plan & strategy, market overview, marketing and sales, operations, 
organization & management, risk mitigation, technology & systems, and finance (Vanderburgh-
Wertz & Ram Moraghan, 2014).  Because food hubs are triple bottom line businesses, the 
authors also include a framework for impact potential, including social, environmental, and 
community economic impacts.  With the exception of some business plan and financial metrics, 
which are cited in Chapter 3, the majority of measures identified by Wholesome Wave are not 
incorporated into the present case study.  However, Wholesome Wave’s framework remains 
extremely useful for a full evaluation that considers a food hub’s growth potential and 
community impact.  
Another useful framework for food hub evaluation comes from Robin Morris of Mad 
River Food Hub, who teaches the finance curriculum for the Food Hub Manager Certificate 
Program at the University of Vermont.  Mr. Morris highlights the importance of using metrics 
“to drive improvements and help businesses focus their people and resources on what’s 
important.”  He recommends that managers create a dashboard of easy-to-understand metrics 
that reflect the various strategies and priorities of the organization.  Good metrics, he says, 
should “drive strategy and direction, provide focus for all parts of an organization, help make 
decisions, drive performance, change and evolve with the organization, and produce good 
internal and external PR” (Morris, 2014).  Morris (2015) shares a framework for organizing data 
and reporting, shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  The Reporting Pyramid (from Morris, 2015) 
Note:  This image was created as part of a presentation for the University of Vermont’s Food 
Hub Manager Certificate Program. 
This framework invites food hub managers to think about a hierarchy of metrics that will 
be reviewed quarterly, monthly, weekly, and daily.  The example given by Morris illustrates the 
tracking of sales revenue.  Individual invoices showing sales per order are reviewed daily or 
weekly by a bookkeeper. Total customer orders are reviewed weekly by a department manager.  
Revenue per program, for example distribution vs. processing revenue, is reviewed weekly or 
monthly by the whole management team.  Total revenue is reviewed quarterly by the board of 
directors.  Thus, each level of data review corresponds to a level of decision-making in the 
business, and is matched to the appropriate personnel for that decision-making.  This framework 
has been helpful in thinking about the frequency and process with which food hubs should use 
each of the proposed key metrics in our own “dashboard.” 
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2.7  Summary 
Food hubs are triple bottom line businesses that serve as valuable marketing 
intermediaries for local and regional producers, whether by brokering, aggregating, processing, 
and/or distributing local food.  As we have seen, the variation in food hub business structures 
makes it difficult to generalize from available data, but a growing literature shows that food hubs 
struggle to make a profit, especially in their early years.  Nonetheless, a number of food hubs 
have successfully passed their breakeven point while continuing to deliver valuable community 
services.  Food hubs share some difficulties with other types of small businesses; in particular, 
they tend to be undercapitalized.  Capital structures of food hubs may bear similarities to other 
small businesses that practice “bootstrapping,” rely on short-term borrowing and source much of 
their capital internally.  Hubs face some additional constraints to their freedom in accessing 
capital, but can also access charitable capital not available to other types of small businesses. 
All of these factors affect how we might interpret and use a food hub’s financial data.  As 
described in small business literature, we should expect working capital to be limited, look 
carefully at assets and liabilities on the balance sheet, and try to understand how the business is 
using other resources beyond those it owns.  We should also place our analysis in a broader 
context of the business’ strategy, positioning, and social responsibility objectives, and try to 
design metrics accordingly.  Finally, metrics should be measured with the appropriate frequency 
and reviewed by the appropriate people in order to be useful for operational decision-making.   
 In the next chapter we will utilize our findings from the literature to propose a specific 
set of metrics for managers to assess their own food hubs, and a methodology for doing so. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
3.1  Introduction 
Case study designs must be carefully structured in order to deliver rigorous results.  To 
structure our comparative study, we conducted a review of metrics used by industries similar to 
food hubs, consulted with food hub experts on our proposed “dashboard” of metrics, and 
compiled numerical benchmarks from various sources including the wholesale, retail and food 
hub sectors.  We developed an interview process for food hub managers and used face-to-face 
visits to screen 10 possible study participants, ultimately identifying four food hubs that could 
provide the necessary data and diversity for our case analysis.  Finally, we conducted individual 
three-year analyses of each food hub using their financial and interview data, returned the 
analyses to the food hub managers for feedback, and analyzed themes across the results.  This 
chapter describes our methods in detail. 
3.2 Multiple Case Study Research Design 
Yin (2003, p. 9) recommends conducting case studies as a means of answering “how” or 
“why” questions about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little 
control.  Many researchers have found case studies suitable for understanding the historical 
development and characteristics of agents, such as businesses or organizations, that cannot be 
controlled experimentally.   
Multiple or comparative case study research designs provide the opportunity to compare 
and contrast several units of analysis.  While a single case study might be useful in 
understanding a business that has an exceptional or unusual story, a comparative case study 
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allows us to look for patterns and processes that might be more generalizable across multiple 
businesses.  Yin points out that multiple case study designs can produce more powerful analytic 
conclusions than single case studies.  This is particularly true when common conclusions arise 
from cases in differing contexts.  Multiple case studies also offer a means to explore difference 
by comparing results from contrasting situations (p. 53-54).   
Yin cautions against using case studies to make “statistical generalizations” about 
characteristics of a particular population.  Rather, case studies should point toward “analytic 
generalization” that explores the theoretical or policy implications of case study observations  
(p. 32).  In the present study, analytic generalization enables us to use specific cases to identify 
processes, policies or decisions that may be helping or hurting food hubs’ financial sustainability 
in general.  We use a common dashboard of key metrics as the starting point and framework for 
each analysis, which makes our methodology more easily replicable.  Not only does the analysis 
uncover financial similarities and differences between food hubs, but it also illustrates a method 
that food hub managers can replicate to calculate their own key metrics, making a “case study” 
of their own businesses. 
We have chosen a comparative case study research design using four cases.  Each case 
provides a financial evaluation of a local food aggregation and distribution enterprise.  Three of 
our cases look at businesses that engaged only in local food aggregation and distribution 
activities, so the unit of analysis for those cases is the entire business.  One of the cases dealt 
with a business that conducted other activities in addition to aggregation and distribution, and in 
that case, our unit of analysis was the aggregator-distributor part of the business only.  Although 
the two types of units of analysis differ somewhat, we treat them as being sufficiently 
comparable that both can be included in the same comparative case study. 
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3.3  Compiling Metrics from Related Firm Types and Industries 
Before analyzing any food hub financial data, a review was conducted to identify 
financial metrics appropriate for local food hubs.  We sought to answer two questions:  (1) which 
performance metrics should food hub managers be using to evaluate their business and make 
decisions, and (2) which benchmarking data from other industries can be usefully compared to 
metrics from a food hub?  
A variety of sources for financial metrics and benchmarking data were consulted, 
including the conventional grocery wholesale industry (Troy, 2013; First Research, 2015; United 
Fresh Produce Association, 2014), the conventional retail grocery industry (Troy, 2013), the 
cooperative retail grocery industry (National Cooperative Grocers Association, 2006), the 
farming industry (Center for Farm Financial Management, 2009), and other reports on food hubs 
(Vanderburgh-Wertz & Ram Moraghan, 2014; NGFN Food Hub Collaboration, 2015).  
Additionally we interviewed Erin Pirro of Farm Credit East, a lead author of the Food Hub 
Benchmarking Study, about how the benchmarks in the study were chosen and the methodology 
used to calculate them.  
Based on our research we drafted a “dashboard” of key financial metrics to use for our 
case studies, and a template with some guidance on how to interpret the metrics.  We received 
reviewer comments on the dashboard and template from three service providers who work 
frequently with food hubs and their financial data:  Kate Danaher or RSF Social Finance, Jesse 
Singerman of Prairie Ventures Consulting, and Robin Morris of Mad River Food Hub, who 
teaches workshops on food hub financial measures for the University of Vermont’s Food Hub 
Management Professional Certificate Program.  These reviewers were recommended by staff at 
the Wallace Center at Winrock International, which organizes the national Food Hub 
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Table 2.  Measures of Liquidity and Cash Flow 
Measure Calculation Meaning Interpretation Ways to Improve Sources 
Days 
Receivable 
(Accounts 
Receivable / 
Total Sales in 
week or 
month) x days 
in week or 
month 
Avg. number of days the 
business takes to collect 
payment owed by 
customers.  If low, sales 
turn into cash quickly.  If 
high, business is slow to 
collect on bills. 
For cash flow, lower DR is better.  Look 
at DR relative to Days Payable 
Outstanding.  It is ideal to have DR 
shorter than Days Payable, but this may 
not always be possible.  Set a goal for 
DR based on industry standards for 
customer type, and measure against this 
goal. 
IF HIGH:  Negotiate and 
actively enforce shorter payment 
terms with customers.  Monitor 
aged receivables closely.  If 
needed, it is appropriate to get a 
line of credit to fund receivables. 
First Research, 
2015; 
Vanderburgh-
Wertz & Ram 
Moraghan, 
2014; United 
Fresh Produce 
Association 
(UFPA), 2014 
Days in 
Inventory 
(Average 
inventory / 
COGS in week 
or month) x 
days in week 
or month 
Avg. number of days it 
takes for inventory to turn 
over completely.  
Businesses that sell more 
perishable product keep 
less inventory, so compare 
to benchmarks from 
companies with similar 
product mix.    
IF LOW:  Depending on business 
model, could indicate efficient inventory 
management and low stocking costs.  
But, could also mean facility is too small 
for product volume, which could be 
constraining sales or increasing the risk 
that stock runs out.  IF HIGH: 
Inventory is taking longer to leave the 
facility.  Is it  constraining cash flow too 
much? 
IF LOW:  Ensure storage type 
is matched to storage needs; 
organize products efficiently; 
increase storage if needed.  IF 
HIGH:  To increase cash and 
reduce inventory costs, consider 
lower stocking positions. Pre-
sell items when possible (e.g. 
process whole animal carcasses 
to order, instead of selling 
individual cuts.) 
UFPA 2014; 
Vanderburgh-
Wertz & Ram 
Moraghan, 
2014 
Days 
Payable 
Outstanding 
(Accounts 
Payable / Total 
Sales in week 
or month) x 
days in month 
Avg. number of days the 
company takes to pay its 
bills.  May be low if food 
hub pays its vendors upon 
receipt of product.   
For cash flow, higher DPO is better.  
Look at DPO relative to Days 
Receivable as explained above.  IF 
LOW: the business is paying vendors 
quickly and not asking them for much 
credit.  Check if Current Ratio is strong 
and check the amount of available 
working capital, as DPO affects these. 
IF LOW:  Determine extent to 
which farmers / vendors need or 
demand short payment terms.  If 
appropriate and necessary, 
lengthen payment terms to 
increase cash flow. 
First Research, 
2015; 
Vanderburgh-
Wertz & Ram 
Moraghan, 
2014 
Current 
Ratio 
Total current 
assets / total 
current 
liabilities 
Ability to pay liabilities in 
the short run without 
disrupting operations.  <1 
means there are not enough 
current assets to pay off 
current liabilities.   
Higher Current Ratios are needed if 
sales are less frequent or if Days in 
Inventory are high.  IF LOW: there may 
be too much term debt or the business 
may be buying too much with cash. 
Look at dollar value of working capital 
too, to see actual size of available cash 
cushion. 
IF LOW:  Pay off short term 
debt if possible; restructure 
short-term debt into long-term 
debt; lower monthly bills; sell 
unproductive assets to increase 
cash; invest excess cash to earn 
interest; increase cash flow via 
favorable payment terms. 
National 
Cooperative 
Grocers 
Association 
(NCGA), 2006; 
Troy, 2013; 
NGFN 2015 
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Table 3.  Measures of Profitability 
Name of Measure Calculation Meaning Interpretation Ways to Improve Sources 
Sales vs. Forecast 
Budget 
Actual Sales / 
Forecast Sales 
Comparison of actual to 
forecasted sales 
Meeting sales targets is critical to 
meeting cash flow needs and 
profitability goals. 
IF LOW compared to targets: 
revisit marketing, sales and 
pricing strategies. 
Morris, 
2015 
Gross Margin 
(before Costs of 
Sales) (%) 
(Gross 
Revenue - 
COGS) / 
Gross 
Revenue 
Portion of each sales dollar 
remaining after Cost of 
Goods Sold.  This is what’s 
left for other expenses and 
profit. 
Gross margins are determined by 
pricing.  Appropriate gross margins 
depend on the customer, the product 
line, the nature of packing and 
delivery, and what the market will 
bear.  Set reasonable targets in line 
with market realities, operating 
expenses and the business plan. 
IF LOW compared to targets: 
Seek markets and products that 
offer higher margins; negotiate 
on prices; work with vendors to 
reduce COGS to the extent 
appropriate within the hub’s 
mission.  Evaluate and update 
business plan projections.  Are 
they realistic? 
NCGA, 
2006; Troy, 
2013; 
Morris, 
2015 
Operating Profit 
Margin (%) 
(Sales – 
COGS – 
operating 
expenses + 
interest + 
taxes)/sales 
Measures profitability 
without considering debt 
payments or tax status.  
Equivalent to the gross 
margin (which reflects 
pricing) minus operating 
expenses (which reflect 
efficiency and depreciation). 
Check gross margins and operating 
expenses relative to each other and to 
benchmarks.  To understand operating 
expenses, look at labor costs and at 
trends in top 5 largest expenses over 
time.  Were the largest expenses 
variable (increasing with sales 
volume) or fixed? 
IF LOW compared to targets: 
Is the gross margin adequate?  
See strategies for increasing 
gross margin.  Are operating 
expenses under control? See 
section on efficiency.  Is 
depreciation unrealistically 
high?  See section on 
improving solvency measures. 
NCGA, 
2006; Troy, 
2013; First 
Research, 
2015 
Return on Assets 
(Net income + 
interest) / 
 total assets 
Measures return on each 
dollar invested in the 
business, allowing 
comparison with other types 
of investments. 
Note:  This measure can be 
volatile for businesses 
holding few assets, and may 
not always be useful. 
Look at Asset Turnover (ability to turn 
assets into revenue) and factors 
affecting operating profit.  If ROA is 
low and Asset Turnover is good, look 
at COGS and other expenses, 
including depreciation and interest.  
Small asset size (e.g. from renting 
equipment) can make ROA large; 
large asset size (e.g. from owning 
equipment) can make it small.   
IF LOW:  Improve operating 
profit, improve Asset Turnover, 
review interest and depreciation 
expenses.  Conventional 
wisdom says to seek ROA 
greater than the interest rate, 
ideally by 2%.     
NCGA, 
2006; Troy, 
2013; First 
Research, 
2015 
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Table 4.  Measures of Efficiency 
Name of 
Measure Calculation Meaning Interpretation Ways to Improve Sources 
Revenue per 
Worker 
Equivalent 
(or Sales per 
Worker 
Equivalent)* 
Revenue / 
Average 
FTE 
Measures how efficiently staff 
time is generating sales.   
IF LOW, may suggest labor 
inefficiencies, or that the food 
hub is focusing on activities that 
do not result in sales. (Note that 
for food hubs this measure is 
usually above conventional 
benchmarks.) 
IF LOW:  Increase efficiency with division 
of labor, clear responsibilities, investments in 
qualified staff, training, and reduced 
turnover.  Consider mechanization options to 
improve staff productivity.  Consider 
marketing, sales, and how staff activities lead 
to revenue. 
NGFN, 
2015 
Labor to 
Income Ratio 
(%) 
(or Labor to 
Sales Ratio)* 
Personnel 
expenses / 
revenues 
Measure of how efficiently payroll 
expenses (wages, salaries benefits 
and other payroll costs) are 
generating revenue. 
Calculate for each program if 
possible. A lower value may 
suggest greater efficiency but can 
also reflect low staff 
compensation.  
IF HIGH:  See recommendations on staff 
efficiency.  IF LOW and if Revenue per 
Worker Equivalent is below benchmarks, 
staff wages may be below average.  See 
section on compensation.  
NCGA, 
2006; Troy, 
2013; 
NGFN, 
2015 
Vendor 
Concentration 
(%) 
$ COGS 
from top 10 
vendors / 
total sales 
Portion of sales derived from 10 
vendors who sell the most to the 
food hub.  High concentration can 
reduce expenses by lowering 
transaction costs of each purchase.  
But it may not align with the hub’s 
mission, and poses risks. 
IF LOW:  Look at time and labor 
involved in working with many 
vendors.  Are there ways to 
reduce these transaction costs?  
IF HIGH:  Is the food hub at risk 
if it loses a vendor?  Is there a 
back-up plan in place for filling 
orders if a large vendor leaves? 
IF HIGH: Develop redundant product 
sources, or discuss effects of vendor 
concentration with key vendors to put 
alternatives in place.  IF LOW, ask:  Should 
you increase sales from existing vendors 
before seeking others?  If the mission 
requires sourcing from many farmers, how 
can you interact efficiently with vendors?  
NGFN, 
2015 
Customer 
Concentration 
(%) 
$ sales to 
top 10 
customers / 
total sales 
Portion of total sales made to the 
10 customers who buy the most.  
High concentration can keep 
transaction and marketing costs 
low as sales grow. But it’s risky if 
a big customer has too much 
negotiating power or stops buying. 
IF LOW:  Look at time and labor 
involved in selling and taking 
orders, starting with Margin 
Minus Labor and variable costs.  
Will increased concentration need 
to be part of the food hub’s 
strategy for scaling up? 
IF HIGH, ask:  If a large customer stops 
buying, are there programs to absorb excess?  
IF LOW:  Consider how to increase sales 
without adding customers, e.g via an 
intermediary such as a distributor or a 
grocery service.  Develop a product line 
targeting large customers. 
NGFN, 
2015 
Asset 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Gross 
revenue / 
average 
assets 
Measures how efficiently the 
business uses assets to generate 
revenues.  Impacted by efficiency 
in using both physical assets and 
monetary assets. Volatile for hubs 
owning few assets. 
IF LOW, sales are low compared 
to the hub's assets. IF HIGH, 
indicates efficient use of assets or 
that the hub is using rented / 
donated infrastructure. 
IF LOW, may have a scale mismatch: 
unproductive assets, too much equipment 
capacity, equipment sized for peak rather 
than average volume, or mismatched 
equipment type.  Or, sales may still be 
catching up to infrastructure size. 
NCGA, 
2006; Troy, 
2013; First 
Research, 
2015 
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Table 5.  Measures of Repayment Capacity and Solvency 
Name of 
Measure Calculation Meaning Interpretation Ways to Improve Sources 
Debt 
Service 
Coverage 
Ratio 
EBITDA / 
scheduled 
principal and 
interest payments 
for year, where 
EBITDA = net 
income + interest 
+ taxes + 
depreciation + 
amortization 
# of times the business 
can cover scheduled debt 
payments (principal and 
interest) using income it 
generates before taxes, 
depreciation and interest. 
Shows degree to which 
the business can endure 
cash shortfalls and still 
pay its debts on time.  <1 
means negative cash flow. 
Rule of thumb: maintain 
debt service coverage of 
1.25 to 1.3.  
IF LOW:  Look at structure of debt:  
interest rates on each loan, interest as a 
% of gross margin or revenue, and total 
principal owed.  Food Hub may be 
carrying too much debt or paying too 
much interest; it may have loans for too 
many fixed assets, which now affects 
cash flow.  Ask:  are these assets 
yielding adequate returns?  Look at 
changes in ROA and Asset Turnover.   
Monitor and anticipate possible cash 
flow shortfalls, especially in low-
volume months. 
IF LOW:  Refinance or 
pay off long-term debt to 
reduce interest payments. 
Increase Operating Profit 
Margins through 
operational efficiencies 
and/or increases in gross 
margin. 
Center for Farm 
Financial 
Management, 
2009; 
Vanderburgh-
Wertz & Ram 
Moraghan, 2014 
Debt to 
Assets (%) 
Total liabilities / 
total assets 
Portion of total assets that 
would need to be 
liquidated in order to pay 
off all liabilities, i.e. the 
portion of the business 
owned by lenders, 
creditors and other 
entities that are not the 
owners. Over 100% 
means the business is 
insolvent and would be 
unable to pay off all of its 
liabilities at one time.  
Below 50% is 
recommended. 
IF HIGH, there may be a solvency 
issue.  If most liabilities are current 
liabilities, there may also be a liquidity 
problem – check Current Ratio.  If most 
debt carries interest, may lead to a debt 
repayment issue and a cash issue – 
check debt service coverage ratio.  If 
operating profit is high enough, a hub 
with a high Debt-Asset Ratio will still 
be able to cover debts. 
IF HIGH:  Increase 
profits; build equity; pay 
off debts. Consider seeking 
charitable dollars that can 
be used for long-term 
assets that improve 
profitability.  Consider 
raising equity from co-op 
members or shareholders.  
IF LOW compared to 
industry standards, and if 
profitability is good, the 
hub might consider more 
debt financing to take 
advantage of growth 
opportunities. 
NCGA, 2006; 
Troy, 2013; First 
Research, 2015 
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Collaboration (see http://www.wallacecenter.org/foodhubcollaboration/) and has worked closely 
with food hub experts all over the United States.  In addition to providing comments regarding 
the dashboard, reviewers responded to questions about common financial challenges for food 
hubs, and which other metrics they found important.  Since the analytic framework for our case 
study is based upon our dashboard of key metrics, an external review of the metrics was critical 
to establishing construct validity, as recommended by Yin (2003, p. 34). 
Tables 2-5 give a detailed description of each metric, including its meaning, 
interpretation, and examples of publications that use it. 
3.4  Compiling Benchmarks into a “Dashboard” 
Once the list of key metrics were compiled, we collected benchmarks for each metric 
from various industries.   Some of our benchmarks had to be manually calculated from published 
benchmarks so that they matched the format of our chosen metrics.  The following benchmarks 
were manually calculated from published benchmarks: 
• Days Receivable:  Benchmarks from Cooperative Retail Grocers (NCGA 2006), and
Broadline Wholesale and Conventional Retail Grocers (Troy 2013) were originally in 
“Receivables Turnover” format.  To convert these to Days Receivable we made the 
assumption that the benchmarked businesses used a fiscal year of 365 days.  We 
made the calculation: 
Days Receivable = Receivables Turnover / 365 days 
• Days in Inventory:  Similar to Days Receivable, benchmarks from Cooperative Retail
Grocers (NCGA, 2006), Produce Wholesale (First Research, 2014) and Broadline 
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Wholesale and Conventional Retail Grocers (Troy 2013) were originally in 
“Inventory Turnover” format. We made the calculation: 
Days in Inventory = Inventory Turnover / 365 days 
• Days Payable:  Benchmarks from Produce Wholesale (First Research 2014) were
originally in “Payables as % of Sales” format.  Again we assumed a 365 day fiscal 
year.  We used: 
Days Payable = Payables as % of Sales  * 365 days 
• Asset Turnover:  The Produce Wholesale benchmark (First Research, 2014) was
given as the ratio of Total Assets to Sales.  We calculated: 
 Asset Turnover =  1 / (Total Assets to Sales) 
• Gross Margin:  The food hub benchmark given for Gross Margin (NGFN 2015) was
Gross Margin After Costs of Sales, meaning Sales minus COGS minus variable costs 
of packing and delivery.  Because we found it difficult to consistently replicate the 
methodology used in the food hub benchmarking study, and because other Gross 
Margin benchmarks use the more traditional format of (Sales – COGS) / Sales, we 
chose to adopt the traditional format.  The benchmarking study also gave Costs of 
Goods Sold as a percent of total business revenue (sales, fees, etc.). To calculate 
Gross Margin Before Costs of Sales from the food hub benchmark, we used the 
following: 
Gross Margin Before Costs of Sales = 1 – Costs of Goods Sold (% of Business 
Revenue) 
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• Debt-Asset Ratio:  The food hub benchmark (NGFN, 2014) was shown as “% Net
Worth,” or equity as a percent of total assets. To find the Debt-Asset Ratio we 
calculated:  
Debt-Asset Ratio = 1 - % Net Worth 
A produce wholesale benchmark was not given for Debt-Asset Ratio, but current and 
long-term liabilities were given as percentages of totals assets (First Research, 2014).  
We used: 
Debt-Asset Ratio =  Current liabilities (% of assets) + long-term liabilities (% of 
assets) 
When compiling benchmarks, we chose to include some food hub benchmarks that were 
variations on conventional metrics, reflecting charitable income.  Specifically, we used both a 
Labor to Sales Ratio benchmark (reflecting the ratio of labor expenses to business revenue) and a 
Labor to Income Ratio benchmark (reflecting the ratio of labor expenses to business and 
charitable income) in calculating labor efficiency.  We also used both a Sales per Worker 
Equivalent benchmark (reflecting business revenue per worker) and a Revenue per Worker 
Equivalent benchmark (reflecting business and charitable revenue per worker).  Including both 
types of benchmarks made it possible to evaluate how labor dollars were used to generate sales, 
but also how they were used to generate dollars associated with charitable activities.  
Table 6 shows the resulting “dashboard” of key metrics, including the external 
benchmarks (in the “To compare to others” column), and notes about interpreting each metric in 
the food hub’s own context (in the “To compare to self” column).  Benchmarking data from the 
conventional wholesale, conventional retail, and food hub industries are included in the template, 
including benchmarks manually recalculated from published data.  Cells in the “To compare to 
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Table 6:  Proposed “Dashboard” of Food Hub Key Metrics 
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Table 6:  Proposed “Dashboard” of Food Hub Key Metrics (continued) 
  
41 
others” column are color coded according to the source of each benchmark, and additional 
information about each benchmark source is given at the end of the table. 
3.5  Selection and Recruitment of Food Hub Participants 
The food hubs profiled in the case studies were selected from a list of 263 businesses in 
USDA’s 2014 Working List of Food Hubs.  (At the time when we began making our selections, 
this working list was posted on a USDA website and had last been updated April 3, 2014.  It is 
no longer available on-line.)  Using readily available information from the food hubs’ web sites 
and elsewhere, the list was narrowed based on the following criteria: age of hub 3-11 years, 
products limited to local food, direct handling and aggregation of product, involvement in at least 
some wholesale marketing, geographic diversity, and apparent profit motive or desire to break 
even.  (See full list of criteria in Appendix B).  From the narrowed list, we selected, visited and 
spoke with eleven food hubs all over the United States about their financial practices.  This 
group was further narrowed based on each food hub’s ability to supply at least three years’ worth 
of detailed financial statements.  Four food hubs were selected that would provide variation in 
business structure (nonprofit, cooperative, and for-profit) and geographic region within the 
United States.  These food hubs were invited to the study and all four agreed to participate.  The 
information shared with us by the other seven food hubs is not included in our results, but helped 
to frame our research questions and informed our search for solutions to commonly mentioned 
problems.  
In the remainder of this paper, the case study hubs will be referred to consistently as Food 
Hubs 1, 2, 3 and 4.  As mentioned previously, there are only a few hundred food hubs operating 
in the United States.  For this reason, to protect the anonymity of the case study hubs, we have 
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chosen not to share their geographic location or other details that could associate their identity 
with their numerical identifier.  Because the information we collected was about businesses, and 
not about individuals, our project was granted Exempt Study status by the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) at Iowa State University.  (See Appendix A for the memo from IRB.) However, 
anonymity remained important for our study participants because the results contain sensitive 
information about the liquidity, solvency and profitability of each firm.  Thus, we developed an 
agreement with each participant in which we committed to protecting their anonymity.   
The aggregate characteristics of all four hubs are summarized in Table 7.  The table 
illustrates the variation in characteristics across the cases. 
Table 7:  Case Characteristics 
Geographic regions are classified using USDA Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education 
(SARE) regions.  See map at http://www.sare.org/About-SARE/SARE-s-Four-Regions. 
Geographic Region Business 
Structure 
Age  
(in final year of study) 
Annual Sales  
(in final year of study) 
1 hub from North Central region 
2 hubs from Northeastern region 
1 hub from Western region 
1 for-profit 
1 nonprofit 
2 cooperatives 
1 hub 5 years old 
2 hubs 6 years old 
1 hub 10 years old 
$430,000 
$1.30 million 
$1.44 million 
$2.26 million 
3.6  Food Hub Contextual Interviews 
To provide context for the financial analyses, food hub managers and staff at all four case 
study hubs were interviewed in person.  A 5-7 hour visit at each site was used to gather details 
about each hub’s operations and facilities.  The interviews were semi-structured, following the 
list of questions shown in Appendix C.  Topics included the history of the food hub’s growth, 
sources of capital, gross margins for different product lines, staffing structure, profitability, 
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business goals, pricing strategy, supplier relationships, anticipated breakeven points, equipment 
ownership, and how the food hub was managing its information.  While not all interview 
questions related directly to the key metrics, they made it possible to understand how the each 
hub’s business model and managerial decisions had impacted its metrics.  The interviews also 
made it easier to understand the impact of practical constraints and values-based commitments 
on each business’ choices, which would inform our recommendations about how to interpret and 
improve their metrics.   
Food hubs submitted their financial data after the face-to-face interviews.  Once the data 
was received, phone calls and emails were used to clarify any confusing aspects of each food 
hub’s history or financial recordkeeping.  In total, each food hub contributed about 7-10 hours of 
interview and communication time to the project.   
 
3.7  Collection, Treatment and Analysis of Financial Data 
 Each food hub provided 3-5 years’ worth of annual income statements and balance 
sheets, as well as additional information about the company’s history, business plan, budgets, 
loan terms, and staff compensation.  Specifically, each food hub was asked to provide the 
following: 
• Income or P&L Statements (annual, 3-5 years) 
• Balance sheets (annual, 3-5 years) 
• Total amount of principal paid per year - OR - terms of any loans:  amount, start date, 
type of loan, % interest, # of years, payment due dates 
• List of items/infrastructure rented and the value of rent paid  
• List of staff positions and wages or salaries (excluding names of individuals)  
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• Reports of aged payables and receivables (current and/or historical info)  
• A balance sheet from midway through each fiscal year 
Items shown above in non-italics were required from all of the food hubs participating in the 
analysis.  Items listed in italics were optional for food hubs to submit.  The only italicized item 
submitted by more than one hub was the information on staff positions. 
As part of the financial analysis, we made adjustments to the financial statement figures 
to achieve a consistent methodology for calculating metrics across the cases:   
• Accrual adjustments:  If the business was operating on a cash basis, accrual adjustments 
were made to the income statement so that revenues were recognized in the same period 
as the expenses that helped generate them.  The following adjustments were made: 
Adjustments to total revenue: 
   Total Revenue (cash basis) 
+ Change in Accounts Receivable (beginning to end of current period) 
+ Change in Inventory (beginning to end of current period)    
= Total Revenue (accrual basis) 
Adjustments to total expenses: 
   Total Expenses (cash basis) 
+ Change in Accounts Payable (beginning to end of current period) 
+ Change in outstanding taxes and interest (beginning to end of current period) 
= Total Expenses (accrual basis) 
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• Depreciation:  To be consistent with the methodology of the Food Hub Benchmarking  
Study, we used straight-line depreciation for all depreciable assets.  The value of vehicles 
was depreciated over seven years: 
Annual depreciation = vehicle purchase price ÷ 7 yrs 
Vehicle value this year = Vehicle value last year – annual depreciation  
Similarly, facilities and infrastructure were depreciated over 15 years.  This required 
adjustments to both the income statement (in the depreciation line item) and the balance 
sheet (in the values of each depreciable asset and the accumulated depreciation).  It 
resulted in higher asset valuations and lower depreciation expenses than what most hubs 
reported in their financial statements.  This is probably because the food hubs were using 
IRS depreciation schedules, which tend to over-depreciate assets relative to their actual 
market value in the first few years of ownership.  (Note:  In cases where the balance sheet 
showed accumulated depreciation from years prior to our study period, it was not 
possible to fully adjust the accumulated depreciation on the balance sheet to reflect the 
straight-line method.  Doing so would have required a breakdown of the values of 
depreciable assets owned in each year prior to the study.  As a result, total assets in our 
calculations are probably somewhat lower than if depreciation were fully adjusted, and 
the metrics that depend on total assets are probably skewed.) 
• Transforming brokerage-model data into ownership-model format:  If a food hub 
was using a brokerage model and not taking ownership of product, we treated the 
brokerage fee as a gross margin and treated the dollars passed directly to farmers as 
“Costs of Goods Sold.”  This made it possible to compare metrics from brokerage-model 
hubs to those of ownership-model hubs in an “apples to apples” fashion. 
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• Charitable income:  As will be explained later, we calculated most metrics with and 
without grant income.  If a grant appeared only on the balance sheet, we moved it off the 
balance sheet and treated it as income.  This made it possible to see the impact of 
charitable funding on the business’ financial health.  We did not try to remove items from 
the balance sheet that had been purchased with grant funding in years prior to the study. 
• Costs of Goods Sold: Costs of Goods Sold includes the cost of actual products, 
processing for those products, inbound freight costs incurred by the food hub to pick up 
or process the products, and any costs of repackaging products into appropriate 
containers.  Costs of putting items into a box or pallet to fill an order would not be 
included in Costs of Goods Sold, but costs of dividing a 5 lb. bag of spinach into 
individual ½ lb. bags would be included in COGS.  Where necessary, we rearranged 
expenses in the income statement so that Costs of Goods Sold met this definition. 
• Non-food-hub activities:  If a business conducted activities not directly involved in local 
food aggregation and distribution, such as running a farm or a substantial educational 
program, we tried not to include the income and expenses associated with these activities 
in our financial analysis.  
Once the data had been collected and adjustments had been made, each food hub’s data was 
compiled and analyzed in several ways.  First, a financial summary was created summarizing 
information about the food hub’s revenues, gross margin, profitability, expenses and revenue 
sources over the three years of data collection.  Second, the dashboard of Key Metrics was 
calculated for each food hub for all three years.  Third, a report of the top five operating expenses 
was created for each year.  Additionally, in the three cases where detailed information about staff 
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FTE and compensation per position title was available, a more detailed analysis of staffing was 
conducted.   
 
3.8  Case Studies and Case Reports 
Yin (2003, p. 79) recommends beginning comparative case studies by conducting a study 
on a pilot case.  Before finalizing the list of key metrics that would be applied to all of the food 
hubs, we conducted a pilot case on Food Hub 1 using a draft list of metrics.  The results and food 
hub manager feedback from the pilot, as well as feedback from reviewers of our list of key 
metrics, were used to revise the list of metrics.  The revised set of metrics was then used for the 
case studies of the remaining three hubs. 
 To complete the case studies, interview data was used to place each food hub’s financial 
analysis in the context of its history of growth and to determine how the numerical data aligned 
or did not align with concerns and challenges expressed by the food hub managers.  Each food 
hub was given a detailed report including its financial summary, table of key metrics, tables of 
top 5 operating expenses, staff wage comparisons, and a narrative discussing the results.   The 
narrative also made recommendations for improvement of problem areas, based on the literature. 
Food hubs were asked to provide feedback on their report. 
One challenge in analyzing food hubs is that they often rely on a combination of 
charitable and business revenue for their operations.  During the completion of the pilot case, a 
manager of Food Hub 1 pointed out the use of grant revenue does not necessarily mean that a 
food hub would have been incapable of covering its expenses if grants had not been received.  
The receipt of a grant typically impacts a food hub’s decisions about how to spend its money.  At 
the same time, it can be valuable to look at a food hub’s financial performance without taking 
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grant contributions into account, because this may give a better sense of the hub’s actual profit 
and long-term financial sustainability.  Therefore, we analyzed each food hub’s financial status 
both with and without the inclusion of grant income.   
 Taken together, the four case study reports revealed both themes and differences across 
the food hubs.  After completing the individual reports, we reviewed all four cases to identify 
and document these themes and differences.  We then returned to the literature in search of 
solutions to commonly identified challenges.  Findings from that second literature search are 
offered in the Recommendations chapter.
  
 
 
49 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION  
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents results and analysis from our comparative case studies of four food 
hubs.  It begins by providing a financial overview of each of the firms in the study, then an 
analysis of key metrics across the four cases.  We touch on themes among the firms, linking our 
findings back to our research questions and to literature on the unique challenges of food hubs 
and small businesses.  Finally, we offer an evaluation of the usefulness of the proposed key 
metrics and benchmarks, and point out how recordkeeping choices can lead to difficulty in food 
hub financial analysis.   
 
4.2  Descriptions of Cases 
4.2.1  Overview of Case 1 
Food Hub 1 is a cooperative that sells to both wholesale customers and direct-to-
consumer (retail) markets.  Products are aggregated from farmers in a single location and then 
distributed to buyers, using the food hub’s own trucks and drivers as well as those of a partner 
company.  For the wholesale component of the business, customers include grocery stores, 
restaurants, health food stores, farm to school, and institutional buyers.  The direct-to-consumer 
retail portion of the business consists of a “food box” program similar to a Community 
Supported Agriculture (CSA) program, delivering prepaid, pre-packed food boxes directly to 
consumers on a regular basis.  As with a CSA program, customers “subscribe” to the food box 
service and pay in advance to receive a series of food box deliveries, which are designed to meet 
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a household’s various weekly food needs.  Wholesale sales comprise about 90% of the food 
hub’s sales, while retail food box sales comprise about 10%.  
Both the wholesale and the retail program have advantages, according to the food hub’s 
managers.  Wholesale makes it possible to move a large volume of product and to scale up 
quickly.  Retail sales require more packing time and more organization, but they help raise the 
profile of the food hub in the community.  They also receive a higher gross margin than 
wholesale sales, and the prepayments for food boxes provide the hub with substantial cash 
($70,000-$80,000) at the beginning of the season.    
The food hub purchases and owns products before reselling them.  Its policy is to add a 
fixed markup to the purchase price it pays to farmers.  In reality, each product line fetches a 
slightly different markup; frozen goods are sold at a higher markup while other products such as 
eggs are sold at lower margins in order to be price-competitive.  Having a flexible markup 
percentage allows the hub to negotiate more sales with customers, allowing higher-margin 
products to offset lower ones. 
Table 8 shows a general financial summary for Food Hub 1 in 2011-2013.  Table 9 shows 
Key Metrics for the food hub, compared with industry benchmarks. 
Even without counting charitable income as income, Food Hub 1 showed a net margin 
greater than or equal to zero in 2011-2013, which was above the average net margin for food 
hubs from the 2014 Food Hub Benchmarking Study.  The reason for this seems to stem from 
Food Hub 1’s low operating costs (21-23%), which are smaller than the benchmark for food hubs 
(26.26%).   The food hub had a lower gross margin than other food hubs, about 22-23% 
compared with 28.05%.  These findings suggest that the food hub is efficient in its operations 
and effective at returning a large portion of sales dollars back to local farmers. 
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Table 8:  Financial Summary for Food Hub 1  
Table 9:  Key Metrics for Food Hub 1 
52
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Table 9:  Key Metrics for Food Hub 1 (continued) 
53 
This food hub earned the majority of its income through business activities, but had on 
occasion accepted grants for specific projects.  During the study period, Food Hub 1 received no 
more than 3% of its total revenue from grants or donations, suggesting that it was less dependent 
on outside funding than its food hub peers in the Benchmarking Study (who received over 6% 
from charitable sources, on average).  
The food hub also capitalized itself with fees from co-op members, but apparently did not 
require a contribution of equity from members as they entered the co-op.  Balance sheet records 
did not make it clear what portion of the co-op’s equity was in individual member equity 
accounts as opposed to unallocated equity.  Managers did mention that they had never paid a 
patronage refund to members, but that they might need to start doing so. 
A breakdown of top expenses is shown in Table 10.  Labor costs represented the Food 
Hub 1’s largest operating expense, which is typical for food hubs.   Trucking and delivery 
expenses were the next-largest expenses, with various overhead costs trailing behind.  Shipping 
and delivery by a third party comprised a large portion of costs – larger than the food hub’s own 
trucking costs in 2013.  In interviews, food hub managers expressed concern about the cost of 
third party trucking, which allowed them to deliver geographic regions beyond the reach of their 
own routes.  Because the food hub had a policy of maintaining the same gross margin for all of 
its wholesale sales, managers were concerned that the deliveries requiring the third party were 
costing them more without bringing them a higher margin.  Without knowing what portion of 
total sales came from products delivered by the third party, though, it is difficult for us to say 
whether or not the third party was more expensive than the hub doing its own delivery. 
54 
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Table 10:  Food Hub 1:  Top 5 Operating Expense Categories, Largest to Smallest 
2011	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  
expenses	   Expense	  
Labor	  and	  Employment	  Costs	   59.4%	   $90,429.82	  
Truck	  expenses	  (rent,	  maintenance,	  repairs,	  fuel)	   14.8%	   $22,464.12	  
Shipping	  and	  Delivery	  (3rd	  party)	   14.4%	   $21,868.65	  
Utilities	   2.6%	   $3,963.74	  
Facility	  Rental	   2.3%	   $3,501.52	  
2012	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  
expenses	   Expense	  
Labor	  and	  Employment	  Costs	   56.2%	   $110,344.13	  
Truck	  expenses	  (rent,	  maintenance,	  repairs,	  fuel)	   15.0%	   $29,541.27	  
Shipping	  and	  Delivery	  (3rd	  party)	   11.3%	   $22,127.50	  
Infrastructure	  Repairs	  &	  Maintenance	   3.1%	   $5,994.59	  
Utilities	   2.5%	   $5,008.83	  
2013	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  
expenses	   Expense	  
Labor	  and	  Employment	  Costs	   51.3%	   $166,025.60	  
Shipping	  and	  Delivery	  (3rd	  party)	   13.2%	   $42,668.70	  
Truck	  expenses	  (rent,	  maintenance,	  repairs,	  fuel)	   11.5%	   $37,353.54	  
Depreciation	  (adjusted)	   3.3%	   $10,731.88	  
Packaging	  Equipment	  and	  Supplies	   2.8%	   $8,905.20	  
In 2013, a large depreciation expense resulted from the acquisition of a capital lease on a 
new truck.  Since a capital lease involves placing the leased asset on the balance sheet, it is 
associated with a depreciation expense.  In this case, the food hub originally depreciated the 
entire value of the truck in the first year.  Without adjustments for straight-line depreciation, the 
depreciation expense would have been the second-largest expense in 2013.  This illustrates the 
large impact that depreciation can have on measures of expense and profitability. 
The appearance of packaging supplies in the top five expenses in 2013 suggests that after 
labor and trucking, packaging supplies were the food hub’s largest variable cost.  High 
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packaging costs often seem to be associated with food box programs, since they typically require 
repacking products into individual containers for each delivery.  It makes sense that variable 
costs such as packaging would start to surpass overhead costs as the food hub’s sales grew. 
Overall, this food hub had the strongest financial position of the four cases.  After 
struggling with prior losses which had left it with a Debt-Asset Ratio over 100% in the years 
before the study period, it was finally enjoying consistently positive profit.  It had relatively high 
efficiency as measured by labor costs as well as overall operating costs.  It was also continuing to 
grow its business revenue at a fast rate comparable to that of the younger hubs, with 55% growth 
in the final year of the study. However, managers still experienced challenges with farmers 
selling “around the hub” to customers cultivated by the hub.  They also struggled with the 
apparently higher costs of longer-distance delivery services, and how to price these services 
appropriately.  Negotiating pricing policy changes with farmer-members remained a difficult 
prospect for managers. 
Notes on adjustments for Case 1:  The set of standard adjustments described in the 
Methods chapter were made to Food Hub 1’s figures. Depreciation was adjusted to reflect 
straight-line depreciation over seven years for vehicles and depreciation over 15 years for 
facilities and equipment.  Accrual adjustments were not necessary because the food hub was 
already operating on an accrual basis.  Grants and some grant expenses were monitored in 
separate accounts from business expenses, so it was not difficult to calculate key metrics both 
with and without grants. 
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4.2.2  Overview of Case 2 
Food Hub 2 has a for-profit structure and, like Food Hub 1, utilizes two main sales 
outlets: a direct-to-consumer food box program and a wholesale program.  In contrast to Food 
Hub 1, however, this food hub made 90% of its sales in 2014 through the food box program and 
the remainder through its new (but rapidly growing) wholesale program.  Food box prepayments 
arrive at several times throughout the year, based on seasonal subscriptions, and managers report 
that the prepayments are beneficial for cash flow.  The food hub takes ownership of all products.  
It rents its facilities but mainly owns its trucks.  A financial summary and comparison of key 
metrics for Food Hub 2 are shown in Tables 11 and 12. 
This food hub grew steadily from 2012 to 2014 in terms of gross revenues and number of 
staff.  Net margin (profit) was close to zero in 2012, negative in 2013, and moderately large in 
2014, showing some volatility in the food hub’s profitability.  (The volatility was much larger 
before adjustments for straight-line depreciation were made; the food hub originally showed a 
loss of more than 9% in 2013.)  Grant and charitable income only had a noticeable impact on the 
food hub in 2014, when it constituted 3.8% of total income.  In that final year, the hub received a 
grant which it converted immediately into a fixed asset, improving its solvency position. 
Before adjustments were made to this food hub’s balance sheet data, it appeared to have 
become insolvent when it incurred losses in 2013, and stayed insolvent in 2014.  After we 
adjusted the balance sheet data (reflecting straight-line depreciation and no grant liability) the 
food hub was shown to have became highly leveraged in 2013, but never insolvent.  During the 
study period this food hub enjoyed very high average gross margins compared to other food 
hubs, and certainly compared to conventional industries.  In 2014 these came largely from its 
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Table 11:  Financial Summary for Food Hub 2 
Table 12:  Key Metrics for Food Hub 2  
Measures in blue are based on year-end rather than average data, in cases where data was not available from the previous year. 
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Table 12:  Key Metrics for Food Hub 2 (continued) 
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retail program as opposed to its newer wholesale program, which operated at a lower margin.  
Keeping pace with the large margins, the food hub also had high operating costs.  
These may be associated with its focus on resource- and labor-intensive retail sales.  They may 
also reflect opportunities to improve operational efficiency. 
Table 13 gives a breakdown of the food hub’s top five operating expenses. 
Table 13:  Food Hub 2:  Top 5 Operating Expense Categories, Largest to Smallest 
Note:  This table reflects straight-line depreciation of facilities and equipment over 15 years and vehicles 
over 7 years.  This adjustment reduced deprecation from about $98,000 to about $15,000 in 2013.  It 
dramatically decreased the apparent Operating Profit Margin losses in 2013. 
2012	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  expenses	   Expense	  
Payroll	   65.1%	   $124,793	  
Event	  Costs	   4.6%	   $8,883	  
Depreciation	  (adjusted)	   4.4%	   $8,338	  
Banking	  Fees	   4.3%	   $8,216	  
Vehicle	  Expenses	   3.3%	   $6,263	  
2013	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  expenses	   Expense	  
Payroll	   38.3%	   $155,298	  
Professional	  Services	   22.5%	   $91,215	  
Vehicle	  Expenses	   5.9%	   $24,089	  
Depreciation	  (adjusted)	   3.7%	   $14,999	  
Banking	  Fees	   3.0%	   $12,267	  
2014	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  expenses	   Expense	  
Payroll	   47.8%	   $228,099	  
Infrastructure	  Expenses	   10.0%	   $47,486	  
Banking	  Fees	   4.1%	   $19,698	  
Vehicle	  Expenses	  	   3.9%	   $18,538	  
Packaging	   3.5%	   $16,476	  
Depreciation	  (adjusted)	   2.0%	   $9,581	  
Over time, variable costs (costs that increase as output increases) crept higher in the list 
of top operating expenses.  Credit card processing fees (to receive online customer payments), 
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packaging, payroll and vehicle expenses are all largely variable costs.  Their increase makes 
sense given that sales volume was increasing.  As the food hub continues to grow its wholesale 
program, it will need to pay close attention to variable costs.  Because working with larger 
customers will involve accepting a lower gross margin, by necessity it must also involve lower 
variable costs per sales dollar than the direct-to-consumer program.  
Food Hub 2 ended the study period with high net income for a food hub (5.6%), 40% 
annual growth, a growing staff of enthusiastic, full-time individuals, and much lower labor costs 
than at the beginning of the study.  While it had struggled with profitability and solvency, it 
appeared to be in a good position for continued growth.    
Notes on adjustments for Case 2:  For a food hub operating on a cash basis, we would 
ordinarily make accrual adjustments so that revenue, expenses and net income reflect business 
activities that were actually conducted in each fiscal year.  However, no accrual adjustments 
were made to this hub’s income statements, because during the years when the food hub was 
operating on a cash basis (2011 through most of 2014), the food hub lacked consistent year-end 
records of inventory, Accounts Payable or Accounts Receivable.  The food hub switched to 
accrual accounting during 2014.   
Depreciation, which accounted for a large portion of expenses in some years, was 
adjusted to reflect the straight-line method.  These adjustments noticeably impacted the data 
from the income statements as well as the balance sheets.  In the adjustments we also removed a 
grant that was listed as a current liability in 2014, so that it would not have a negative effect on 
the hub’s financial position.  With the adjustment, the grant funds appear similar to owner-
contributed capital and add to the food hub’s equity.   
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4.2.3  Overview of Case 3 
Food Hub 3 is a non-profit organization that operates several different food-related 
programs.  Like Food Hubs 1 and 2, it has a wholesale program and a direct-to-consumer retail 
food box program.  These aggregate and deliver a variety of products to customers, including 
fresh produce and shelf-stable value-added items.  The organization also conducts other activities 
beyond its food hub functions.   
At the recommendation of the managers, we tried to focus our analysis only on the 
wholesale and direct-to-consumer food box parts of the business, because they were the activities 
that most resembled the activities of the other food hubs in our study.  Wherever possible we 
calculated metrics using income and expense data solely from those two programs.  Making 
things easier, the food hub tracked expenses and income separately for each of its programs in 
the last two years of the study.  However, infrastructure used for food hub activities was shared 
with other programs, so it was sometimes difficult to determine which assets and expenses 
belonged to the food hub component of the organization. 
Unlike the other hubs in our study, this food hub uses a brokerage model for the 
wholesale portion of its activities.  It does not take ownership of products, but rather charges a 
fixed percentage brokerage fee, which is added to the price offered by farmers.  For the retail 
food box program, it purchases products outright and packs them at its rented facility.  For the 
most part, the food hub does its own delivery, using a truck that it also rents. 
A financial summary and key metrics calculated for Food Hub 3 are shown in Tables 14 
and 15.  Note that because we only had two years of financial statements in which income 
statements were broken down by program, we could only show two years of data in the financial 
summaries.  Also, because a program-by-program breakdown of expenses was available for this  
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Table 14:  Financial Summary for Food Hub 3 
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Table 14:  Financial Summary for Food Hub 3 (continued) 
Table 15:  Key Metrics for Food Hub 3  
Measures in blue are based on year-end rather than average data, in cases where data was not available from the previous year. 
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Table 15:  Key Metrics for Food Hub 3 (continued) 
67 
 
 
food hub, we added separate summaries of the wholesale and retail programs to our standard 
financial summary template. 
As seen in the financial summary, Food Hub 3 grew its sales by 55% in 2012 and by 26% 
in 2013, 2013, but only grew 9% in 2014.  Staff FTE did increase during this time, however, and 
so did operating costs, which contributed to negative profit in 2014.  The relative contributions 
of the food box and wholesale programs to total sales did not vary greatly over the three years.  If 
food-box food costs are not counted as part of wholesale sales, then wholesale comprised 84%, 
80%, and 83% of food hub business income in 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively.  Retail (food 
box) sales comprised the remainder of sales. 
Individually, both the wholesale and the food box programs saw positive profits in 2013 
and small losses in 2014, not counting grant revenue.  The total food hub activities (combining 
wholesale and food box sales) also produced small positive profits in 2013 (1.8%) and small 
losses in 2014 (-0.2%), again not counting grant revenue.  If grant funding is considered, the 
food hub saw a positive profit from the two combined operations in both years.  However, 
charitable funding comprised only a small portion of the total income for the two programs, 1.9-
2.6%. This is less charitable funding than the “average” food hub used in the Food Hub 
Benchmarking Study. 
A breakdown of the food hub’s top five expenses is shown in Table 16.  The top three 
operating costs similar same in both years.  Increases in labor costs (as seen also in the increased 
Labor to Sales Ratio) may have been the main contributor to the net loss in 2014.  This may have 
been linked to a mission-driven effort by the food hub to move away from contracted labor and 
towards employee labor.  The depreciation allocated to the wholesale and retail programs also 
68 
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Table 16:  Food Hub 3:  Top 5 Expense Categories, Largest to Smallest 
 
2013	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  expenses	   Expense	  
Labor	  and	  Employment	  Costs	   61.5%	   $287,983.04	  
Truck	  expenses	  (rent,	  repairs,	  fuel,	  insurance)	   21.1%	   $98,823.51	  
Facility	  Rental	   6.6%	   $30,891.00	  
Production	  supplies	   2.2%	   $10,174.10	  
Data	  and	  Computer	  Services	   2.0%	   $9,282.81	  
	   	   	  
2014	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  expenses	   Expense	  
Labor	  and	  Employment	  Costs	   63.0%	   $355,903.36	  
Truck	  expenses	  (rent,	  maintenance,	  repairs,	  fuel)	   20.9%	   $117,882.12	  
Facility	  Rental	   6.4%	   $36,318.00	  
Bank	  Service	  Charges	   2.5%	   $14,097.32	  
Depreciation	  (adjusted)	   1.6%	   $9,260.28	  
 
 
increased in 2014 as the food hub made investments in new equipment.  These cost increases 
occurred even with the slow sales growth from 2013 to 2014.  As we will see, this food hub 
could probably look at ways to increase its staff’s efficiency at generating sales, but its total 
operating costs were not unreasonable for a business that generates most of its revenue through 
wholesale.  Like most food hubs, the nonprofit Food Hub 3 articulated a strong values-based 
commitment to the mission of serving farmers and of making local food more widely available to 
customers.  Managers were not explicitly interested in making a profit, but said they sought to 
cover programmatic costs and some of the overhead shared with other initiatives.  Taken 
together, the financial performance of the wholesale and food box programs seems consistent 
with the managers’ stated objectives.  If the food hub’s sales growth continues to be small 
relative to its prior growth rate, the next challenge may be adjusting to this new phase of slower 
growth and/or finding new ways to expand. 
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This food hub showed a reasonably strong financial position overall.  It compared well to 
its peers in terms of low operating costs, low staffing costs, good liquidity and a good solvency 
position.  Not taking ownership of wholesale product means that the food hub faces few risks 
from product shrinkage and does not have its cash tied up in unsold inventory.  Products flowing 
through the hub do not belong to the food hub and are usually already sold by the time they 
arrive.  The smaller retail program complements the wholesale model by providing prepaid sales, 
which are also good for cash flow and for expanding the food hub’s marketing presence in the 
community. 
This food hub’s business model illustrates how bundling multiple sets of services 
together may make it possible to do “more with less.”  The food hub’s wholesale and retail 
programs may have benefitted from sharing administration, management and other overhead 
with other enterprises owned by the same firm.  These functions may have been performed more 
efficiently because they were being performed at a larger scale than if they only existed for the 
wholesale and retail portions of the business.  The business probably also benefitted from 
economies of scope in which its various marketing and sales activities complemented one 
another.  It is worth noting that although Food Hub 3 was not the oldest hub in our study, it had 
by far the largest annual sales revenue, over $2.2 million.  It had been able to build a substantial 
customer base in a relatively short span of time.  The diversity of Food Hub 3’s set of services, 
each of which targeted a slightly different clientele, probably contributed to this by raising its 
overall profile and visibility.   
Food Hub 3 also set a strong example with the setup of its financial statements.  Because 
the organization sought to measure the net income (or losses) from each of its many programs, it 
separated its programs into different accounting classes in QuickbooksTM.  This made it easier to 
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compare operating expenses between the wholesale and retail programs and to see how each 
program was contributing to overall profit.  
Notes on Adjustments and Calculations for Case 3:  As noted, this food hub never 
allocated assets or liabilities on its balance sheet among programs.  As a result, we could not 
calculate any metrics solely for two food hub programs in 2012, but we did calculate metrics for 
2013 and 2014.  Metrics that depended on balance sheet data could not be calculated exclusively 
for the two food hub programs.  However, we could (and did) calculate them using balance sheet 
data for the whole business.   
Days Payable and Days Receivable could only be calculated for the end of 2014, the year 
when the organization began to track receivables.  For an outsider, these metrics were difficult to 
interpret for Food Hub 3 because the Accounts Receivable and Accounts Payable on the balance 
sheet were for all parts of the business, not just the retail food box and wholesale programs.  
Also, wholesale Receivables were being uploaded to QuickbooksTM from sales software, so it 
wasn’t clear whether the receivables in QuickbooksTM were accurate or up-to-date at a given 
point in time.  In an effort to measure only receivables from relevant business transactions, some 
receivables that were clearly not from wholesale or food box customers were removed from the 
Days Receivable calculation.     
There may have been some relevant staffing, marketing and administrative costs that 
didn’t appear in our analysis because they were allocated to the other enterprises (other P&L 
classes in QuickbooksTM) that were outside of our analysis. For example, no accounting or 
general liability insurance expenses were allocated to the wholesale and retail programs of the 
food hub.  In reality, the food hub was probably sharing some accounting and insurance costs 
  
 
 
72 
with other programs.  If this is true, then the actual operating costs would be higher than what is 
reflected in our analysis.   
Food Hub 3 also required special consideration because it operates partly on a brokerage 
basis, without taking ownership of product, and is therefore difficult to compare to businesses 
that do take ownership.  In our analysis, we adjusted the food hub’s figures to reflect what the 
food hub’s income statements and metrics would look like if the hub were taking ownership.  
That is to say, total wholesale sales (including the portion that passes through to farmers) were 
treated as gross revenue, and pass-through to farmers was treated as Cost of Goods Sold 
(COGS).  Gross margins for the wholesale program and for the overall business were calculated 
using this information, and so were the other metrics like the Labor to Sales Ratio.  This made it 
possible to see how Food Hub 3 compares to food hubs in the Food Hub Benchmarking Study, 
and to other businesses that do not use a brokerage model. 
The standard set of adjustments presented in Chapter 3 were also applied.  These 
included making adjustments for straight line depreciation, and moving the cost of box materials 
from Costs of Goods Sold into the operating expenses.   
 
4.2.4  Overview of Case 4 
 Food Hub 4 is a cooperative that sells a varied product line of produce, meats, dairy, and 
frozen goods to exclusively wholesale outlets.  It does not operate any direct-to-consumer retail 
programs.  Some unique aspects of this food hub’s business model cause its expenses to look 
different from those of the other hubs in the study.  It relies on partners for the majority of its 
hauling and owns no trucks.  Partly as a result, its customer base is highly concentrated, meaning 
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that it does not have many direct customers.  It also rents its facility, so overall its freight and 
infrastructure costs are relatively low.  It is the youngest of the food hubs in our case study.    
Tables 17 and 18 show a financial summary and key metrics for Food Hub 4.  It 
experienced very rapid growth in 2012-2014, with a sales increase of 101% (or about $210,000 
in additional sales) in 2014.  However, as a relatively new business, its total revenue ($424,000 
in 2014) remained very small compared to that of other firms in our case study. The food hub 
also experienced very narrow gross margins, which made finances challenging.  This is partly 
explained, but not fully explained, by the fact that the food hub was competing in the landscape 
of wholesale prices and relying on partners to do the actual distribution of its products.  The 
margins used by the hub were well below the benchmarks for broadline wholesale.        
The food hub was able to subsidize its growth during its startup period with charitable 
funding; in any given year, 11-16% of revenues came from grants, and most of the remainder 
came from sales.  The business also generated small revenues from other sources such as 
membership fees, rent, and interest.  Still, the business faced large negative profits each year 
during 2012-2014.  In the metrics, this is shown to be true even if grant income is considered to 
be revenue.  
Food Hub 4 was capitalized by a combination of investor equity, grants and (to a lesser 
extent) co-op member equity.  All of the business’ equity was owned by investors and co-op 
members.  Because it never made a profit, it had no retained earnings or unallocated member 
equity.  Shareholder and member equity served to buffer each year’s losses.  Although the hub 
did not make a profit, a dividend was still paid in each year.  (Note:  in our calculations we 
counted the dividends as a deduction from net income and did not consider them to be expenses.)   
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Table 17:  Financial Summary for Food Hub 4  
 
Table 18:  Key Metrics for Food Hub 4 
75 
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Table 18:  Key Metrics for Food Hub 4 (continued)  
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After several unprofitable years the food hub became insolvent, and it was facing liquidity 
problems by the end of 2014. 
Financial statements were well-organized and included important basic information that 
our other cases failed to track, including Accounts Payable, Accounts Receivable, Inventory, and 
line items for shrink and for quality-related customer credits. All statements were on an accrual 
basis.  This made it easier to analyze the data than for some of our other cases. 
A breakdown of the food hub’s top five operating expenses is shown in Table 19. 
Table 19:  Food Hub 4:  Top 5 Operating Expense Categories, Largest to Smallest 
2012	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  expenses	   Expense	  
Labor	  and	  Employment	  Costs	   57.0%	   $57,172.93	  
Advertising	  and	  marketing	  	   12.1%	   $12,129.29	  
Insurance	   10.6%	   $10,645.79	  
Facility	  Rental	   6.3%	   $6,300.00	  
Printing	  &	  Reproduction	   4.4%	   $4,413.89	  
2013	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  expenses	   Expense	  
Labor	  and	  Employment	  Costs	   59.5%	   $57,641.41	  
Professional	  Services	   13.2%	   $12,795.95	  
Insurance	   11.4%	   $11,026.75	  
Facility	  Rental	   7.4%	   $7,200.00	  
Freight	   5.2%	   $5303.50	  
2014	  
%	  of	  total	  
operating	  expenses	   Expense	  
Labor	  and	  Employment	  Costs	   36.9%	   $78,686.46	  
Professional	  Services	   33.0%	   $70,290.88	  
Insurance	   5.7%	   $12,132.32	  
Facility	  Rental	   4.3%	   $9,150.00	  
Advertising	  and	  Marketing	   3.4%	   $7,166.04	  
As with the other case study hubs, staffing was the largest expense for Food Hub 4.  All 
of its labor was hourly and there was a cap on the number of paid hours per staff person per 
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week.  The hub showed a steady proportional decrease in its labor expenses (as seen in the Labor 
to Sales Ratio) during the study period.  Because it did not have many variable costs other than 
hourly labor and COGS, the largest cost categories were primarily overhead costs, with the 
exception of freight in 2013.  Several of the larger expenses, including Advertising and 
Marketing, Printing and Reproduction, and some of the Professional Services, were probably for 
grant-funded promotional startup activities.  These investments make sense in a new business’ 
early years.   Insurance costs were large for a food hub of this size, but evidently a $10 million 
insurance policy was required for dealing with one particular customer.   
Dividends were not considered to be an expense in our calculation of Operating Profit 
Margin, operating expenses or net margin; as noted we considered dividends to be part of net 
income.  Net income was always negative, though.  Clearly, paying out dividends in unprofitable 
years affected both the organization’s cash flow and its long-term reserves.  It also further eroded 
the equity held be members.  One could even say that the dividends received by shareholders 
were being subsidized by the equity contributed by members.  Our interviews indicated that the 
co-op paid a 5% dividend to holders of preferred stock each year or rolled the dividend over into 
additional stock.  One question raised by our reviewers was whether the co-op could take the 
roll-over option, rather than paying out a dividend, in order to boost cash flow.   
Notes on adjustments for Case 4: No accrual adjustments were made to Food Hub 4’s 
financial statements because the statements were already on an accrual basis.  Depreciation 
adjustments were not needed because depreciation was a negligible cost for this hub.  The only 
adjustment we made for Food Hub 4 was to remove freight costs from Costs of Goods Sold and 
add them to operating costs, because all of the freight costs were for outbound freight (i.e. 
delivery to customers), according to managers.  In our analyses we consider outbound freight to 
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be a Cost of Sales, not a Cost of Goods Sold.  If the food hub had inbound freight expenses, we 
would treat them as a Cost of Goods Sold. 
 
We have shared an overview of the four food hubs that were part of our comparative 
study, and how their data were manipulated for analysis.  Next we will provide a more 
systematic summary of the results. 
 
4.3  Key Metrics:  Discussion of Results Across Case Studies  
In our initial research questions for the comparative case study, we asked:  how can a set 
of financial metrics be used to evaluate the performance of a particular food hub and to direct 
managerial decision-making in the future?  In this section we apply our dashboard of key metrics 
from Chapter 3 to the four case study hubs and interpret the results.  As in the dashboard of 
metrics, our analysis is organized into four sub-sections: “cash flow and liquidity,” “efficiency,” 
“profitability,” and “repayment capacity and solvency.”  
 
4.3.1  Cash Flow and Liquidity Metrics 
In this section, we consider metrics related to cash flow, or the amount of money 
available to pay bills, and liquidity, or the ability of the business to pay current debts without 
liquidating long-term assets.  Metrics related to cash flow include Days Receivable (DR: average 
number of days that receivables are outstanding), Days in Inventory (DI: the average number of 
days that items stay in inventory) and Days Payable Outstanding (DPO: the average number of 
days that payables are outstanding).  DR, DI and DPO together make up the Cash Conversion 
  
 
 
80 
Cycle (CCC), which measures how long it takes to convert the cost of goods purchased from 
farmers (Costs of Goods Sold) into cash from sales.  The CCC can be calculated as follows:   
DR + DI – DPO = CCC 
The shorter the Cash Conversion Cycle, the more cash the food hub will have available to 
finance the costs of its own growth.  A short CCC means that cash flow is keeping pace with the 
sales growth of the business, rather than lagging behind.  This increases the food hub’s ability to 
self-finance its growth using its own cash, at zero interest.  Due to limited information we could 
not calculate the Cash Conversion Cycle for most of the case study hubs in most years.  
However, the individual components of the cycle, and especially the relationship between 
Accounts Payable and Receivable, still say a great deal about cash flow.  
To measure liquidity in general, we use the Current Ratio, which shows the degree to 
which the food hub can cover its short-term debt and other short-term liabilities without selling 
off its fixed assets.  
 
Days Receivable:  Some food hubs were using cash accounting (as opposed to accrual 
accounting) at the beginning of the study period, and Accounts Receivable were not recorded 
consistently by food hubs in those years, so Days Receivable measures could not be calculated 
for all hubs in all years.  However, we did have at least one year of receivables data from all four 
of the hubs.  
Food Hub 1 showed Days Receivable ranging between 12 and 16 days.  These were 
lower than the benchmarks of 22 days for broadline wholesalers and 30 days for produce 
wholesalers, indicating that the food hub collected Accounts Receivable from customers more 
quickly than other businesses.  Nonetheless, Food Hub 1’s average 2013 receivables ($59,637) 
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equaled a full 50.3% of its average total assets ($118,528).  This means that half the food hub’s 
assets were essentially tied up in no-interest loans to customers.  By way of comparison, the 
average broadline distributor in the Almanac of Business and Financial Ratios had receivables 
that were about 33% of total assets (Troy, 2013).  Receivables constituted a large portion of 
assets for the other food hubs as well. 
Because Food Hub 2 did not have a consistent system for tracking Accounts Receivable 
during 2012-2014, we were only able to calculate this measure for the end of 2014, using annual 
sales from 2014.  The result is a crude measure, but still interesting:  on average the hub was paid 
6.6 days after food was delivered.  The food hub’s figure was probably so low because of its 
prepaid food box program, in which many consumers paid for products long before they were 
delivered.     
The bad news not evident in Food Hub 2’s Days Receivable is that, in 2013 and 2014, 
they experienced significant problems collecting customer payments.  The problem was 
especially noticeable in the retail food box program, to the point that the hub had to “write off” 
(treat as a loss) a significant portion of its aged receivables.  Write-offs totaled $29,160 in 2013, 
or 3% of sales.  Viewed as an expense, write-offs were higher than the food hubs’s total vehicle 
expenses in that year.  Because the food hub still incurred Costs of Goods Sold for products that 
customers never paid for, these write-offs cut directly into the hub’s profits. If the written-off 
bills had been collected, the food hub’s profit in 2013 would have been 3% higher, transforming 
its net income from negative to profit for that year.  The hub’s managers attributed the problem 
of write-offs to its system of collecting personal checks for seasonal food box shares, sometimes 
on an installment basis.  Managers reported that after 2013 the hub started tracking payments 
more closely and accepting more online payment, and in 2014 the write-offs decreased.  
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However, it then had to pay credit card processing fees of more than 2% on its customer 
transactions, illustrating a tradeoff between accepting instant payment with credit cards or 
accepting delayed payment with checks.  
For Food Hub 3, the Days Receivable figure for the end of 2014 (2.7 days) was quite 
short compared with the benchmarks.  There are several plausible reasons for this.  First, the low 
Days Receivable would be consistent with Food Hub 3’s ongoing efforts to collect receivables 
more quickly, which one of the food hub managers described in interviews.  Second, it probably 
reflects the fact that 16-19% of sales came from prepaid food box deliveries, which typically add 
a zero or very low balance to Accounts Receivable.  Third, it may reflect aspects of the 
brokerage model, which does not require the food hub to purchase farmers’ products outright.  
Either way, the organization’s practices for collecting payment appeared to be good for cash 
flow. 
Since Food Hub 4 only sells wholesale, it seems appropriate to compare it to the 
Broadline Wholesale and Produce Wholesale benchmarks. Days Receivable for Food Hub 4 
were very long compared to the benchmarks in 2012 and 2013 (70.5-74.4 days), but less than the 
benchmarks in 2014 (18.8 days). This suggests that in 2014 Food Hub 4 may have altered its 
billing terms and collection practices to increase cash flow.  (Towards the end of 2014 the food 
hub had spent all its equity and suffered from low working capital, as we will see).  Even in 2014 
managers may have had reason to improve bill collection practices, though.  Based on a list of 
Accounts Receivable, the food hub’s largest customer was taking 30-90 days or more to pay 
some of its bills.  If this was a regular pattern, and especially if it violated payment terms, it 
needed to be addressed with the customer.        
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One useful practice employed by both Food Hubs 1 and 2 was to separate Accounts 
Receivable into subaccounts – including one for the retail program and one for the wholesale 
program.  This approach, mentioned by Food Hub 2’s accountant in our interviews, probably 
helped with setting and meeting targets for recovering receivables in each program.  Each 
business could then focus on shortening customer payment terms in the wholesale department 
(without “Days Receivable” being skewed by the prepaid boxes), and could work on eliminating 
aged payables for the prepaid food boxes.  For both food hubs, Days Receivable seemed to be 
drastically shorter for retail food box programs than for wholesale.  It is difficult to say whether 
this was generally true or seasonally dependent, since food box prepayments were only collected 
at certain times of year.  If it were generally true, then we would conclude that retail customers 
paid the food hubs much faster than wholesale customers.   
It seems intuitive that prepaid programs would shorten overall Days Receivable.  
However, an important point to notice is that Days Receivable only reflects the time between 
billing and payment.  It does not reflect the separation in time between when products are billed 
and when they are delivered.  Since most food box prepayments were received well in advance 
of product delivery, they acted as a source of early-season cash, which could then be drawn 
down over time to pay for expenses.  Cash flow statements would show this, but not necessarily 
Days Receivable.  When first switching to accrual accounting, Food Hub 2 recorded food box 
payments as “negative receivables,” which literally subtracted from overall Days Receivable and 
made the cash flow benefits of food boxes obvious.  This method is awkward for recordkeeping, 
however, and after the first year, Food Hub 2 began simply recording food box prepayments as 
cash assets, similarly to Food Hub 1.  We would expect some of the cash flow benefits of food 
box programs to show up in the Current Ratio, but they are difficult to see in our metrics. 
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Overall, we can observe that for the food hub that offered only wholesale, Days 
Receivable in the first two years were noticeably longer than in the benchmarks.   For the food 
hubs that had a retail component, Days Receivable were much shorter.  For the food hub that 
brokered most of its products, Days Payable and Receivable were both very short and probably 
less important for cash flow, because the hub was not taking ownership of the products. 
Finally, the example of Food Hub 2 reveals that aged receivables can be a major problem 
for profitability.  Conversations with other hubs have confirmed this.  In fact, on the National 
Good Food Network’s Food Hub Community of Practice listserv, one large hub reported an 
average of 35-45% receivables past due and about 1-1.5% write-offs.  Not all hubs can afford to 
extend this kind of credit or suffer this much loss.   
 
Days Payable Outstanding:  This measure also varied greatly and, like Days Receivable, could 
not be calculated in every year for all four food hubs.  However, we did receive at least one year 
of Accounts Payable data from each hub.   
Days Payable for Food Hub 1 were shorter than 30 days, but were consistently longer 
than Days Receivable, suggesting that its managers might have been using different payment 
terms on Accounts Payable and Receivable to generate cash.  Keeping receivables terms shorter 
than payment terms is a good practice for increasing cash flow, if cash is limited.  
Food Hub 2 only provided year-end payables data for 2014.  Based on this limited 
information, they appeared to be using a similar strategy to Food Hub 1, maintaining Days 
Receivable shorter than Days Payable. In its early years managers said they usually paid its 
farmers and suppliers immediately, but in late 2013 they changed their policy to improve cash 
flow.  By the end of 2014, the firm took an average of 25 days to pay its bills.  
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Days Payable for Food Hub 3 at the end of 2014 (1.0 days) were extremely low, 
assuming their recorded Accounts Payable really did reflect the full value of payables.  This 
would indicate that the food hub was paying its producers very quickly, almost immediately after 
receiving products.  Such a practice has many benefits for producers, and might be more feasible 
for a food hub using a brokerage model that sells products before they are ever brought to the 
food hub.  Having low Days Receivable and a cash cushion from unspent grant funds may have 
made it easier for Food Hub 3 to pay farmers quickly without experiencing a cash shortage.   
Food Hub 4 paid its producers quickly in 2012 and 2013.  It only showed Days Payable 
longer than Days Receivable in 2014, when other problems with the business probably created a 
need for cash flow.  The choice to wait longer to pay farmers may have been a response to a 
severe reduction in working capital, which resulted from negative profits over time, and limited 
cash, a result of holding large amounts of inventory.  (Notably, however, having larger payables 
than receivables reduces working capital in itself.)  The food hub may have been forced to 
extract more credit from its producers in order to cash flow its basic operations in 2014, or 
producers may have extended the additional credit voluntarily.   
In general, December Days Payable did not average more than 30 days for any of the 
hubs except in the last year of Food Hub 4’s records.  Given that United Fresh produce 
wholesalers report a Days Payable Outstanding of 47.8 days, conventional wisdom might suggest 
that everyone could lengthen their payment terms more.  It is likely that food hubs make a 
deliberate choice not to do so because of their values-based commitment to supporting farmers.  
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Days in Inventory:  Data on inventory was limited, but when measurable, Days in Inventory 
varied greatly according to business model.  Data to calculate Days in Inventory was available in 
at least one year from Food Hubs 1, 3 and 4.  
For Food Hub 1, which turned over most of its fresh products immediately but stored 
some over the winter, Days in Inventory were moderate and in the range of the benchmarks, 
between 7 and 12 days.  Food hub managers told us they held a larger amount of shelf-stable 
inventory in the winter than in the spring and summer.  If we had financial statements from the 
summer we might expect them to show faster inventory turns. 
For Food Hub 3, which brokered most of its products and purchased a relatively small 
quantity of products for its retail program, Days in Inventory were very short at 1.4 days  Food 
Hub 3 recorded inventory on the balance sheet for the wholesale program only.  This food hub’s 
“inventory” operated differently from inventory in a company that takes ownership of product.  
The value of inventory seemed to have been recorded in terms of sale price (i.e. gross revenue), 
rather than COGS, so we took the unusual step of calculating Days in Inventory as:   
365 Days x Inventory ÷ Total Annual Sales   
This metric should be numerically equivalent to typical Days Receivable.   The result 
shows that, if inventory held by the business at the end of December was typical, then wholesale 
items spent an average of 1.4 Days in Inventory before being sold.  The low number probably 
reflects how pre-selling products leads to swift product turnover.  (Technically, a business that 
does not take ownership of products should not record them as an inventory asset, so it might be 
more accurate to say that Days in Inventory was close to zero.  We are not exactly sure why the 
food hub chose to record inventory for the wholesale program.  Inventory for the food box 
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program, which the food hub did own, probably was not recorded because it turned over so 
quickly.) 
Food Hub 4 began tracking inventory in QuickbooksTM in 2013, probably because it was 
paying rent on its frozen product storage.  For this food hub, Days in Inventory (about 67 days) 
were much longer than industry benchmarks. Our interviews with staff suggest that turnover for 
fresh produce was very fast, usually within 24 hours.  Therefore, the inventory appearing on the 
food hub’s balance sheet was probably mostly frozen and value-added.  Managers of Food Hub 4 
told us that the hub’s ultimate goal was for fresh produce to comprise only 30% of total 
revenues, with most of the remaining 70% coming from sales of frozen products.  Obviously, 
keeping frozen inventory is a valuable part of the food hub’s business model, spreading out 
revenues from harvest-season produce throughout the year.  However, having such a large 
amount of Costs of Goods Sold tied up in inventory means that the food hub needs more working 
capital to operate.  This food hub should consider making a cash flow budget and tracking the 
holding costs of its inventory, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.  Long holding times for 
inventory may be partly responsible for the relatively large losses from shrink (spoilage) that the 
food hub reported. 
None of the food hubs seemed to be using a sophisticated system (such as an ERP) for 
inventory functions; they were storing their inventory data in QuickbooksTM.  Only one case 
study hub was tracking inventory at the beginning of the three-year study period.  By the end of 
the study period, three of the four were tracking inventory. These observations suggest that 
inventory management tends not to become a priority for food hubs until they start to mature.  
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Current Ratio:  Like Days Receivable, Days Payable, and Days in Inventory, our Current Ratio 
calculations represent only a snapshot of each company based on December balance sheets.  
Current Ratios likely varied throughout the growing season in tandem with current liabilities 
such as Accounts Payable and current assets such as Accounts Receivable, cash and inventory.  
For example, current assets might be higher in months when food box prepayments are received.    
Nonetheless, the December Current Ratios provide enough information to identify working 
capital constraints for some of the food hubs.  Furthermore, if food hubs were experiencing 
problems with liquidity in December, which is usually at the end of the busy season, then it 
seems even more likely that they were struggling in March, when food hub sales tend to be the 
lowest, or at the beginning of the summer, when rapid increases in sales sometimes put a strain 
on available cash. 
For Food Hub 1, the average Current Ratio was <1 in the first two years, but >1 
(although still low) in the third year.  This suggests that on average, in its first two years, the 
food hub experienced negative working capital and may have had trouble meeting its payment 
obligations.  Most likely, the hub survived its liquidity constraints by delaying payments to 
farmers and by obtaining new loans from co-op members, which appear on the balance sheets at 
the end of those years.  The situation appears to have improved in 2013, when the average 
Current Ratio increased to 1.22.  This figure is still low compared to the benchmarks.  However, 
a low Current Ratio is more acceptable for a business like Food Hub 1 that makes frequent sales 
and sells its inventory reasonably quickly. 
For Food Hub 2, this measure could only be calculated for the end of 2014, when the 
adjusted Current Ratio was 0.3.   This Current Ratio of <1 raises a “red flag,” indicating that the 
hub at that time would not have been able to pay off all its current liabilities using only its 
89 
current assets.  However, a closer look at the list of current liabilities shows that several of them 
were not actually required to be paid off within the year.  For example, a short-term loan from 
the owner to the business appeared in current liabilities.  This loan reflected capital that the 
owner has contributed to the business, but hoped to recover.  As noted in Chapter 2, representing 
this kind of capital as a short-term loan may be appealing, because it makes the capital easy for 
the owner to retrieve (Levin & Travis, 1987).  In this case, however, the owner did not actually 
take back all the funds at the end of any year, so showing them as a current liability served to 
make short-term obligations appear larger than they really were. 
Still, the food hub may have been having trouble meeting its short-term obligations at the 
end of 2014.  Like many hubs, Food Hub 2 heavily used cost-free short-term sources of credit, 
such as pre-paid sales and Accounts Payable, to cheaply finance their operation.  This made 
current liabilities large.  In fact, they constituted 79% of total liabilities and 155% of total assets 
– playing a key role in the food hub’s insolvency problem, which we will discuss later.  (By
comparison, current liabilities on average make up 72.5% of total assets for conventional 
produce wholesalers.) 
For Food Hub 3, since assets on the balance sheets were not allocated among programs, 
it was not possible to calculate the Current Ratio for only the retail and wholesale food hub 
programs.  We did, however, calculate the Current Ratio for the whole business.  This ratio 
reflects relevant current assets and liabilities as well as those unrelated to the food box and 
wholesale program.  Still, the Current Ratio gives a general sense of organizational liquidity.  
The calculated ratio of 2.1 in 2014 shows that the organization was maintaining good liquidity, 
on a par with Food Hub Benchmarking Study averages and better than the benchmark for the 
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conventional wholesale industry.  The organization’s other non-food-hub enterprises were 
heavily grant-funded, and grant funding may have helped contribute to working capital.   
Food Hub 4’s average Current Ratios in 2013 and 2014 were lower than benchmarks, 
but higher than 1.  Sources of working capital used by Food Hub 4 during this time included 
shareholder equity, grant funding, and an operating loan.  Until late 2014, these sources of 
capital probably helped buffer the shortage of cash created by continually negative profit, long 
receivables terms, short payables terms, and slow turnover of frozen inventory.  However, by the 
end of 2014 (not shown in the averages in Table 17), the food hub had run through its cash 
reserves and the Current Ratio was at 0.85.  At this point, current assets were less than current 
liabilities, and the business was probably squeezed for cash.  Businesses like Food Hub 4 that 
have long Days in Inventory typically need a larger Current Ratio since some of their working 
capital is trapped in inventory, making the situation even more pressing.  Since almost all of the 
assets owned by Food Hub 4 were current assets, the Current Ratio strongly impacted the debt-
asset ratio.   
 
To summarize results of the cash and liquidity measures, three of the four food hubs did 
experience negative working capital at some point (Current Ratio <1), which is consistent with 
what we would expect based on the literature (Welsh & White, 1981; Vanderburgh-Wertz & 
Ram Moraghan, 2014). Three of the hubs did seem to be using the practice of maintaining Days 
Payable longer than Days Receivable to generate cash flow, based on the patterns in the metrics 
and by their own admission in interviews.  However, they were all able to pay their farmers and 
suppliers within 30 days, unless they were experiencing severe financial hardship (as with Food 
Hub 4 in its final year).  Results from Food Hub 4 illustrate that it may be more difficult to 
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negotiate short Receivables when working with exclusively wholesale buyers.  The relative Days 
Receivable for the wholesale vs. retail outlets of Food Hubs 1 and 2 support this.  Conversely, 
the very short Days Receivable associated with retail food box programs at Food Hubs 1, 2 and 3 
showed positive benefits for cash flow, although they did not always result in a strong Current 
Ratio.  Finally, the case of Food Hub 4 shows how continually negative profits can eventually 
erode the Current Ratio, even if the business starts out with a large cushion of working capital. 
 
4.3.2  Efficiency Metrics 
For food hubs, efficiency is closely tied to profitability.  In this section we look at several 
measures of labor efficiency, which are important because labor is the number one operating 
expense for most food hubs.  Additionally, to measure overall efficiency in using assets to 
generate sales, we consider Asset Turnover.  As measures of efficiency and risk we also 
recommend that food hubs calculate customer and vendor concentration, but unfortunately we 
did not have enough data to do so in our case studies. 
In analyzing labor performance, the Food Hub Benchmarking Study recommends looking 
at costs (via Labor to Sales Ratio and labor costs per worker equivalent), sales (via Sales per 
Worker Equivalent), and efficiency in converting worker time into sales. As a measure of overall 
efficiency we look at Asset Turnover, which shows how efficiently the business uses its assets to 
generate revenues.  This measure is impacted by the use of fixed assets and infrastructure, as 
well as its monetary assets. 
 
Labor to Sales Ratio:  According to the benchmarks, food hubs tend to spend more on staffing 
and labor expenses (18.3% of sales revenue according to the Food Hub Benchmarking Study) 
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than broad-line grocery wholesalers (3.6% of sales revenue) or conventional grocers (6.3% of 
sales revenue).  Our case study findings support this observation.  Food hubs may spend more on 
labor because of the additional services they offer, such as working with smaller producers, 
adding value through point of sale materials, providing supply chain transparency, or offering 
education.  It may also be because food hubs pay workers a better wage, substitute less labor 
with technology, or experience scale-related inefficiencies in comparison to multimillion dollar 
conventional wholesalers.     
For example, Food Hub 1 spent more of its revenue on labor (11-13%) than wholesale or 
conventional businesses did.  However, it spent consistently less than the food hub benchmark 
(18.3%) and the other case study hubs.  Labor to Sales Ratios decreased slightly over time, 
suggesting improvements in labor efficiency.  Since Food Hub 1 was the oldest food hub in our 
study, they may have been enjoying the benefits of experienced staff, improved process 
efficiency and strategic technology investments that improved the cost-effectiveness of their staff 
time.    
For Food Hub 2, the 2012 portion of revenue that was spent on labor (21.4%) was larger 
than the food hub benchmark.  The hub spent somewhat less than the benchmark in 2013 
(16.8%) and 2014 (17.6%).  The owner described 2014 as being a year “heavy on payroll 
expenses” because they were “investing in a team.”  However, in actuality expenses increased by 
less than 1% that year, and the firm also enjoyed gains in efficiency, as we will see later.  Food 
Hub 2 seemed to be headed in the right direction with regard to labor expenditures.  
For Food Hub 3, Labor to Sales Ratios (14.1% in 2013 and 17.3% in 2014) were 
consistently below the averages from the Food Hub Benchmarking Study.  This may partly 
reflect the food hub’s ability to allocate costs across its multiple programs, so that its more 
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profitable programs could absorb the administrative staff costs of its less profitable programs.  
Also, the hub may have created efficiencies in overhead staffing costs by spreading them across 
multiple programs.   
Since Food Hub 3 tracked labor expenses for each program, it was possible to calculate 
the Labor to Sales Ratio by program (counting sales and fees, but not charitable funding, as part 
of each program’s income):  
 
2014 Labor to Sales Ratios by Program 
Wholesale:  12.21%   
Retail / Food Box: 25.5% 
Overall:  17.3% 
 
As shown, 2014 labor costs per revenue dollar in the retail program were about half those 
in the wholesale program.  This makes sense because of the labor-intensive nature of the retail 
food box program, which requires managing numerous customers and drop-off sites and packing 
thousands of individual food boxes.  It illustrates why retail requires a higher margin than 
wholesale to be profitable.  (Note that sales made from the wholesale program to the food box 
program are counted twice in the program-specific figures; we did not attempt to split them out 
because those sales were associated with labor costs in both programs.) 
Food Hub 4 had a Labor to Sales Ratio that was very high in 2012, but decreased sharply 
in 2013 and fell very close to the Food Hub Benchmarking Study averages by 2014.  This 
suggests that over time the food hub became much more efficient at converting labor expenses 
into sales.  It is worth noting, however, that labor costs alone exceeded the hub’s entire gross 
margin in all three years.  
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Overall, Labor to Sales Ratios varied from food hub to food hub.  Two of the cases had 
ratios higher than the food hub benchmarks, suggesting less efficient use of labor dollars; the 
other two had ratios lower than the benchmarks.  The two hubs with the lowest ratios were the 
oldest food hub and the food hub that shared administrative and managerial staff with other 
enterprises.  Many other factors probably combined to affect the Labor to Sales Ratio, including 
food hub age, managerial practices, staff training, staff turnover, use of labor-saving equipment, 
and relative volume of sales in labor-intensive retail programs. 
 
Sales per Worker Equivalent:  We were able to calculate Sales per Worker Equivalent for Food 
Hubs 2, 3 and 4 given available data.  Doing so required determining how many Full Time 
Equivalents (FTEs) of staff hours were used by each food hub in each year.  In our results, all 
three case study hubs had Sales per Worker Equivalent measures that were noticeably lower than 
the food hub benchmark.  At first glance, this implies that their activities were more labor 
intensive and/or less efficient than those of other hubs.   
For Food Hub 2, for example, Sales per Worker Equivalent in 2012 and 2014 was less 
than half that of the “average” food hub.  One possible reason would be that they did more 
direct-to-consumer retail (90%-100% of sales) than the average hub in the benchmarking study 
(for which direct-to-consumer markets comprised 39.17% of sales).  Retail sales usually require 
more staff time for packing, customer service, etc. than wholesale.  This labor intensiveness may 
have paid for itself, since retail sales fetched an unusually high gross margin for Food Hub 2.  
However, as the business scales up its lower-margin wholesale program, it would be useful to 
take a close look at staffing efficiency and to set targets for future performance.   
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Food Hub 2 also provided us with payroll information that enabled us to view their labor 
usage in greater detail.  One interesting observation was that the number of seasonal employee 
FTEs nearly doubled from 2012 to 2013, comprising about half of the total hours worked during 
the hub’s least profitable year.  The number of different individuals working seasonally also 
appeared to increase that year.  The food hub greatly reduced its labor costs from 2012 to 2013 
when it used more seasonal workers, but Sales per Worker Equivalent also dropped.   In 2014, 
the hub decreased its seasonal workers back to 2012 levels and hired more salaried staff.  Even 
with the time it took to train these new staff, Sales per Worker Equivalent increased by about 9% 
while only increasing the Labor to Sales Ratio by 0.8% of sales.  In interviews, one of the 
managers said that the food hub was “done with [using] seasonal labor” in 2014 and had made a 
deliberate decision to shift towards more salaried staff.  Our observations confirm that moving 
away from seasonal labor may have been a prudent choice for improving efficiency. 
It is interesting to note that Food Hubs 2 and 3 had low Sales per Worker Equivalent but 
also had low Labor to Sales Ratios.  It seems self-contradictory to conclude that these two firms 
used labor in a cost-effective manner relative to other food hubs, but that their use of labor hours 
was less efficient than average. There are a variety of reasons for which this might have 
happened.   
One possible explanation is that the food hubs were accomplishing a greater portion of 
their total work with lower-paid workers, such as part-time pack line staff and truck drivers, than 
other hubs.  This would make their Labor to Sales Ratios low.  For example, in 2013, 82% of 
staff time allocated to the wholesale and food box programs at Food Hub 3 came from workers 
paid no more than $30,000 per year.  In 2014, it went down to 65%, and the food hub’s labor 
expenses went up that year.   
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Lower compensation rates for staff at all levels would also explain the low labor to sales 
ratios at Food Hubs 2 and/or 3.  At Food Hub 2, several of the staff were owners or founders of 
the business, and indicated that they had been willing to accept low or no pay because of a 
commitment to growing the business.  The salaries received by the managers of Food Hub 2 
were 30-50% lower than those received by comparable staff at the other food hubs in our case 
studies.  Low compensation may be a cost-saving measure in the short run, but it meant that 
unpaid or underpaid staff were effectively subsidizing the business, making it look more 
profitable than it really was.  In the long run, a more sustainable approach to staffing may be 
necessary to avoid staff burnout. 
A third explanation for the low labor costs, specific to Food Hub 3, would be the 
allocation of labor costs.  As noted, Food Hub 3 allocated its staff costs among multiple 
programs.  If managers allocated higher-paid managerial staff to programs outside our analysis, 
the hub would appear to be was spending less on staffing than it really was.  If there were missed 
opportunities to increase staffing efficiency, some of the costs of those missed opportunities may 
have been borne by the other programs. 
Setting questions of compensation aside, one additional interpretation of our food hubs’ 
low Sales per Worker Equivalent could be that the food hub benchmarks did not reflect true 
national averages.  Some plausible reasons for this will be discussed later, in section 4.5. 
Asset Turnover ratio:  Asset Turnover could only be calculated for Food Hubs 1, 2 and 4.  For 
Food Hubs 1 and 2 it was usually high compared to all the benchmarks from conventional 
industries, reflecting the modest size of these hubs’ total assets in comparison to their sales 
volume.  (There are currently no Asset Turnover benchmarks available for food hubs.)  
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Compared to the industry benchmarks, these hubs were able to generate a large volume of sales 
using very limited assets. Asset Turnover is impacted in part by a business’ decisions about 
whether to rent or own its infrastructure and vehicles. So, in the case of Food Hub 2, high Asset 
Turnover Ratio probably reflects the fact that it rented its facility.  Asset Turnover is also 
impacted by whether a business is using rent-free shared or borrowed infrastructure, whose value 
is not included on the balance sheet.  Food Hub 1’s Asset Turnover was probably high because it 
used some physical assets that belonged to another entity, paying minimal rent. 
Food Hub 4’s Asset Turnover was more moderate, a little below the benchmarks.  It 
increased each year from 2012 to 2014, matching up with the business’ increases in staffing 
efficiency during that same period.  Because Food Hub 4 owned almost no fixed assets, this 
hub’s Asset Turnover was essentially a measure of how efficiently it is using its financial assets 
to generate sales.  It therefore makes sense that Asset Turnover and the Labor to Sales Ratio 
would be closely tied together.   
For small businesses we might expect Asset Turnover to reflect the practice of 
“bootstrapping to minimize capital utilization,” as described by Windborg & Landström (1997). 
This includes buying used equipment, hiring seasonal instead of year-round personnel, creating 
policies to incentivize customers to pay quickly, and leasing equipment instead of buying.  These 
activities make it possible to do business without owning many assets – and in fact, both of the 
food hubs that had high Asset Turnover ratio were using at least one of these practices. 
 
 In summary, the efficiency metrics suggest that there may be room for improvement in 
the area of labor efficiency, although some food hubs performed better in this category than 
others.  In general, decreasing labor costs were associated with increasing food hub age and 
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experience, both across hubs and from year to year within a given hub.  Two of our food hubs 
may have been paying their staff at a less-than-average rate, possibly because they were doing a 
greater portion of their work with lower-paid part-time staff, or because salaried staff were 
willing to accept especially low salaries.  Asset Turnover figures were more favorable than labor 
efficiency metrics, illustrating the efficacy of various bootstrapping practices in generating sales 
from few assets. 
 
4.3.3  Profitability Metrics 
In this section we look at measures of profitability, which consider revenues and 
expenses together.  Gross Margin Before Costs of Sales reflects the amount of sales revenue left 
for expenses and profit after paying Costs of Goods Sold.  Operating Profit Margin measures 
ability to generate net income, without considering the company’s debt structure or tax status.  It 
can be seen an indicator of profit potential if the business scales up.  Return on Assets (ROA) 
measures actual return on each dollar invested in the business, allowing a direct comparison with 
other possible types of investments.  While Asset Turnover measures effectiveness in turning 
assets into gross sales, ROA measures effectiveness in turning assets into operating profit.  
Unlike Asset Turnover, ROA takes operating costs into account.   
We also recommend that food hubs track Sales vs. Forecast Budget, including 
breakdowns of sales by outlet, by drop site, etc.  However, we did not gather enough information 
about food hubs’ budgets to collect Sales vs. Forecast Budget for all the hubs. 
 
Gross Margin (before Costs of Sales): Gross margins are a subject of interest for food hub 
managers because gross margins are so closely tied both to sales volume (in their relationship to 
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pricing) and to profitability.  The case study results were consistent with the Food Hub 
Benchmarking Study in showing much higher gross margins for direct-to-consumer retail than 
for wholesale outlets.  Table 20 summarizes food hub gross margins in the final year of the 
study, and shows the amount of net income each food hub made that year. 
Table 20:  Food Hub Gross Margins, Operating Expenses and Profitability 
Final Year of Study Period 
Hub 1 Hub 2 Hub 3 Hub 4 
Wholesale Margin 21.8% 20.9% 19.4% 7.9%* 
Retail Margin 33.0% 46.5% 39.4% n/a 
Overall Margin 23.0% 44.3% 24.8% 11.0% 
Operating Expenses 23.0% 36.6% 25.0% 50.7% 
Operating Profit Margin 0.1% 8.0% -0.2% -39.3% 
* The overall margin for Food Hub 4 was greater than its wholesale margin because membership fees and
shipping & delivery income were included in the overall margin but not the wholesale margin. 
Profitability depends on both gross margins and operating costs.  In Table 20 we can see 
that overall gross margins varied widely from hub to hub.  The wholesale margins for the three 
hubs that has positive or breakeven operating profit were all near 20%.  However, a great deal of 
variation came from the direct-to consumer outlets, where food hubs’ market power or pricing 
policies apparently varied widely. Operating expenses varied widely as well.  Reasons for 
varying operating expenses include age, efficiency, business model and the relative amount of 
emphasis on retail sales, which tend to be more labor-intensive. Differences in operating 
expenses explain why Food Hubs 1 and 2 could have a 21% difference in their overall gross 
margins, but a smaller 8% difference in their Operating Profit Margin. 
Food Hub 1 utilized a standard gross margin on its wholesale accounts, but a more 
flexible margin on its retail accounts.  We can see that the resulting overall margin was always 
high compared to industry benchmarks (as were the margins for Food Hubs 2 and 3), but always 
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below the food hub benchmark.  With modest operating expenses, the result was positive 
operating profit in every year.  
Food Hub 2 stood out for having exceptionally high gross margins, and was clearly 
effective at achieving favorable prices with its farmers and retail customers.  However, this hub 
had high operating costs (33-44% of revenue) compared to the food hub average (26.3%).  As a 
result, Food Hub 2 did not make a profit in all three years.  While it saved on labor compared to 
other hubs, it paid more than average for other expenses.  Based on the financial overview, its  
expenses that were unusually high in 2013 probably including marketing costs and uncollected 
receivables.  Even with high operating costs, though, it managed to obtain an impressive 8% 
operating profit in 2014.     
 The gross margin calculation for Food Hub 3 treats all sales, including brokerage pass-
through dollars, as “gross revenue.”  Managers of the food hub reported a policy of charging a 
15% commission fee on wholesale in 2012, which they changed to an 18% fee in 2013 and 2014 
to better cover their costs.  In reality the gross margins on wholesale (19.4% in 2014) were 
higher than expected from the food hub’s reported fee schedule.  Expected gross margin from an 
18% commission fee should be 0.18/1.18 = 15.25%.  This was the only food hub for which 
realized gross margins were higher than their targets.  (We should note that the wholesale gross 
margins for Food Hub 3 include sales made from the wholesale program to the food box.  We 
did not attempt to split them out because those sales were associated with expenses in both 
programs.  So, the overall gross margin is not a perfect weighted average of the margins from the 
two programs.) 
Our ability to calculate the net income for each of Food Hub 3’s programs allows us to 
draw conclusions about the adequacy of their gross margins.  We know that net income ranged 
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from -0.3% to 1% for the wholesale program, so the commission fee on that program appears to 
have been just sufficient to cover that program’s operating costs without much grant funding.   
We also know that the food box program saw a net loss of -2.7% in 2014, suggesting that the 
food hub needs to either reduce its operating costs or increase its gross margin for the food box 
in the future.   
 The relatively low gross margin, high operating costs and large losses of Food Hub 4 
suggest that that food hub was struggling more than other hubs to price its services appropriately 
and to deliver services efficiency.  The wholesale margin charged by Food Hub 4 was much 
lower than the wholesale margin charged by the other three food hubs.  The food hub had very 
high customer concentration, meaning it was highly dependent on very small number of 
customers for the majority of its sales.  This may have reduced its bargaining power and 
contributed, in part, to the low gross margin.  Additionally, although we would typically expect a 
wholesale operation to have lower operating costs than a retail operation, the wholesale-focused 
Food Hub 4 had higher operating costs than all three of the food hubs that sold a combination of 
wholesale and retail.  This may be because of its small scale, which could result in inefficiencies, 
and the relative newness of the food hub.   
Notably, the overall achieved gross margins for Food Hub 4, which were never above 
11%?, were much lower than the target gross margin of 20% that was reported to us in 
interviews.  Food Hub 4’s managers should revisit the pricing strategy that was laid out in their 
business plan, and closely monitor achieved margins.  Interestingly, if revenue is considered as 
income, the food hub’s gross margins increase to 24.2%-25.2%.  It seems possible that the food 
hub may have been using its gross margins including grant income, rather than its gross margins 
before grant income, to determine whether it was meeting its targeted margins.  This would help 
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to hide the fact that the food hub’s pricing scheme is leading to such an unusually narrow 
margin.  However, even with grants the gross margin does not cover operating costs. 
The food hub closely at shrink, which is affecting the margin as well.  In the 2014 
financial statement, the “Q&A Samples and Unsellable” cost category under 2014 COGS 
represented 9% of overall Costs of Goods Sold and 8.2% of total revenues.  This category 
included “QA issues, salesman/customer samples and spoils.”  If these costs had been eliminated 
from COGS, the gross margin would have been 16.1% in 2014 – still below the overall target, 
but headed in the right direction.  Every dollar of lost product represents a dollar of lost gross 
margin, directly impacting profit.  Thus, it appears that reducing losses from quality issues and 
shrink would be an important first step toward improving the business’ bottom line.   
In our interviews we learned that Food Hub 4 intended to increase sales of its value-
added frozen line in order to widen its margins.  The projected gross margin for the frozen 
product line was 30%.  Expanding the frozen line might be a good idea, but only if records of 
realized revenue and COGS confirm that its margin is as least as high as the desired overall 
margin.  Processing costs and delivery to and from the processing facility should be included in 
the COGS calculation for frozen products.  The food hub should also consider costs of holding 
the frozen inventory, as we will discuss later. 
 
Operating Profit Margin:  Although three of the four food hubs attained positive operating profit 
at some point during the study, three of the four struggled with negative profits at some point as 
well.  For Food Hubs 1 and 2, net losses in bad years were noticeably reduced when depreciation 
was adjusted to reflect a straight-line method. 
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Food Hub 1 was the only one found to have consistently positive operating profit 
without grants, once adjustments for depreciation were made.  Age and experience probably 
contributed to this success, as mentioned previously.  Relatively low labor expenses contributed 
to relatively low operating expenses, and the addition of a retail food box program helped 
increase overall gross margins.  The firm was also able to utilize some borrowed infrastructure at 
minimal expense, which helped limit rent, capital costs and depreciation. 
For Food Hubs 2 and 3, operating profits vacillating around zero suggested that they 
may have been moving through the “breakeven” phase described by Matson & Barham (2015):  
“covering operating expenses but not necessarily interest or depreciation.”  However, Food Hub 
2’s operating profits in 2014 were exceptionally high at 8%, suggesting that its new wholesale 
program, high gross margins, and unpaid owner labor hours were paying off.  Food Hub 3 
reported no taxes or interest, so its Operating Profit Margin was functionally the same as the net 
margin.  Without including grant funding in revenues, its metrics showed a small, positive 
operating profit in 2013 and a small operating loss in 2014.  If grant funding is included in 
revenue, the overall operating profit in both years was positive.  As mentioned earlier, Food Hub 
3 tracked retail and wholesale program expenses separately, and retail appeared to be less 
profitable than wholesale.  This is different from what one might expect based on the relative 
gross margins of wholesale and retail, and it highlights the value of tracking costs separately for 
different programs.   
Food Hub 4 was newest of all the cases, and the only one with consistently negative 
operating profit.  As mentioned previously, the managers of this food hub were squeezed 
between high operating costs and an atypically small wholesale gross margin.  High costs are not 
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surprising given that the food hub was less than five years old, but they will clearly need to be 
reduced to fit within a reasonable wholesale margin.  
 
Return on Assets:  This measure could only be calculated for Food Hubs 1, 2 and 4.  It tended to 
be large, and volatile from year to year because the food hubs in question had small asset bases.  
In years with positive profit, ROA was a very large positive number and in years with negative 
profit, ROA was very large negative number.  
For example, Food Hub 2 showed a negative ROA in 2013 when profits were negative, 
but a very high ROA of almost 50% in 2014 when profits were positive.  Its average asset value 
of about $211,000 was small relative to profits in that last year.  The ROA values were even 
more extreme before figures were adjusted for straight-line depreciation, because the food hub’s 
original depreciation method made its asset value lower than with our straight-line method. 
Food Hub 1’s ROA excluding grant income was positive, in the vicinity of the 
benchmarks in the first two years, but decreased dramatically in the third year.  During this time 
the food hub’s profits decreased while its assets increased from $45,000 to $119,000, mainly 
with the acquisition of a new truck.  As with Asset Turnover, ROA appeared reasonably strong 
for this hub because most of its infrastructure was leased or borrowed at minimal cost, giving it 
an advantage over most for-profit wholesalers.  By the same token, Food Hub 4, which also 
owned minimal infrastructure, showed consistently large negative values for ROA because it had 
negative profits each year. 
Although ROA offers a perspective on how well assets are generating profits, and can be 
compared to ROAs from other firms, it may not be very useful for decision-making in a firm 
with few assets. 
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 In summary, profitability metrics for the four food hubs showed variation across business 
models and illustrated the role of food hub age in impacting profitability.  The widely varying 
gross margins for each food hub, particularly for direct-to-consumer programs, illustrate a range 
of possible approaches to pricing products and to mixing wholesale and retail marketing outlets.  
The food hub targeting wholesale outlets struggled the most with profitability, while the three 
hybrid hubs all succeeded in earning positive operating profit in at least two out of three years.  
All of the food hubs had struggled with profitability at some point in their lifetime, but during the 
study period the oldest food hub earned consistently positive operating profit and net income 
while the newest food hub earned only negative operating profit and net income.  The two 
“middle-aged” hubs had profits that varied between positive and negative.  Operating costs 
decreased with age, and clearly played a role in profitability.   Pricing also turned out to be a 
challenge for the wholesale hub, whose below-average margin suggests that it may have lacked 
the bargaining power needed to achieve its pricing goals. 
 
4.3.4  Solvency and Repayment Capacity Metrics 
In this section we look at the Debt-Asset Ratio and the Debt Service Coverage Ratio, 
both of which have a large affect on firms’ ability to secure loans and attract investment.  Debt 
Service Coverage Ratio measures repayment capacity, or whether the business is generating 
enough income to make payments on its long-term debt in the short run.  It shows the number of 
times the business can cover scheduled long-term debt payments (principal and interest) using 
the income it generates before taxes, depreciation and interest.  This indicates the degree to 
which a business can endure possible shortfalls in cash flow resulting from adverse economic 
conditions.  
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The Debt-Asset Ratio shows the portion of total assets that would need to be liquidated in 
order to pay off all liabilities, or the portion of the business owned by lenders, creditors and other 
entities who are not the owners.  Solvency can become a big issue for food hubs, especially those 
that are started with a relatively small amount of owner equity.  With slow and occasionally 
negative net income, a solvent business that is highly leveraged (i.e. one that has large liabilities 
in proportion to its assets) is at risk for becoming insolvent quickly if it incurs losses instead of 
profits.        
 
Debt-Asset Ratio:  In three of the four cases (Food Hubs 1, 2 and 4), a history of unprofitable 
years had significantly reduced the food hubs’ equity over time, at some point increasing their 
Debt-Asset Ratio and making them insolvent (>100% debt-asset ratio).  For Food Hubs 1 and 2, 
the problem was exacerbated by overly rapid depreciation of assets.  After adjustments were 
made to reflect straight-line depreciation the ratios looked better, but were still very high.  
For example, Food Hub 1 began the study period insolvent, with a debt-asset ratio over 
100%, but improved its position over the three years with its positive net income.  The business 
had been financed largely with member fees, and its equity had been severely reduced by losses 
in previous years, but profits allowed equity to be built up again quickly.   
Before adjustments, Food Hub 2 initially appeared to become insolvent during its 
unprofitable year in 2013, with a debt-asset ratio of over 100%.  By 2014 the ratio was 213.4%, 
meaning the value of the company’s liabilities was twice that of its assets, a major “red flag.”  
After our adjustments, the company was shown to be highly leveraged, but not insolvent.  Aside 
from depreciation, why did Food Hub 2 have an increasing Debt-Asset Ratio?  The firm had a 
small amount of equity to begin with ($25,500 in 2012), as is common among small start-up 
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firms.  As the company grew, its equity failed to grow with it, and it became more heavily 
leveraged.  A highly leveraged business risks losing a large percentage of its equity if it has an 
unprofitable year, which happened in 2013 when the company saw -1.4% net (adjusted) income.  
Nonetheless, the adjusted Debt-Asset Ratio never exceeded the broadline wholesale benchmark 
of 84.7%. 
For Food Hub 4 the Debt to Asset Ratio increased dramatically each year during 2012-
2014.  The food hub started with a strong solvency position during 2012, with creditors holding 
only 12% of assets.  In that year the remaining 88% of the business was held by the hub’s 
shareholders and members, and the hub had no retained earnings of its own.  Over time, though, 
negative profits accumulated in a negative retained earnings balance that reduced the value of 
shareholders’ and members’ equity.  In 2014, on average, the food hub’s shareholders and 
members owned only 21% of the business and the remaining 78.9% was owned by creditors.  By 
the end of the year, the business had tipped into insolvency, with an equity balance of negative 
$18,000.  Since virtually all of the hub’s assets and liabilities are current, the insolvency problem 
was a liquidity problem as well. 
Only Food Hub 3, which managed food hub operations as part of a larger suite of 
services, showed little problem with solvency.  Its Debt-Asset Ratio hovered around 50% in 
2013 and 2014, meaning that the food hub owned about half of its assets and creditors owned the 
other half.  As a business, this food hub also maintained a better solvency position than the 
benchmark for the Conventional Wholesale industry. Grant funding and grant-related cash, both 
from food hub activities and from other activities, may have helped supplement that food hub’s 
working capital and create equity.   
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In general, challenges with solvency likely stemmed from not having much equity to 
begin with.  Initial sources of equity appeared to include membership fees, member equity, 
contributed capital from owners and grants.  In the co-ops, member equity was not heavily 
utilized.  Only one business had external investors.  Interestingly, of the three food hubs that 
experienced insolvency, two of them made positive profit in at least two years.  These food hubs 
may still have been suffering from being undercapitalized and highly leveraged during their 
startup period.   
 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio:  The food hubs in the case study did not have much debt to pay 
interest on.  The Debt Service Coverage Ratio varied from year to year for Food Hubs 1 and 2, 
whose small debt size tended to make the Debt Service Coverage Ratio high in profitable years.   
Whenever profits were negative, the Debt Service Coverage Ratio was by definition negative as 
well.  The coverage ratio was irrelevant for Food Hubs 3 and 4, which recorded no term debt at 
all. 
Food Hub 1 had a very high Debt Service Coverage Ratio in its first two years, because 
it had little term debt and positive profit.  In 2013, the food hub entered into a capital lease for a 
truck, so its interest and principal payments increased, and the food hub’s small profit margin 
allowed a much smaller cushion (a Debt Service Coverage Ratio of 1.3) for repaying the debt.   
Because Food Hub 2 had small long-term debt in proportion to its annual revenues, its 
coverage ratio was also comfortably above the recommended values in 2012 and 2014.  In 2013 
the coverage ratio was <1 because of the losses that the food hub faced.  The food hub might 
have had trouble making its long-term debt payments in that year. 
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The finding that two of the cases had no term debt is interesting.  Food Hub 4, for 
example, was financed entirely through current liabilities, grants and shareholder equity.  Heavy 
use of current liabilities as sources of credit appears to be common among food hubs.  This is 
probably because some short-term sources of credit, such as Accounts Payable or pre-paid 
consumer food sales, are cheap or free.  Furthermore, because Food Hub 4 did not purchase 
much equipment, it probably saw little reason to seek term loans. 
The relatively small amount of debt financing was consistent with observations in the 
literature that small businesses tend to use internal more than external financing.  This will be 
discussed in greater detail in a later section. 
 
In summary, our measures reveal challenges with solvency, but milder concerns about 
debt repayment capacity.  Equity did not always grow in tandem with business growth.  The food 
hubs in our case studies were at times highly leveraged and vulnerable to small changes in 
profitability from year to year. Because of the firms’ small total assets, their Debt-Asset Ratio 
could deteriorate rapidly, but could also recover rapidly in profitable years.  Debt repayment 
capacity turned out to be less of a problem than solvency because the food hubs in our case 
studies accepted so little long-term financing.  Potential debt repayment capacity, though, would 
depend on whether a given food hub could obtain consistently positive profit. Notably, Kate 
Danaher of RSF Social Finance told us in an interview that she tends to look more closely at 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio than at the debt-asset ratio when deciding whether to grant a loan 
to a food hub (personal communication, December 4, 2015).  This may explain how food hubs 
have continued to access operating loans and sometimes long-term loans while still facing 
solvency issues.   
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4.3.5  Summary of Potential Challenges Revealed Through Key Metrics  
Table 21 summarizes some of the potential challenges identified in the financial analyses 
and the degree to which they were shared across the four case studies.  In addition to challenges 
identified in the key metrics, challenges related to recordkeeping are also documented. 
Table 21:  Summary of Potential Challenges Reflected in Annual Case Study Metrics 
As in the individual food hub case reports, metrics are based on annual, year-end (December 31) 
financial data adjusted to reflect straight-line depreciation.  Metrics reflect items from the year-end 
balance sheets that were averaged across each fiscal year.  “X” indicates that a statement was true for at 
least one year of the study period; “XX” indicates that it was true for more than one year. 
Potential Challenge Case 1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Liquidity 
Days Receivable > 45 days XX 
Days Payable > 30 days X 
Days Receivable > Days Payable X 
Current Ratio < 1 XX X * 
Profitability Operating profit < 0 X X XX 
Efficiency Labor to Sales Ratio > food hub benchmarks X XX 
Solvency 
Debt-Asset Ratio > 70% XX X X X 
Debt-Asset Ratio > 100% X * 
Record-
keeping 
Adjustment from reported to straight-line 
depreciation increased operating profit by > 3% X X 
Inventory not recorded XX X X 
Accounts Payable and Receivable not recorded X X 
* This criterion was met at year-end of 2014, but was not reflected in annual averages.
So far this chapter has explored how key metrics can be used to analyze food hubs, and 
what the results tell us about our four case studies.  Now we will turn to a broader look at themes 
in the data, and what they tell us about our original research questions. 
4.4  Additional Observations Across Case Studies 
In our case studies we sought to understand how the financial histories of individual food 
hubs reflect characteristics documented in the food hub and small business literature.  In 
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particular, we looked for evidence of: limited access to capital and disproportionate use of 
internal over external financing; constrained working capital; difficulties with labor efficiency 
and staff retention; difficulties with pricing and price negotiation; grant dependence; and 
difficulties achieving profitability, especially below annual sales of $1 million for wholesale and 
hybrid hubs.  We also looked to understand what financial characteristics seem to be shared in 
common among food hubs of different sizes, ages, structures, business models and geographic 
locations. 
Several of these issues have already been addressed in the discussion of key metrics.  Our 
analysis of efficiency metrics suggested that labor efficiency was indeed a challenge for all of the 
case study hubs.  Current ratios of <1 in three of the four cases suggested that food hubs do 
indeed face working capital constraints.  The low gross margin achieved by Food Hub 4 suggests 
that that hub, in particular, struggled to price products in a way that would meet its targets for 
gross margins.  The analysis of key metrics in general pointed out other common characteristics, 
including solvency problems. 
In the this section we round out our analysis by exploring the questions of internal vs. 
external and short-term vs. long-term financing, grant dependence, and profitability at various 
scales.  
 
Access to capital and the structure of financing:  As described in Chapter 2, it has been noted in 
the literature that small businesses tend to use internal over external sources of financing.  It has 
also been noted that new and small businesses tend to finance themselves with disproportionately 
current liabilities, such as trade credit (Accounts Payable) and operating loans.  These two 
observations have both been used to support the claim that small businesses have trouble 
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accessing capital.  Alternatively, they have also been given as evidence that small businesses are 
selective about sources of capital because they wish to maintain control over their operations. 
Tables 22-24 show several perspectives on the types of funding used by the study hubs.  
Table 22: Current and Long-Term Liabilities as % of Total Liabilities 
From December 31 of final year in study 
Type of Liability External Source? 
% of total liabilities 
Hub 1 Hub 2 Hub 4 
Produce 
Wholesale 
Benchmark* 
Current Liabilities 
Accounts Payable (X) 40.6% 18.2% 99.7% 44.0% 
Bank line of credit X 0.0% 15.6% 0.0% 
Loans from individuals 10.8% 7.0% 0.0% 
Credit card debt X 6.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Grant liabilities X 4.0% 18.9% 0.0% 
Payroll liabilities X 4.3% 0.0% 0.3% 
Food box liability X 0.0% 19.4% 0.0% 
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 66.3% 79.2% 100.0% 66.5% 
Long-term liabilities 
Bank loans X 0.0% 11.6% 0.0% 
Capital leases X 33.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Loans from individuals 0.0% 9.2% 0.0% 
TOTAL LONG TERM LIABILITIES 33.7% 20.8% 0.0% 33.5% 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
*From First Research, 2014
Table 23:  Internal vs. External Sources of Liabilities Held by Case Study Hubs 
From December 31 of final year in study 
Source of liability Hub 1 Hub 2 Hub 4 
Internal sources 51.4% 16.1% 99.7% 
Co-op members 51.4% n/a 99.7% 
Owners, friends, family 0.0% 16.1% 0.0% 
External sources 48.6% 83.9% 0.3% 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 24: Equity Contributed by External Investors, as a % of Total Equity (Year-end) 
 
 Hub 1 Hub 2 Hub 3 Hub 4 
Year 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 97.0% 
Year 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 98.1% 
Year 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 98.3% 
 
In Table 22 we provide a breakdown of current vs. long-term liabilities on the balance 
sheets of each case study hub in the study’s final year.  For context we include some benchmarks 
from produce wholesalers as well.  Next, in Table 23, we show the portions of each food hub’s 
liabilities that came from internal and external sources.  In our calculations, internal sources of 
financing include loans from owners, co-op members, friends and family as well as accounts 
payable to co-op member-owners, where applicable.  External sources include bank loans, credit 
card debt, grant liabilities, payroll liabilities, food box liabilities (e.g. food box prepayments for 
orders not yet filled), capital leases and accounts payable to anyone who is not an owner.  
Unfortunately, since Food Hub 3’s balance sheet reflected liabilities and assets that were 
unrelated to its wholesale and retail food hub activities, we could not include Food Hub 3 in the 
analysis presented in Tables 22 and 23.  Finally, in Table 24, we provide a breakdown of sources 
of equity capital for each food hub.  This table is fairly straightforward because only Food Hub 4 
had external investors.   
 Table 22 shows that while the three case study hubs drew loans and credit from a variety 
of sources, current liabilities comprised 66-100% of total liabilities in all three.  These 
proportions of current liabilities were greater than or roughly equal to the benchmark for produce 
wholesalers in all three cases.  In other words, the food hubs in our study made greater use of 
current liabilities in financing their operations than larger produce wholesalers did.  Notably, 
Food Hub 4 drew almost all of its liabilities from Accounts Payable in 2014, probably because it 
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was having difficulty accessing other forms of credit at that time.  The other food hubs had more 
varied liabilities, but Accounts Payable always played an important role, just as it did for the 
benchmarked wholesalers (for whom Accounts Payable constituted 44% of liabilities, on 
average).  The disproportionate use of current liabilities might be seen to suggest that food hubs 
cannot access term debt, or that they reject the restrictive covenants that long-term liabilities 
would require. 
 Whether a particular food hub made greater use of internal or external sources of 
financing depended to a large degree on whether it was a co-op.  Because Hubs 1 and 3 required 
all suppliers to be co-op members, and because co-op members are also owners, Accounts 
Payable were technically an internal source of financing for these hubs.  As a result, Food Hub 1 
obtained slightly more than half of its liabilities from internal sources, and all of Food Hub 4’s 
liabilities were internal.  Although Food Hub 2 made use of loans from both owners and friends, 
the majority of its liabilities consisted of current liabilities from external sources, including 
Accounts Payable and lines of credit.   
In some ways, the internal vs. external funding dichotomy seems insufficient to describe 
the different types of relationships that a food hub may have with its creditors.  Some of the 
sources of credit used by Food Hubs 1 and 2 could be seen as external but “closely affiliated” to 
the hubs, posing less risk or less loss of control than an institutional lender would.  These include 
the food box liabilities (owed to customers), payroll liabilities (owed to employees), and the 
Accounts Payable for Food Hub 2 (owed to farmers).  As a values-based business, it is likely that 
a food hub would have a more lenient, trust-based relationship with such creditors than a large 
corporation would have with most of its creditors.  After all, providing low-risk, interest free up-
front capital is the fundamental concept behind Community Supported Agriculture programs, 
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which food box programs seek to mimic.  Customers prepay for CSA boxes because of a values-
based commitment to supporting a local business, even if the growing season goes poorly.  CSA 
and food box customers do not expect to be paid interest on their prepayments, and risk for the 
CSA provider is somewhat low because they have some leniency in how much value they 
provide for customers.  Similarly, some individuals on the payroll may be “patient” creditors, 
especially if they are owners or co-op members who feel deeply invested in their firm’s success.  
These individuals may be willing to accept deferred payment at times when their employer is 
constrained for cash.  Additionally, farmers who have a close relationship with a food hub might 
be willing to extend additional credit or to convert some Accounts Payable into loans, if 
necessary.  If we add “closely affiliated” sources of capital such as food box, payroll and 
Accounts Payable liabilities to the list of internal sources, then internal sources provided more 
than 50% of liabilities in all three food hub cases. 
 Another common feature among the three food hubs was the large amount of interest-free 
credit obtained by each.  Sources of interest-free credit, at least in the short run, included 
Accounts Payable, food box prepayments, payroll liabilities and grant liabilities. These 
constituted 49%, 57% and 100% of total liabilities for Food Hubs 1, 2 and 4 respectively.  
Unfortunately we do not have a way to benchmark these figures against similar data for 
conventional wholesalers.  However, it is interesting to note that except in the last year of 
operations for Food Hub 4, all four case study hubs paid less than the Broadline Wholesale 
benchmark for interest expenses, which was 0.4% of revenue (Troy, 2013).  This suggests that 
the food hubs were making lesser use of interest-bearing loans and credit than their conventional 
counterparts. 
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Sources of equity offer an additional measure of access to internal vs. external financing, 
depicted in Table 24.  As shown, Food Hubs 1-2 had no investors, relying entirely on member 
fees, owner contributions and retained earnings as sources of equity.  Food Hub 4, on the other 
hand, behaved quite differently.  Almost all of its equity was raised from external investors, 
except for a small amount that belonged to co-op members.  This balances out its use of 
exclusively internal liabilities at the end of 2014.  The case study hubs demonstrate what our 
interviewees also told us, that there are different approaches and philosophies regarding the use 
of external investors to capitalize food hubs. 
How do these findings relate to the notion of the “finance gap,” or the idea that small 
businesses have difficulty efficiently accessing external capital and term debt?  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, we know that limited access to outside capital was one of the challenges reported by 
food hub managers (Barham, Tropp, Enterline, Farbman, Fisk, & Kiraly, 2012; Fisher, Hamm, 
Pirog, Fisk, Farbman, & Kiraly, 2013).  However, it is also possible that food hub managers 
avoid external financing because of the actual or perceived risks involved, including the risk of 
losing control, as suggested by Meyers (1984).  From the available data, we see that the food 
hubs made limited use of term debt and institutional lending, although it is difficult to determine 
the causal factors behind this.  However, the prevalent use of interest-free credit suggests that 
food hubs may have had very practical reasons for avoiding bank financing.  If food hubs were 
following a “pecking order” of preferred sources of capital, then short-term, interest-free credit 
from closely affiliated sources appear to have been near the top of the pecking order.  Bank 
lending was used less often, and for Food Hubs 1 and 2, external investor equity was not used at 
all.  By contrast, Food Hub 3 used a large amount of external equity, but almost entirely internal 
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interest-free credit.  Clearly Food Hub 3 had no dislike of external investment, suggesting that 
different food hubs have different pecking orders.   
In summary, the available data suggests that our cases had a strong preference for 
financing their operations with current rather than long-term liabilities, compared to conventional 
wholesalers.  While food hubs used a combination of internal and external financing, they 
appeared to made less use of institutional lending than their conventional counterparts and 
proved effective at accessing interest-free capital.  These findings still do not give us much 
information on how managers evaluated the riskiness, cost and accessibility of grants, loans and 
investments against sources of internal capital.  The motivations behind choices of food hub 
financing would be a good topic for future research. 
 
Use of charitable funding:  All of the food hubs, regardless of structure, secured some grant or 
charitable funding – although not necessarily during the study period.  For three of the hubs, 
grant and charitable funding never increased net income by more than four percentage points, 
which also means that it never exceeded 4% of total revenue.  For the fourth hub, which was the 
newest and the least profitable, grant funds comprised a more substantial portion (11-16%) of 
income.  This food hub’s managers did not report using grant funds for charitable or educational 
activities, but rather seemed to view its grant funding as necessary for operational startup.   
The balance of food hubs’ non-charitable income was earned through business activities, 
most of which were product sales.  Other sources of income included membership fees, shipping 
and delivery fees, and admission fees from special events held by the food hub.   
In some cases, charitable dollars made the difference between positive and negative net 
income.  However, as noted earlier, grant expenses are not always ordinary operating expenses.  
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A food hub might secure grant money to perform a public-interest activity that it would not 
otherwise perform, such as holding producer or consumer outreach events or providing 
educational programming at a school.  While these activities probably have positive impacts for 
business, some of them would not occur if a grant were not secured.  This is why we 
recommended looking at metrics both with and without grant income. 
The discussion on internal vs. external funding we considered unspent grant liabilities to 
be external sources of capital.  Whether grants really are a form of external financing is an 
interesting topic.  Grant and charitable dollars come from external sources, but are typically 
viewed as income and not as debt or equity capital because they do not need to be returned to 
funders at the end of the grant term.  In some ways, a grant maker operates more like a business 
customer than a lender; they form a contract with the grantee and expect specific socially 
beneficial services to be delivered in exchange for payment.  In other ways, though, grant makers 
do resemble lenders or investors.  As noted by Brislen, Woods, Meyer & Routt, (2015), grant 
makers can exert some control over a firm’s choice of business activities.  Like loans, grant 
applications usually have extensive information requirements resulting in high transaction costs.  
Additionally, donations and grant funds paid up front in cash probably function as an important 
external source of working capital; they can be “borrowed” internally for a variety of purposes 
and “repaid” to the grant account before ultimately being used for their stated purpose.  Some 
grant funds can even be converted into permanent assets on the balance sheet, if the funder 
allows infrastructure purchases.  So, grants probably play a hybrid role in food hub financing, 
worthy of further investigation. 
 
  
 
 
119 
Sales needed to achieve breakeven:  As noted in Chapter 2, Matson & Barham (2015) have 
proposed a breakeven annual sales level of $1.19 million and a “viability” sales level of $2.36 
million for hybrid (combined wholesale and direct to consumer) food hubs.  For exclusively 
wholesale hubs they proposed similar levels of $1.21 million and $2.4 million respectively.  How 
do these figures align with our case study findings?   
The results were mixed.  Food Hub 1 enjoyed positive net income in years when it earned 
$720,000 and $940,000 in business revenues.  Food Hub 2 achieved positive profit at $1.3 
million, but also at $583,000.  Food Hub 3’s profits were positive in the first two years, but 
turned negative when they reached $2.25 million revenue mark, just short of Matson & Barham’s 
revenue threshold for “viability.”  Food Hub 4, with $130,000-$420,000 in business revenue, 
never obtained positive profits.  In general, the differences between Food Hub 4 and the other 
three cases support the idea that breakeven is more easily obtained above $500,000.  They also 
illustrate that for hybrid hubs, breakeven can be reached at a level below $1 million.  Finally, 
they show that that revenue levels of $1-$2.25 million in no way guarantee positive net income, 
and that food hubs’ profitability is likely to bounce back and forth within this range.  This seems 
consistent with Mattson & Barham’s definition of breakeven, a level of profitability at which no 
money is “set aside for unexpected events.” 
Reasons for the case study hubs’ less profitable years seemed to vary.  Food Hub 3’s 
slightly unprofitable year involved relatively flat (9%) sales growth from the previous year, but a 
larger increase in operating costs.  Food Hub 2’s unprofitable year featured a spike in operating 
expenses, increasing to 43.5% of revenue from 32.9% the previous year, apparently the result of 
a large marketing contract and high depreciation on new equipment. Food Hub 4 and others 
blamed weather factors for their least profitable year.  On top of these specific issues, Food Hubs 
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1 and 2 were all dealing with a constantly changing composition of wholesale vs. retail sales.  
One of these hubs began with retail and later added a wholesale program, while the other began 
with wholesale and later added retail.  Because choice of sales model impacts variable costs and 
gross margins, the mathematical breakeven point of each food hub probably moved up and down 
from year to year or month to month as their composition of outlets changed.  So, while 
generalizations about breakeven for hybrid food hubs may be helpful from a planning standpoint, 
the reality is much more complicated. 
 
Thus far, this chapter has summarized results of financial analyses from across the four 
food hub case studies.  In the remainder of the chapter, we turn to a discussion of the financial 
evaluation process itself, including the usefulness of the metrics and the implications of food 
hubs’ recordkeeping choices for financial analysis. 
 
4.5  Usefulness of Metrics 
The set of key metrics used in our case studies were informed by many sources.  In 
practice, some metrics proved to be more useful than others when viewed from a decision-
making perspective.  In this section we evaluate the usefulness of each metric based on how it 
contributed to our case study analyses.  We also revisit the research question, “to what extent are 
benchmarks from other types of food businesses, such as wholesale distributors and retail 
grocers, useful for evaluation of individual food hubs?”  
 In our dashboard of key metrics, the measures that informed liquidity and cash flow were 
Days Receivable, Days in Inventory, Days Payable and the Current Ratio.  Together, Days 
Receivable, Days in Inventory and Days Payable can be used to calculate the length of the Cash 
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Conversion Cycle.  In our analyses, Days Receivable and Days Payable proved very helpful in 
understanding how cash moved through each business and how billing policies affected cash 
flow.  However, data to calculate Days in Inventory was usually not available, probably due to 
the perceived difficulty or expense of setting up an inventory tracking system.  If inventory data 
had been recorded consistently, Days in Inventory would have been helpful both for 
understanding the cycle of cash flow and for understanding the efficiency with which the food 
hub used its warehouse space to turn over inventory.   
The Current Ratio proved helpful in understanding liquidity constraints within the 
timeframe of the entire fiscal year, but was somewhat abstracted from the day-to-day 
accessibility of cash and working capital.  A more immediate measure of Working Capital might 
have been helpful.  For example, Robin Morris of Mad River Food Hub prefers using the 
measure Net Operating Working Capital, which reflects only the “most current” portions of 
current assets and liabilities:   
Bank Balances + Inventory + Accounts Receivable – Accounts Payable   
This could be a useful addition to the dashboard. 
External benchmarks for Days Receivable proved helpful in understanding what average 
customer payment terms might be considered “normal” in relevant industries, especially for 
wholesale.  Benchmarks for Days Payable, however, proved a bit less useful because they were 
so high.  Food hubs generally articulated a values-based commitment to paying farmers quickly, 
certainly more quickly than in 45-50 days, so their figures were almost always below the 
benchmark.  Additionally, in one of our interviews, Kate Danaher of RSF Social Finance 
mentioned that a food hub with Days Receivable of more than 30 days would raise a “red flag” 
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for her as a lender, because she would wonder if the food hub had enough cash to pay its 
producers.   
The Days in Inventory external benchmarks proved only moderately useful.  The  
seasonal nature of local food and the varying composition of food hub product lines made it 
difficult to makes “apples to apples” comparisons to other industries.  For example, the produce 
wholesale benchmarks probably reflect firms that hold little inventory as a part of their business 
model, and that hold similar amounts of inventory at all times throughout the year.  By contrast, 
we would expect Days in Inventory to show large seasonal variation for most food hubs.  For 
example, in order to meet winter-season demand, some food hubs had to store food for longer 
than would be typical in other sectors.  This suggests that hubs should set different targets for 
different seasons rather than comparing themselves to the same industry benchmark throughout 
the year.  In general, it is probably more useful to interpret inventory data in the context of the 
food hub’s own operations and cash flow needs than to compare it to others.  Managers should 
be looking at the cash flow implications of inventory and regularly comparing the value of 
inventory to the projections used in their own cash flow budget.  This should help them to avoid 
(or at least anticipate) unexpected cash shortfalls as a result of holding more inventory than they 
had planned. 
 Industry benchmarks for Current Ratios proved to be broadly applicable and useful for 
food hub analysis, especially in looking at food hubs from a lender’s perspective.  In general, 
though, our liquidity and cash flow measures turned out to be limited in that none of them clearly 
captured the impact of prepaid food box programs or grant funds on available working capital 
and cash flow.  Metrics based on cash flow statements might have been able to show this more 
clearly.  Also, basing our analysis on year-end balance sheets prohibited us from tracking 
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seasonal changes in current assets and liabilities, which would give a much clearer picture of 
liquidity constraints. 
The efficiency metrics in our dashboard included the Labor to Sales (and/or Revenue) 
Ratio, Sales (and/or Revenue) per Worker Equivalent, and Asset Turnover.  (We also 
recommend that managers calculate vendor and customer concentration, although we were not 
able to do so in this study.)  After beginning the study, we also began subtracting the Labor to 
Sales Ratio from the Gross Margin to calculate Margin Minus Labor, although it was not 
included in our key metrics.  This turned out to be especially useful on a program-by-program 
basis because it shows how gross margin and labor costs interact with one another, and that gross 
margins tend to be larger for more labor-intensive retail programs.   
The Labor to Sales Ratio proved easy to calculate, but because it is based on expenses, it 
does not distinguish labor efficiency from compensation rates.  Labor to Sales Ratio benchmarks 
from wholesalers and conventional grocers did not seem especially relevant to the food hubs, 
since food hub work turned out to be so much more labor-intensive than typical wholesale and 
retail, but the food hub and cooperative benchmark provided useful context.  In general, the 
Labor to Sales Ratio proved most useful when considered in the context of the food hub’s own 
operating expenses and gross margins.  It was also useful when looked at in combination with 
Sales per Worker Equivalent, which measures labor efficiency more directly, but is a harder 
measure to work with in practice.    
Unfortunately, even the most profitable of our case study hubs had Sales per Worker 
Equivalent values far below the food hub benchmark.  This could suggest that our cases 
experienced systematic problems with efficiency, but it could also mean that the benchmark 
value is too high.  The methodology used to calculate this benchmark in the Food Hub 
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Benchmarking Study was to divide the total sales of each hub, as taken from financial 
statements, by total FTEs, which were summed from several categories of labor FTEs that each 
food hub reported in a survey.  When trying to calculate total FTEs for the food hubs in our own 
study, we found it difficult to reconcile what food hub managers told us about FTEs and wages 
with what we found in their actual payroll records and recorded expenses.  The changing 
responsibilities of part-time salaried employees and the use of seasonal employees made the 
calculation nontrivial.  For us, making a good estimation of total FTEs required a detailed review 
of (a) a roster of salaried employees with start and end dates and weekly expected hours, 
including any changes in hours over time, and (b) payroll records showing total hours for hourly 
employees.  Having observed inconsistencies between the records and what the managers said, 
we suspect that some food hub managers may not really know how many FTEs they use.  Thus, 
it seems possible that food hubs who completed the Food Hub Benchmarking Survey may have 
underreported their total FTEs, although there is no way to confirm this.  In general, improved 
tracking of labor FTEs may be necessary if managers wish to include labor efficiency metrics in 
their self-evaluation. 
 Asset Turnover was our one measure of general operating efficiency.  Comparing Asset 
Turnover to benchmarks was not very meaningful, because food hubs tend to own so few assets, 
so their values tended to be high.  Tracking Asset Turnover over time does give a sense of 
changes in how assets are being used to generate sales, although it may not inform any particular 
managerial policy. 
 To measure profitability, we used the Gross Margin before Costs of Sales, Operating 
Profit, Return on Assets, and of course Net Income.  We also recommend that food hubs evaluate 
Sales vs. Forecast Budget, although we did not have enough data on food hub forecasts to do 
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this.  Gross Margin was very helpful in understanding the relationship between pricing policies 
and profitability.  Calculating Gross Margin per program proved to be particularly useful if costs 
were also being tracked on a per-program basis, because we could see the portion of gross 
margin left after program-specific costs, and compare the results across programs.  At the 
beginning of this project we also tried calculating Gross Margin After Costs of Sales, following 
the methodology of the Food Hub Benchmarking Study, which involves subtracting variable 
packing and delivery costs from the Gross Margin (NGFN Food Hub Collaboration, 2015).  
However, this method required distinguishing variable labor costs, including variable activities 
performed by salaried staff, from fixed labor costs. We found the Gross Margin after Costs of 
Sales calculation to be a difficult one to replicate consistently, so we ultimately did not use it. 
Benchmarks for gross margins provided an interesting comparison, but as we saw, gross 
margins can vary tremendously across food hubs and still yield positive net income.  Looking at 
gross margin benchmarks may tell us more about what the wholesale market can bear than what 
is necessary to be profitable.  In the case studies, we saw that the three most successful food hubs 
used a wholesale gross margin of roughly 20%, suggesting that this wholesale margin coluld be 
generalizeable to other food hubs.  The 20% margin fell in between the national food hub 
benchmark of 28.1% and the broadline wholesale benchmark of 16.3%.  The retail margins in 
our cases, on the other hand, varied tremendously and were often higher than benchmarks.  Thus, 
while food hubs would be well-advised to consult gross margin benchmarks in order to avoid 
overestimating what is reasonable, they should also look at their own local market conditions, 
operating costs, market power, customer loyalty and so on, and possibly consult with other 
established food hubs whose situation is similar to theirs. 
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Operating Profit Margin and Net Income have obvious usefulness in measuring the 
profitability and sustainability of a business, although the two measures tended to be about the 
same because the case study hubs were not paying much tax or interest.  The relatively low 
industry benchmarks for Operating Profit Margin turned out to be within the range of 
profitability for the food hubs in our study, suggesting that they do have relevance.  However, 
having seen the large differences in Operating Profit Margin that can result from different 
methods of depreciation, we would advise managers to calculate Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) instead of or in addition to operating profit.  One 
advantage of EBITDA is that it does not reflect subjectively determined depreciation methods.  
Also, deprecation is often added to financial statements at the end of the year, but EBITDA can 
be calculated at any time of year without having to calculate or adjust depreciation.  As with 
Operating Profit Margin and Net Margin, EBITDA benchmarks are commonly available from 
the wholesale and retail sectors. 
Return on Assets did not turn out to be a very useful measure for our case study food 
hubs because profits were so small and the participating food hubs held so few assets.  The 
ROAs for food hubs were volatile and bore little relationship to the benchmarks.  For trend 
analysis of a single food hub over time, ROA might be most relevant for a hub that owns most of 
the assets that it uses.  Otherwise, food hubs may not need to calculate their ROA unless they 
plan to seek outside investors, for whom ROA allows a comparison of investment opportunities 
across different firms. 
As measures of repayment capacity and solvency, we evaluated the Debt Service 
Coverage Ratio and the Debt to Asset Ratio.  The Debt-Asset Ratio turned out to be extremely 
important because it revealed the solvency problems that food hubs were facing.  The broadline 
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wholesale benchmark for the Debt-Asset Ratio (85%) suggests that wholesalers are similar to our 
case study hubs in their tendency to be highly leveraged.  The other benchmarks illustrate a more 
conservative position.  It is probably less important to follow the benchmarks than to understand 
how high of a Debt-Asset ratio lenders are willing to accept in a particular business.  
Conventional wisdom says that lenders become uncomfortable with debt-asset ratios above the 
60% range, but this will vary by sector and by lender.  In addition to considering the lender 
perspective, managers should also consider the degree to which their business is in danger of 
rapidly becoming insolvent, which depends on asset size.  
The Debt Service Coverage Ratio provides a lender’s perspective on a firm’s ability to 
pay off term debt, which is helpful for a manager who plans to seek debt financing.  It is easily 
calculated, although in our case studies it required looking beyond balance sheets and income 
statement records to identify principal payments that were made (or due).  We did not identify 
benchmarks for Debt Service Coverage Ratios from food industries, but the rule of thumb of 
maintaining a ratio above 1.1-1.5 worked well enough.  
In our analyses, the usefulness of each metric was determined largely by the data that a 
firm had or had not collected.  The next section addresses challenges in food hub recordkeeping 
that emerged during our analysis. 
 
4.6  Implications of Recordkeeping Decisions for Financial Analysis 
Some measures were difficult to calculate or interpret because of each firm’s decisions 
about how to record and represent data.  The following recordkeeping factors impacted our 
analysis, and illustrate some of the unique challenges in evaluating food hubs as small 
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businesses.  They also illustrate ways in which managers could improve their recordkeeping to 
make self-evaluation easier and more accurate. 
• Cash vs. accrual accounting.  The move from cash to accrual accounting makes income 
statements more accurate.  Accrual-based statements reflect business activities that 
actually took place during the accounting period, matching expenses to the income that 
they helped produce.  The monitoring of Accounts Payable and Receivable, which tends 
to accompany accrual accounting, also makes it possible to calculate more measures of 
liquidity and cash flow.  Two of the four case study hubs did not make the move to 
accrual accounting until midway through the study, and were not recording Accounts 
Receivable and Accounts Payable until that point.   
• Tax-basis depreciation.  Depreciating assets using IRS schedules is appropriate for 
filing taxes, but can result in items being valued well below their market value in the first 
few years after purchase.  For example, one case study hub depreciated almost the entire 
$45,000 value of a new truck in the year it was purchased, which made the firm insolvent 
and resulted in a large negative profit.  Two of the four hubs understated their profits by 
more than 3% due to using IRS instead of straight-line depreciation.  Because 
depreciation appears as an expense on the income statement sheet and a debit from asset 
values on the balance sheet, it affects managers’ ability to know their business’ solvency 
and profitability.  Managers should remain aware of how their accountants are calculating 
depreciation, and consider keeping  managerial accounting records that use more modest 
(and realistic) depreciation methods.  
• Not tracking inventory.  Three of the four case study hubs did not track their inventory 
during the whole study period.  One never tracked inventory at all.  When inventory is 
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not being tracked in the accounting system, purchases of inventory items are usually 
recorded as a Cost of Goods Sold at time of purchase.  In this case, the value of inventory 
simply disappears from the balance sheet until it is sold.  For food hubs that were holding 
a large amount of unrecorded inventory, which some were, this skewed their Debt-Asset 
Ratio and made their equity look smaller than it really was.  Tracking inventory also 
allows the Cash Conversion Cycle to be measured. 
• Methods of categorizing grants.   Some food hubs chose to show grants as short-term 
liabilities on their balance sheet until the grant funds were spent for their contractual 
purposes.  This may make sense as an accounting method, especially if the grant will be 
spent for some purpose outside the food hub’s normal operations.  However, grants 
categorized in this way are confusing from a financial metrics standpoint; they appear as 
though the funds must to be paid back to the funder.  They negatively impact the Current 
Ratio and Debt-Asset Ratio.  Grants also caused some confusion when their income and 
expenses were mixed in with business income and expenses.  Managers are highly 
encouraged to create a separate accounting class for grant expenditures so that they can 
be monitored separately from ordinary business expenses.  This makes it much easier to 
assess profitability.  They may also wish to subtract grant liabilities from the balance 
sheet when calculating metrics.   
• Loans made by an owner to the business.  One food hub owner chose to make a short-
term loan to a food hub instead of contributing equity.  As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
phenomenon is a common strategy among small business owners seeking to capitalize 
their business while making their funds easy to retrieve.  In practice, the owner did not 
expect the food hub to repay the loan within the year, and instead left most of the money 
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in the business year after year.  In our analysis of the firm, treating the loan as a long-
term loan or owner equity might have been more accurate and would have improved the 
business’ position. 
• Categorization of Expenses.  One of the four food hubs chose to categorize its expenses
according to program, allocating them between wholesale and retail food box subclasses 
in their accounting system.  This made an enormous difference in our ability to analyze 
the relative cost-effectiveness and profitability of each program.  For example, we could 
calculate the Labor to Income Ratio for each program and look at how this efficiency 
measures impacted net income.  We could also subtract variable costs from each 
program’s gross margin to see what was left to cover overhead and profit.  We would 
encourage food hub managers to track costs separately by program, at least for labor 
expenses, and ideally for variable and even fixed expenses. 
Table 25:  Effects of Adjustments on Year End Balance Sheet, Food Hub 2 
Without 
Adjustments 
With Adjustments 
Current Assets $43,623.84 $43,623.84 
Long Term Assets $94,809.88 $211,625.59 
 TOTAL ASSETS $138,433.72 $255,249.43 
Current Liabilities $215,577.54 $164,027.54 
Long Term Liabilities $56,640.72 $56,640.72 
TOTAL Liabilities $272,218.26 $220,668.26 
Owner Equity -$133,784.54 $34,581.17 
Implications for Liquidity and Solvency: 
Debt-asset ratio 197% 86% 
Current Ratio 0.2 0.3 
Solvent? NO YES 
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Table 25 gives an example of the impacts of recordkeeping choices.  Food Hub 2 had 
undervalued its assets by depreciating according to IRS depreciation schedules on its balance 
sheet.  It had also included a $50,000 grant under “current liabilities,” making its short-term debt 
appear larger.  Without adjustments, the food hub’s financial metrics showed it to be insolvent 
and to have negative working capital.  But if the grant liability is removed and assets are 
depreciated using a straight-line method, as in the “With Adjustments” column, the business 
turned out to be solvent, as shown in the table. 
From a recordkeeping standpoint, neither way of depicting the food hub’s assets is 
wrong, but from a financial evaluation standpoint the adjusted version gives a more accurate 
picture of the business. 
 
4.7  Summary   
 This chapter has summarized findings from the four case studies and offered some 
evaluation of the financial evaluation process itself.  In general, we observed that three out of 
four of the case study hubs exhibited working capital constraints, all of them struggled with labor 
efficiency concerns, three out of four at some point experienced high debt-asset ratios, and all 
wrestled with profitability.  The youngest food hub was the only one that experienced 
consistently negative net income, even after receiving substantial grants.  It struggled with high 
operating expenses and had a very narrow gross margin even for wholesale, suggesting that it 
was underpricing its services.  This may have been due in part to high customer concentration, 
which resulted in limited bargaining power.  The other food hubs were able to reach positive 
profits in the range of $500,000-$2.25 million of sales through various mixtures of wholesale and 
direct-to-consumer sales, but their profitability varied in a manner consistent with the 
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“breakeven” phase described by Matson & Barham (2015).  All of the food hubs utilized grant 
funding at some point.  However, with the exception of the newest hub, which relied on grants to 
cover a large portion of operating expenses, grant income never constituted more than 4% of 
total revenue.  Grant income may also have had benefits for cash flow and liquidity which were 
difficult to capture. 
None of the food hubs held much owner equity in their early years, with the exception of 
the newest hub, which had raised capital from external investors.  The firms owned relatively 
few fixed assets, and several were struggling with a legacy of negative profits from their startup 
phase, which had eaten into their equity and left them highly leveraged.  Factors affecting current 
assets and liabilities, including decisions about inventory, choice of customers, and policies on 
bill payment and collection, turned out to strongly influence each business’ Debt-Asset Ratio 
because of the large ratio of current to long-term assets.  The small size of fixed assets and the 
disproportionate use of current liabilities suggest that these firms may have experienced limited 
access to external capital, especially term debt.  However, it is difficult to say whether managers 
were “bootstrapping” because they could not access external funds, or because they had made 
deliberate choices to seek interest-free sources of credit, maintain control and protect their 
mission.  Grant funding may also have helped reduce the need for external borrowing or 
investors. 
Most of the proposed key metrics offered useful information for evaluation purposes.  
However, comparing Return on Assets and Asset Turnover to industry benchmarks yielded 
figures that were wildly different from industry benchmarks, probably because food hubs own so 
few assets.  Evaluating Sales per Worker Equivalent proved worthwhile for understanding labor 
efficiency, but required an exact knowledge of worker FTEs that many food hub managers may 
  
 
 
133 
not have.  Additional measures introduced partway through the study, such as Margin Minus 
Labor and variable costs by program, added depth to the analysis.  Better measures of cash flow, 
showing the effects of grant income and prepaid food box programs, would have been helpful 
additions.  Generally, the usefulness of metrics and the accuracy of our overall analyses were 
affected by managers’ decisions about whether to use accrual accounting, whether to track 
inventory, how to value assets, how to represent owner capital, how to record information about 
grants, and whether to subcategorize the income statement by revenue center. 
It is evident that the food hubs in our case studies faced challenges with regard to pricing, 
working capital, labor efficiency and possibly access to capital in general.  The next section 
provides recommendations for how food hub managers might approach such challenges. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this study has been not only to demonstrate an evaluation of business 
performance, but also to show how key metrics can be used by managers to make decisions.  We 
have seen how financial analysis can reveal problem areas related to liquidity and cash flow, 
profitability, efficiency, solvency and repayment capacity, as well as more specific issues related 
to pricing, labor, shareholder relationships, and inventory management.  In this chapter we 
provide guidance on making improvements in each of these areas, turning back to the literature 
where appropriate.  Note: the text in this chapter is adapted from the Managers Guide to Food 
Hub Financial Metrics, an Extension document produced as part of the present study.  The 
recommendations in this section were written for a practical audience of food hub managers. 
 
5.2  Improving Liquidity and Cash Flow  
The following practices, compiled from interviews and food hub manager feedback, can be 
used increase liquidity and assist with cash flow.  These practices address issues that emerged 
from our study, including limited working capital and large write-offs on Accounts Receivable. 
• Make a cash flow budget to anticipate possible cash shortages at certain times of year.  
Determine what sources of cash (including a line of credit, alternative lending, or grant 
and charitable funds) could provide enough of a cash cushion during the shortfalls.   
• Obtain a line of credit for short-term working capital. 
• Develop sales outlets that benefit cash flow. Pre-sell products whenever possible.  
Examples of sales outlets that enable prepayment for products include online 
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marketplaces and prepaid direct-to-consumer food box programs.  These outlets can 
provide cost-free credit from supportive customers. 
• Target some customers who can meet shorter payment terms.  For example, some 
food hubs report being able to use Net 7 (i.e. seven day) terms with restaurants because 
restaurants receive payment from their own customers almost immediately.  Some 
customers may even pay cash on delivery. 
• Accept credit cards where possible, in order to receive payments quickly. 
• Where possible, aim for shorter receivables terms (e.g. Net 7 or Net 15) and longer 
payables terms (e.g. Net 30).  Keeping Days Receivable shorter than Days Payable 
brings cash into the business.  If paying producers quickly is part of the food hub’s 
mission, or if the food hub serves customers such as schools that tend to pay slowly, this 
may not be possible.  In this case it may be more important to obtain an operating loan 
and/or to emphasize the other cash flow strategies listed here. 
• Consider a role for charitable funding.  For example, some grant programs or donors 
may be willing to provide unrestricted funds for use as a cash cushion, similar to an 
operating loan that does not need to be paid back..  Privately donated funds may have 
fewer restrictions than grant funds.  
• Consider sources of equity financing.  Selling shares of the business can help generate 
working capital, although this can be risky because it may involve giving up some 
control of the company.  For co-ops, member equity or low-interest member loans can 
also expand available cash. 
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• Manage dividends carefully.  If there are shareholders or cooperative members who 
own equity in the company, consider carefully whether to pay dividends or patronage 
refunds out of profits.  (Obviously this depends on agreements with shareholders.)  
• Reduce the time that goods spend in inventory, where possible within the business 
model.  If there are certain times of year when the business carries more inventory, 
incorporate this into cash flow budgeting.  We will discuss inventory in greater detail 
later on. 
• Consider the implications of ownership vs. brokerage models.  A brokerage model 
has some disadvantages; for example, charging a flat brokerage fee means having less 
flexibility to negotiate a high gross margin on certain products.  However, not taking 
ownership means not having cash tied up in unsold inventory that the food hub owns.  
The food hub also avoids risks of loss from product shrinkage in inventory. 
• Increase profitability.  More net cash income means more cash to reinvest in the 
business. 	  
Many food hubs report challenges with collecting payment from customers on time.  Receiving 
delayed payment from customers obviously affects cash flow.  If there is no disincentive for 
paying late, customers may intentionally or unintentionally exploit the opportunity to extract free 
credit from food hubs.  
In the case of Food Hub 2, we saw that write-offs (i.e. bills never paid by customers) 
became a problem, impacting profitability as well as cash flow.  Their write-offs were as high as 
$20,000.  Costs of goods sold to non-paying customers eat directly into a food hub’s profits.   So, 
a little more time spent on collecting bills can yield a large return.   
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 The following practices, paraphrased from a listserv discussion among food hub 
managers in the pre-2016 archives of the NGFN Food Hub Community of Practice listserv 
(https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/ngfnfoodhub), have been recommended by managers 
to improve collection of receivables.  Most of these strategies apply to a wholesale context, but 
some can be adapted to direct-to-consumer programs. 
• Send bills daily or at the end of each week.  Customers can only pay a bill once they 
receive it.  Automatically emailing statements on a regular schedule through 
QuickbooksTM can be helpful. 
• Check credit and/or require references for customers who will be buying products on 
credit.  For new customers, require cash on delivery for the first three orders or until a 
credit check can be completed.  
• Aim for 7- or 14-day payment terms where possible.   Different terms make sense for 
different customers.  Restaurants may be given terms as short as 7 days because their 
revenue comes through cash and credit cards.  Other customers may need longer terms if 
their own cash conversion cycle is longer. 
• Speak to customers in person to confirm their credit terms.  Build a relationship. 
• Establish a credit limit with customers.   
• Consider offering a small percentage discount for early payers. 
• Monitor aged receivables closely.  Personally reach out to late payers.  If necessary, 
work with them to establish a payment schedule of partial payments, with due dates. 
• Make a rule about when to stop delivering to late payers.  For some food hubs, the cut-
off point is 90 days.  If receivables age past an acceptable number of days, and if the 
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customer has stopped paying their bills completely, stop credit sales and require cash on 
delivery. 
• Make use of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) and obtain a PACA 
license.  PACA is a legal tool that provides special rights for produce wholesalers, 
including the right to receive full payment within 10 days of delivery. All produce 
wholesalers are covered by PACA, but having a license can assist a wholesaler with the 
enforcement of their rights.  Avoid unintentionally waiving PACA rights by agreeing to 
payment terms in excess of 30 days or providing inconsistent information about pay 
periods on invoices and contracts. 
In spite of its best efforts, a food hub may still end up with receivables over 90 days old, which 
tend to be viewed unfavorably by lenders.  If this happens, it may be necessary to take them out 
of current assets and count them as a loss (or write-off).  Aged receivables over 120 days should 
definitely be counted as a loss.  This allows a more realistic valuation of business’ current assets 
and profitability, especially if the customer responsible for the aged receivables has stopped 
sending payments altogether.  However, if the customer is still in touch and is making payments 
on older bills, their aged receivables should not be written off yet. 
 
5.3  Improving Profitability 
All of the food hubs in our study struggled to maintain consistently positive profits.  
Since all key metrics are interconnected, all should be kept in mind when looking for ways to 
improve profitability.  Many of the recommendations for improving efficiency and cash flow can  
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impact profit as well.  Below are some specific principles for improving profitability, again 
drawn from our interviews and study findings.   
• Form realistic expectations for gross margins.  According to Kate Danaher of RSF 
Social Finance, unrealistically high projections of gross margins are one of most common 
(and most important) mistakes that food hubs make (personal communication, December 
4, 2015).  It is important to know the norms of the industry and the expectations of 
customers, especially when planning to expand beyond an initial customer base.  Expect 
cyclical and non-cyclical changes in margins over the course of the year as produce goes 
in and out of season and market prices vary.   
• Monitor margins closely, by program.  Food hubs that do not use a predetermined 
percentage markup (e.g. 18% for all products) experience a tradeoff.  On the one hand, 
they are free to negotiate on price and to take advantage of the highest margins that the 
market will allow.  On the other hand, they may not know the overall gross margin they 
are achieving.  Such hubs should monitor actual (achieved) gross margins for each 
program on a weekly or monthly basis to make sure they’re on target.  Also, check 
achieved margins on sales to especially large customers or categories of customers.   
• Know the gross margins associated with each product line, and expand accordingly.  
Try to identify what is profitable based on past data rather than targets or assumptions.  
Evaluate achieved gross margins individually for product line categories like produce, 
meat, frozen goods, and dairy.  This requires tracking COGS and revenues separately for 
each product line.   
• Look at gross margins and Costs of Sales together.   In food hub accounting systems, 
try to categorize operating costs, especially variable and labor costs, by program.  Over 
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time, monitor costs in relation to the gross margin for each program to see whether 
variable costs per sales dollar are increasing, decreasing, or staying flat as sales volume 
increases.  If expanding from retail to wholesale, pay close attention to operational 
efficiency to be sure the smaller gross margin will cover costs.  If focusing on direct-to-
consumer retail programs, remember that their appealingly high gross margins do not 
necessarily equate to more profit.  In our case studies, retail programs were sometimes 
less profitable than wholesale – because of the large amount of labor, credit card 
processing fees and packaging costs involved.  This illustrates the importance of tracking 
variable costs by program. 
• Pay attention to trade-offs, especially with inventory items.  Sometimes inventory 
items such as value-added products or frozen meats obtain a high gross margin.  Be sure 
that the cost of keeping these items in inventory will be covered by the added margin.  
Calculate the holding costs of inventory to determine whether apparently profitable 
inventory items really are profitable.  See Section 5.8 for details.  
• Consider changing prices or markups.  Sometimes price or markup changes are 
necessary.  Most successful food hubs report having had to adjust standard margins or 
markups to cover expenses.  When larger wholesale companies need to increase prices, 
they schedule the changes with customers in advance, so that customers can plan ahead. 
For more detailed ideas about pricing and margins, see Section 5.   
• Invest judiciously in branding and marketing.  In our case studies, two food hubs saw 
high costs from marketing expenses that did not seem to yield the desired results.  
Sometimes hiring an in-house marketing person is effective; other times it may be better 
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to hire an experienced external marketing firm.  Either way, interview several candidates 
and check references before committing to a contract. 
• Use grant funding strategically.  Grant funding should be used to build capacity for 
more retained earnings in the long run, but ideally not to prop up losses year after year.  
Consider spending grants on assets that will improve profitability in the long run. 
Examples include marketing services that will increase sales, or infrastructure that will 
increase efficiency and capacity.  Notably, grant funds used to buy fixed assets will 
translate directly into equity on the balance sheet, making the business more appealing to 
lenders and investors. 
 
5.4  Resolving Efficiency Issues 
All of the food hubs in our case study had reason to increase their labor efficiency, 
especially as measured by Sales per Worker Equivalent.  It is important to recall that all 
personnel in the business, not just sales and marketing staff, contribute to increasing the volume 
of sales. To improve staff efficiency at generating sales, the Food Hub Benchmarking Study 
suggests asking the following questions (note:  these are suggestions from the study’s authors, 
not findings of the study itself): 
 
- Should we be doing more or different marketing? 
- Do we have the right people doing the right jobs? 
- Can we give our staff sales training? 
- Do we do performance evaluations on key personnel? 
- Where can we improve sales efficiencies or remove bottlenecks? 
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- Is our pricing appropriate? 
- Have we built a marketing plan with a sales goal? 
- Does our entire team know the plan? (NGFN Food Hub Collaboration, 2015) 
 
Other recommendations include: 
• Focus on decreasing the Labor to Sales Ratio and increasing Margin Minus Labor 
(gross margin minus the Labor to Sales Ratio) on a program-by program basis.   It 
is useful to break staff expenses up by program or function in order to compare labor 
efficiency metrics for wholesale and retail.  Limit seasonal labor hours in situations 
where seasonal labor is not the most efficient way to get tasks done.  Continue to plan 
ahead for growth to avoid staffing bottlenecks. 
• Look closely at compensation and benefits in tandem with efforts to reduce turnover 
and increase labor efficiency.  Retaining talented staff and attracting future talent will 
yield returns in the long run, but may require higher compensation.   See Section 5.7 for 
more about setting appropriate compensation. 
• Reduce losses from product spoilage and quality concerns.  These losses can have a 
large impact on the gross margin.  To be able to monitor them closely over time, consider 
using QuickbooksTM to separately track costs of shrink in inventory and costs of quality-
related product returns by customers.  
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5.5  Improving Solvency 
Three out of four food hubs in our study struggled with solvency.  In general, the two 
ways to improve the debt-asset ratio are to build more equity and to reduce total liabilities.  The 
best way to build equity is to be profitable so that debts can be paid off.  In an article for farm 
businesses, Alex White of the Agricultural and Applied Economics program at Virginia Tech 
suggests the following approaches. 
• Sell unneeded assets and use the proceeds to pay down your debts
• Take good care of your assets (preventative maintenance) so they will hold their
value longer 
• Reinvest profits back into the operation – be sure to invest in productive, profitable
assets, though! 
• Find outside investors for your business -- If you are a c-corporation you might sell
additional shares of stock, etc. 
• Don’t take on additional debt if you can possibly help it (White, 2007)
Additional sources of equity for food hubs include member equity (for co-ops only) or grants 
that can be spent on long-term assets.  However, co-op member equity accounts may be treated 
as a liability by some lenders. The decision about whether to seek outside investors for a food 
hub, especially if it is having profitability problems, is a serious one, as it usually involves giving 
up some control of the business. 
To improve repayment capacity, a business owner can either increase Earned Income 
Before Interest, Depreciation Taxes and Amortization (EBITDA) or reduce the amount of 
current debt that it owes.  This can be done by paying off existing long-term debt, but also by 
refinancing short-term debts into long-term loans. 
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If a company is unable to service its debt and is veering towards default on its loans, 
owners should think outside the box about how to improve their position.  One of the service 
providers we interviewed told us about a food hub that was having trouble creating enough cash 
flow to pay off the last few years of a debt.  Managers knew that once the debt was paid off, they 
would be “in the black” again.  The food hub went to its farmers and told them it needed a 
temporary 2-3% increase in gross margins, effective only through the end of the debt term.  The 
extra 2-3% would be placed in a reserve account and used exclusively to make debt payments.   
The farmers agreed to accept a temporary decrease in prices on the condition that the food hub 
would reinstate the original pricing once the debt was paid off.  This flexibility was possible in 
part because farmers were also owners and shareholders of the hub (K. Danaher, personal 
communication, December 4, 2015). 
 
5.6  Pricing and Margins 
At least one food hub in our study suffered because of its very low gross margin, and 
several of the managers we interviewed were interested in improving their pricing strategy.  
Since narrow gross margins tend to be a challenge for food hubs, finding the right margin and 
choosing a successful pricing strategy are critical.  In this section we provide a basic overview of 
some “textbook” approaches to pricing, then give examples of how real food hubs deal with 
price in practice.  We also discuss common issues related to pricing, including the issue of 
farmers selling “around” the hub. 
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5.6.1  A “Textbook” Approach to Pricing 
There are two components that determine the gross margin retained by a food hub:  the 
cost side, including operating costs and purchase prices paid to farmers, and the demand side, 
including the selling price that customers are willing to pay.  Usually, prices are determined 
using some combination of information about the cost side and the demand side. 
 
The cost side.  Some businesses take a cost plus approach to pricing.  To determine selling price, 
they start with the cost of providing a quantity of goods, and then add a markup.  One method of 
cost plus pricing takes into consideration not only the Costs of Goods Sold (including 
processing), but also the variable costs of packing, processing (if applicable), delivery and fixed 
costs of maintaining a facility (Noreen, Brewer, & Garrison , 2011). A hypothetical example 
might look something like this:  
 
Table 26:  Cost Plus Pricing per Case of Broccoli 
For forecast monthly sales of 1,000 cases.  All prices and costs are fictional. 
 
Cost Amount Description 
   Cost of Goods  $30 / case Price per case of broccoli purchased by the food hub 
+ Variable Labor $3 / case Estimated cost of labor needed to pick and deliver each case 
+ Variable Overhead $2 / case Other per-unit costs that increase with quantity, like fuel  
+ Fixed Overhead $1 / case Costs that don’t vary much with quantity, like rent and insurance, 
divided by number of units.  Suppose these are $1000 per month and 
the hub sells only broccoli, then fixed overhead per unit is $1000 / 
1000 cases = $1 / case 
= Unit Product Cost 
(absorption cost) 
$36 / case Total of per-unit costs above 
+ Selling & Admin 
Expenses + Desired 
Profit 
$4  (~11%) This is used to cover any remaining selling and admin expenses and 
profit 
= Target price $40 / case Desired selling price to charge to customers 
 
The amount added to the Unit Product Cost should be big enough to cover any selling 
and administrative costs and still leave enough profit to meet profitability goals.  In the example, 
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the food hub has determined that it needs to add an 11% markup to the total costs of buying, 
storing, picking, packing and delivering the broccoli (costs which total to $36/case).  So, the food 
hub aims for a selling price of $40/case.  The hub may have chosen this markup based on 
experience, recommendations from other food hubs, or a calculation.   
It is important to notice that at a given price, if the number of cases of broccoli sold is 
different from the sales forecast, profits will change.  If the food hub in the example sells more 
than 1000 cases, profits will be larger than the target profit.  If it sells less than 1000 cases, 
profits will be smaller that the target, and might be negative.  
Cost plus pricing is not an exact science.  Some of the values needed for the method on 
the previous page, like labor per case, might be hard to estimate.  Often, managers use trial and 
error to determine what markups are needed to cover their costs – but back-of the envelope 
calculations like the one shown can help as well.  
 
The demand side.  As any manager knows, costs aren’t the only factor in pricing -- the demand 
side plays a huge role as well.  Considerations include:  what price are customers willing to pay 
for particular items?  How much will demand change if prices increase?  To what degree are 
customers segmented in their characteristics and in their willingness to pay?  To what extent, and 
how, can the food hub charge different prices to different segments?   
The Lerner Index tells us that if demand for a particular product is price-inelastic, then 
the seller has more price-setting power, and a larger price markup should be possible.  If the 
demand is price-elastic, then sellers must charge a smaller markup (Elzinga & Mills, 2011).  
Consider eggs, for example.  Grocery stores sell many eggs, and although consumers may 
consider them a staple, there is plenty of competition in the egg-selling market.  Suppose a store 
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knows that consumers are price-sensitive when it comes to eggs.  As a result, they mark them up 
less than other products.  They may even treat eggs as loss leaders, taking a small loss on each 
unit to lure in customers, hoping they will also buy other products with larger markups.   
Following a similar logic, several food hubs we interviewed obtained a 15% gross margin 
on eggs while obtaining a 20-30% gross margin on almost everything else they carried.  We were 
told that a customer’s standing order for a weekly delivery of eggs can be a good foundation on 
which to add other, more lucrative sales.  So, charging a competitive price on local eggs turned 
out to be worthwhile.  Getting a feel for the price-elasticity of different products helps vendors to 
create an overall pricing strategy that balances out to positive profits, even though some items 
may be sold at low markups and even at a loss.   
Other relevant pricing concepts include price skimming and premium pricing.  Price 
skimming, a form of periodic pricing, involves introducing a product at a high price and 
gradually lowering it over time, to try to capture the best price possible from those who are 
willing to pay extra to get the product early (Tellis, 1986). This is essentially what farmers are 
doing when they charge a higher price for early-season produce.   
Premium pricing usually involves selling two grades of products at different prices that 
are produced using roughly the same process (Tellis, 1986). The seller might take a loss on the 
low-priced product but make a profit on the high-priced product.  A farmer selling higher-priced 
Extra Fancy heirloom eating apples and lower-priced culls from the same orchard would be an 
example of premium pricing.  We would expect the Extra Fancy apples to generate a profit on 
each unit sold.  The culls might be sold at a loss, for less than their per-unit variable cost of 
production.  Selling the culls would still be beneficial to the farmer, though, if it helps him 
recover his fixed costs for things like equipment and inputs.  Alternatively, the farmer could find 
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a market for the culls where they have more value, for example as child-sized apples for school 
lunches.  Either way, premium pricing requires thinking about high-grade and low-grade items  
together so that the overall result maximizes profit. 
 
 
5.6.2  Food Hub Pricing In Practice 
In practice, food hubs generally take one of two basic approaches to pricing:  either they 
charge a fixed gross margin, or they use a flexible gross margin that varies with farmer needs, 
market prices, customer expectations, and product line.  Some hubs pay all farmers the same 
price for a particular product, while others do not.  Some hubs charge all customers the same 
price for the same product, while others do not.  Either way, managers tell us that pricing is part 
of a more complicated equation of building trust and relationships on both the supply and 
demand sides.  Quality relationships are key to suppliers’ and customers’ willingness to work 
with the food hub on price. 
 
Working with customers.  To obtain good prices from wholesale customers, organic farming 
consultant and author Atina Diffley recommends these basic principles (Diffley, 2012): 
• Know what your customers value	  
• Assure quality	  
• Work from your strengths and competitive advantages	  
• Stay in the market and never break a pattern of delivery	  
• Tell the same story consistently with your delivery person, label, quality, pack, 
point of purchase cards and attitude 
• Engage in production planning to assure predictable supply 	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Clearly, there is a relationship between the selling price and the volume that can be sold 
at that price.  For farmers, pricing is often a question of matching the price to the volume that the 
farmer wishes to produce, according to Diffley.  Food hubs may have more flexibility than 
farmers on the volume of products they offer, but still follow the same principle.  If selling to a 
customer who resells product, such as a retail grocery store, it may be appropriate to ask how 
much of a product they will be able to sell at different prices as part of a price negotiation. 
Understanding the marketplace is also key to price negotiation, according to some of our 
interviews.  USDA Agricultural Marketing Service regularly publishes market prices for edible 
commodities on their Market News website (USDA, 2016).   The most common reference points 
for produce prices are the terminal markets, which are large public exchanges located at major 
transportation hubs across the country.  USDA’s terminal market price reports cover both 
conventional and USDA Certified Organic items.  USDA also posts prices on local and regional 
food, collected from major farmers markets and other locations. 
Most food hubs seem to want to avoid “the price game” of closely tethering their prices 
to the fluctuating national market.  However, Red Tomato, a large food hub based in 
Massachusetts, uses terminal market prices as a tool to understand how their price points are 
likely to compare to conventional wholesale.  According to Executive Director Laura Edwards 
Orr, knowing the market price allows the food hub to recognize in advance if their suppliers’ 
prices are significantly higher or lower than the market price.  They constantly review market 
prices and forecasts for the season.  This gives them a chance to share their concerns with 
growers, and if necessary, to gather talking points about the attributes of a particular product so 
that they can explain or negotiate a higher price to customers.  This prevents them from being 
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caught off-guard in price negotiations when they make their sales calls (Edwards-Orr & Futrell, 
2016). 
 
Working with farmers.  Food hubs often struggle to offer a “fair” price to farmers when selling in 
competitive markets.  However, Michael Rozyne of Red Tomato argues that there are many 
ways to offer “a good deal” to farmers in ways that go beyond price (Rozyne & Hodges, 2012).  
These include: 
• Volume: Being able to sell a large and consistent volume, but also to match the right 
grower to the customer so that their price and volume expectations align;	  
• Planning:  Helping farmers plan their production so that they can fit their volume to the 
demand without having excess capacity;	  
• Long-term relationships:  Creating a feedback loop with customers so that growers 
have the chance to improve, which helps with customer retention;	  
• Efficient logistics:  Saving growers money on distribution via shared trucking, 
backhauls, and full pallets;	  
• Fast, reliable payment:  This benefits farmers’ cash flow which can be a big need, 
especially for farmers selling to wholesale channels only;	  
• Ability to move the whole crop -- all sizes, all grades:  Finding alternative markets that 
maximize the value of small and cosmetically imperfect products; and	  
• Quality of relationship:  Providing reliability, trust, dignity and market intelligence, 
reducing farmers’ stress and risk.	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When food hubs offer farmers “a good deal” that helps them move more products, gain 
critical information about the marketplace, reduce waste and excess, and speed up cash flow, 
farmers may be in a position to be more flexible on prices. 
In general, farmers selling large volumes of products may have more flexibility around 
price, while small farmers may require a higher price to be viable.  Rather than standardizing 
prices, Red Tomato builds supply chains that match farmers to the right type and volume of 
customers so that each farmer can earn the price he or she needs to be profitable.  To this end, the 
food hub provides customized ordering guides to different customers depending on the type of 
customer, specific products and the volume of product they purchase.  As a result, the food hub 
may end up paying different farmers different prices on the same day for the same product – but 
this suits their mission and also helps them capture the margins they need.  Red Tomato is 
always transparent with growers about price negotiations and the prices they are charging their 
customers (Edwards-Orr & Futrell, 2016). 
Similar to Red Tomato, Common Market in Philadelphia works closely with farmers on 
pricing.  Common Market’s Haile Johnston explains that they provide guidance to farmers on 
what they think the market will bear, but essentially allow farmers to set their own prices and to 
test how well different prices will work.  To these prices Common Market adds a flexible 
markup of 15-35% that depends on the product, time of year, and their relationships with the 
market segment in question (Johnston, 2014). 
Some managers feel strongly about the importance of flexible gross margins, because 
they allow food hubs to take advantage of favorable market variations in price.  In some cases, 
especially during the height of the growing season, the asking price of local farmers can turn out 
to be much lower than the prices offered by national distributors.  This can happen routinely, or 
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for special reasons such as droughts in California or fluctuations in fuel prices.  Flexible pricing 
and margins allow the food hub to retain at least some of the profit from these windfall price 
advantages before passing the rest on to farmers or customers.  An inflexible pricing scheme, 
based on a fixed margin and average farmers market prices rather than seasonal wholesale prices, 
was cited as one reason for the unprofitability and eventual closure of Grasshoppers Distribution 
food hub in Kentucky (Brislen, Woods, Meyer, & Routt, 2015). 
 
5.7  Employee Turnover and Compensation 
Employee turnover and compensation are closely tied to labor efficiency issues, and 
several of the managers we interviewed expressed frustration with staff turnover.  Furthermore, 
according to the 2014 Food Hub Benchmarking Survey, the 25% of food hubs with the highest 
profits spent 3% less of their revenue on labor than the average food hub, but paid workers 39% 
more per FTE (NGFN Food Hub Collaboration, 2015).   Such findings highlight the importance 
of investing in and retaining skilled staff.  However, in our analysis of wages and salaries 
accepted by food hub staff in our case studies, we found that staff at all levels were accepting 
compensation well below the “market” rates for comparable positions in wholesale and 
distribution.  In our interviews, food hub managers expressed interest in strategies for 
benchmarking appropriate wages and salaries.  Several managers also mentioned staff turnover 
as an operational challenge that might be decreasing their labor efficiency.  So, this section 
explores reasons for turnover, the role of compensation in labor productivity, and resources for 
benchmarking compensation.  
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5.7.1  Staff Turnover 
Staff turnover can cost 20% of an employee’s annual salary to replace an employee who 
leaves (ExtenData and International Telematics, 2014).  It also affects customer relationships.  
The case study on the collapse of Grasshopper Distribution concluded that “staff turnover, 
combined with frequent changes to the business model and underdeveloped supply-side expertise 
and infrastructure, resulted in management and quality control issues that affected customers’ 
relationships and overall performance of the enterprise” (Brislen, Woods, Meyer, & Routt, 
2015). Furthermore, turnover can reduce efficiency, lower morale, and make it difficult to build a 
culture around organizational values. 
In a review of published research on staff turnover, Porter & Steers (1973), identified the 
following significant predictors of turnover: 
1. Whether initial expectations for the job are met; for example, to what degree was the 
job situation accurately described at time of hire 
2. Compensation level, including:  
o Adequacy for meeting income needs 
o Whether compensation is perceived to be a fair reward for effort 
o Whether the promotional scheme is seen as equitable 
3.  Likelihood of promotion or increase in pay, even if expected increase is small 
4.  Satisfaction with supervisor relations, including: 
o Perceptions of equitable or inequitable treatment 
o Whether employee needs for recognition and feedback are met 
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5. Quality of peer relationships on the job, including: 
o Participation in a cohort of other trainees upon hire 
o Inclusion and cohesiveness among peers 
o Equity of social aspects of the job 
6.  Satisfaction with the job content, including:  
• Are the job tasks too repetitive 
• Is there enough autonomy and responsibility 
• How does the level of clarity about job roles compare to a given employee’s need 
for clarity, which varies among individuals 
   As noted, compensation is only one of many factors in whether employees stay with a 
business.  Food hubs may be able to recruit and retain skilled staff by providing a positive peer 
atmosphere, empowering staff to make decisions, offering opportunities for advancement, and 
providing strong job satisfaction.  However, compensation also has social responsibility 
implications for a values-based business such as a food hub, and plays a role in productivity as 
well as turnover. 
 
5.7.2  Compensation and Productivity 
Zeynep Ton, an MIT professor who researches the staffing strategies of retailers, has 
documented many instances where cutting staff or paying low wages hurt retailer profitability.  
Reasons include impacts on staff morale, customer service quality, and staff efficacy in making 
stocking decisions or other judgment calls that impact sales.  Ton cautions against using the 
Labor to Sales Ratio alone as a tool for determining ideal staffing levels, as this tends to lead to 
cuts in payroll.  Instead, she recommends that stores improve labor efficiency by reducing the 
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number of product offerings and special promotions, cross-training employees for various tasks, 
timing and standardizing tasks, and giving employees the freedom to make small decisions.  One 
example of a store that uses these strategies is Costco, which pays employees 40% more than its 
chief competitor Sam’s Club and enjoys almost twice the sales per square foot (Ton Z. , 2012).   
To determine optimal staffing levels, Ton recommends tracking performance on tasks that are 
the most likely to suffer from insufficient labor, and adjusting accordingly (Ton Z. , 2008). 
While these suggestions are aimed at retail stores, they could have relevance for food 
hubs as well.  For a food hub that adapts its marketing strategies, employee roles and process 
efficiency to increase Sales per Worker Equivalent and Margin Minus Labor, the associated cost 
savings could make it more affordable to raise worker pay, which in turn could pay off with 
more efficiencies in the long run.   
 
5.7.3  Benchmarking Wages and Salaries 
Food hub managers often express curiosity about the wages and salaries that other food 
hubs are paying.  However, our case studies suggest that food hubs tend to greatly undervalue 
their personnel.  So instead of giving examples of actual food hubs’ compensation rates, we offer 
suggestions of alternative ways to benchmark staff compensation.  
For guidance on appropriate pay for employees, Jesse Singerman, food business 
consultant for Prairie Ventures LLC, recommends the following sources (J. Singerman, personal 
communication, October 8, 2015). 
• Local economic development entities that collect wage information from their 
business members 
• Local chambers of commerce 
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• Newspaper advertisements or online job postings (be sure to look at job descriptions
for similar positions, including positions at nonprofits or social enterprises, and how 
they are defined) 
Additionally, social sector support organizations such as Third Sector New England sometimes 
collect regional compensation data for values-driven organizations.  
The Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics calculates median wages and salaries for all kinds 
of job descriptions nationwide (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).  A search of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) National Compensation Survey data can be conducted for a particular 
state and region at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/home.htm.   Median hourly wages and salaries can be 
searched through the “multi-screen data search” feature on the site, or by downloading Excel 
spreadsheets for a given state or metropolitan region.  To search for wages only from the food 
wholesale industry, use NAICS code 424400: “ Grocery and Related Product Merchant 
Wholesalers”. 
Median wages for the following occupational categories may be of special interest: 
13-­‐1921	  Buyers	  and	  Purchasing	  Agents,	  Farm	  Products	  
41-­‐0000	  	  Sales	  and	  Related	  Occupations	  
43-­‐4051	  	  Customer	  Service	  Representatives	  
53-­‐0000	  Transportation	  and	  Material	  Moving	  Occupations	  
53-­‐3033	  	  Light	  Truck	  or	  Delivery	  Services	  Drivers	  
53-­‐7062	  Laborers	  &	  Freight,	  Stock,	  and	  Material	  Movers,	  Hand	  
53-­‐7064	  Packers	  and	  Packagers,	  Hand	  
We have not found BLS median wages and salaries for managerial positions to be very 
useful, because they reflect pay rates from larger for-profit companies that mostly do not reflect a 
social mission.  From a mission-driven standpoint, it may be both unrealistic and undesirable for 
food hubs to pay their managers the same salaries as top-level staff at a $15 million wholesale 
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distribution company.  However, BLS figures do reinforce the need to offer a good package 
(including job satisfaction, a connection to values, and other non-monetary benefits) for 
employees who could be making more money elsewhere. 
On the other hand, BLS median wages for positions in lower pay brackets, such as 
packers, drivers, and the other occupational categories listed above, may be helpful in 
understanding what wages are competitive in the local labor market.  Wage-labor jobs probably 
bear the least resemblance to nonprofit jobs in the degree to which employees are able to 
sacrifice potential income to become part of a social mission.  
Benefits are another consideration.  Some food hubs make use of contracted workers and 
avoid offering health, vacation, dental or retirement benefits to employees.  For retention, such 
benefits are highly recommended.  In addition, consider creative, low-cost ways to reward 
employees.  For example, one food hub we interviewed offers an annual $400 “Professional 
Development stipend” for employees to attend food-related classes or conferences of their 
choosing.   
 
 
5.8  Managing inventory  
Inventory management has implications for food hub financial performance, both on 
paper and in reality.  In our study, we observed how limited information about inventory at three 
of the four food hubs inhibited our ability to evaluate them.  The case of Food Hub 4 also hinted 
at the cash flow implications of holding inventory for long periods.  This section explores the 
importance of inventory management, approaches to setting up an inventory management 
system, and the costs of holding inventory items. 
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5.8.1  The Importance of Inventory in Financial Metrics 
Food hubs that specialize in highly perishable products tend not to invest time and money 
in inventory tracking systems at the outset, which makes sense when their products turn over 
almost immediately.  If inventory is being held for more than a few days, though, it is worth 
tracking for several reasons: 
• Efficiency:  Calculating Days in Inventory or Inventory Turnover make it possible to 
track how efficiently the food hub is moving its products and using its warehouse 
space.   
• Cash Flow:  Since inventory turns are part of the cycle of converting Costs of Goods 
Sold into cash, knowing Days in Inventory (together with Days Receivable and Days 
Payable) allows the food hub to see how quickly sales are being converted into cash 
for the business.   
• Accurate Valuation of Assets:  Tracking inventory allows it to be listed as an asset, 
which improves the hub’s liquidity and solvency measures.  Even if products are 
turning over very quickly, a large portion of current assets may be sitting in inventory 
at any given time. 
Kate Danaher of RSF Social Finance says that she has seen inaccurate information about the 
value of inventory lead to problems for food hubs, especially those that engage in or pay for 
processing (personal communication, December 4, 2015).  The valuation of each unit of 
inventory should reflect the Cost of Goods Sold for that product, which for processors includes 
the per-unit costs of processing.  For example, suppose a food hub purchases a steer, has it 
processed, and places all the cuts of meat in a freezer to sell them separately.  In the valuation of 
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this inventory, processing costs should ideally be divided across all of the cuts of meat according 
to their weight; this is complicated because prices per pound probably differ for each cut.   
Such precise tracking may not always be possible, but managers should be aware that 
small discrepancies over time can lead to large cumulative discrepancies in the valuation of their 
inventory.  Danaher suggests that managers revisit and reconcile their inventory valuation 
periodically, for example every quarter, so that discrepancies don’t pile up.  Otherwise, 
overstatements of inventory value eventually become unexpected write-offs that dig into the food 
hub’s margins. 
 
5.8.2  Choosing an Inventory Management Solution 
Implementing inventory management involves more than just purchasing software. 
Successful inventory management requires some kind of informational gatekeeper to actively 
make sure inventory information is kept up to date.  The gatekeeper can be an automated 
technology solution, a staff person, or both (C. Krejci, personal communication, Feb. 16, 2016).  
If the gatekeeper is a technology solution, that solution should provide standard 
procedures for logging items into and out of inventory, should be straightforward enough for 
multiple staff to use, and should make it difficult for people to bypass the system.  (For large 
wholesalers, such systems usually involve handheld barcode scanners, which feed inventory 
adjustments directly into a computer system.)  Staff who use the system must be trained to 
respect the importance of following standard procedures so that data is kept up to date.  
If the gatekeeper is a person, they become the “funnel” through which all inventory-
related information will pass.  The recordkeeping system itself could be simple, since only one 
person needs to use it.  It could be an Excel spreadsheet, a Google form or the inventory feature 
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of Quickbooks.  The gatekeeper must take full responsibility for making inventory updates, and 
work systematically to make sure all information is correct.   
Most hubs seem to start tracking inventory using Excel or the basic inventory functions 
of Quickbooks Professional.  Quickbooks, however, is not ideally set up to manage a warehouse.  
Depending on the hub’s needs, a more advanced solution may or may not be required later on. 
Large distribution companies typically purchase inventory management capabilities as part of an 
Enterprise Resources Planning (ERP) software solution.  ERP software collects, stores and 
interprets data from many activities including inventory, planning, marketing, shipping and 
more.  One helpful thing about ERP systems is that they can automatically trigger reordering of 
inventory items when stock is reduced to a certain level.  They are also built to interact directly 
with financial recordkeeping so that financial statements will reflect accurate inventory 
valuations. 
Some businesses choose to purchase an already-designed ERP package, while others 
have one custom-designed for their needs.  Examples of ERP systems designed for food 
distributors include Edible Software, FoodConnex, and Produce Pro.  Other ERP systems are 
specifically designed for food hubs.  Examples of food hub ERPs that advertise inventory 
management capabilities include Delivery Biz Pro and Local Orbit.   
New Venture Advisors, a consulting company that helps food hubs select technology 
solutions, offers the following framework to help food hubs evaluate the inventory capabilities of 
potential software solutions:  
• Silver (good):  Inventory services are optimal for "just in time" and are largely 
grower-level. Minimal functionality that allows hub to view products that are 
owned by the hub and part of the hub's supply chain. 
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• Gold (better):  Tracks in-house inventory by "ordered, received, in warehouse, 
booked, etc." and tracks shelf-life and aging. 
• Platinum (best):  Includes produce specific characteristics, such as recognizing 
shelf-life/aging as unique from "received date". (New Venture Advisors, 2014): 
Food hubs are advised to look carefully at solutions before selecting one, as the costs of 
switching systems are usually significant.  
 
5.8.3  True Costs of Inventory  
Sometimes inventory items such as frozen products or value-added goods have a higher 
gross margin than highly perishable items.  Given the limitations of the growing season, a food 
hub may have good reason to stock up on large quantities of high-margin inventory items while 
they are available.   However, it’s important to remember that holding inventory can be costly.  
Inventory holding costs include (Rushton, Croucher, & Baker, 2006, p. 204): 
• Risk cost:  Costs from deterioration of products (shrinkage), theft, or damage while 
items are in inventory.  This cost is very important for food purveyors and is often 
underestimated. 
• Capital cost:  The “opportunity cost” of tying up capital in inventory that could 
otherwise be invested elsewhere or used to cash-flow the operation.  For example, if 
holding inventory requires obtaining an operating loan to replace the cash invested in 
inventory, then the interest on the loan will be a capital cost. 
• Service cost:  The cost of managing inventory stock and insuring its value. 
• Storage cost: The cost of warehouse space and handling during storage. 
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Total holding costs can be found by adding up the four cost categories above.  (Finding 
storage costs per unit is tricky if one already has a fixed amount of storage; it may or may not 
make sense to include these.  Risk and capital costs per unit are a bit easier to calculate.) 
If one knows the Days in Inventory per unit of a particular product, this can be multiplied 
by daily holding costs to get a rough idea how much it costs to hold each unit of product before it 
is sold.  By subtracting this and other variable costs from the gross margin of an inventoried 
product, it is possible to see how the inventoried product compares to other products in terms of 
profitability.   
Although inventory incurs costs, it can also reduce costs.  Keeping more items in 
inventory can reduce ordering costs, or costs of procuring more product, and shortage costs, 
which represent the missed opportunity of not being able to fill orders if inventory runs out.   
Many theories of supply chain management address how to balance the risks of shortage 
against the costs of holding inventory.  Conventional manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers 
typically calculate the economic order quantity (EOQ), the optimal amount of product that they 
should order at a given time in order to minimize the sum of holding costs and ordering costs.   
The formula for EOQ is as follows (Homa, 2016):   
𝐸𝑂𝑄 =    2 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟  ($) ∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑  (𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠)ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡  ($)   
Where holding cost per unit = holding cost (%) * cost per unit ($) 
A more complex version of this model is used in ERP systems to determine optimal order 
size and the level of stock that should trigger an order to replenish inventory.  The latter 
calculation also considers lead time, or the amount of time between when the firm places an 
order and receives the order.   
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The EOQ concept may be less applicable to businesses that procure highly seasonal 
products or that pre-sell or broker items.  However, it is relevant for businesses that purchase and 
hold inventory items, such as frozen or value-added goods, throughout the year.   
 
5.9  Equity and Sources of Financing 
In a finance presentation at the 2012 National Food Hub Conference, lenders urged food 
hubs to “guard equity jealously” and to set a timeline of goals for building equity (NGFN Food 
Hub Collaboration, 2012).  This is because all businesses must increase their equity in order to 
grow sustainably, and they must have their own money in order to borrow money.  Even if the 
firm rents its equipment and owns few physical assets, as sales increase it will still need an 
increasing amount of working capital to operate.  If equity does not grow in tandem with the 
firm, the firm will need to borrow more, and over time it could become highly leveraged.  It 
could eventually its lose the ability to borrow, and could become insolvent. 
Food hubs can increase their equity in one of three ways: 
1. Profitability from operations;   
2. Infusions of capital from charitable funders, if the food hub is eligible, and  
3. Contributed capital from owners, co-op members and/or investors. 
Compared with debt financing (e.g. loans and credit), equity financing from investors has several 
advantages.  In some ways it is less risky than a loan because it does not have to be paid back on 
a certain schedule, and there are no regular loan payments to detract from available working 
capital.  Investors usually do not expect an immediate return on their investment.  The initial 
value of the investment does not have to be paid back if the business goes bankrupt, although 
some investors may have preferred access to liquidated assets.   
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On the other hand, investors may ultimately require a rate of return larger than the 
interest that would be paid on a loan.  Also, taking on investors involves giving up some control 
of the business.  For a business that is strongly mission-driven, investor control has the potential 
to pull the enterprise away from its founders’ mission. 
Some food hub service providers believe that traditional equity financing is too awkward 
of a fit for food hubs (K. Danaher, personal communication, December 4, 2015).  According to 
the Food Hub Benchmarking Study, the average hub experiences negative profit (NGFN Food 
Hub Collaboration, 2015).  A “typical” investor will be looking for a larger return on investment 
than a “typical” food hub can offer.  Of course, there are atypical investors who are more patient 
with their capital, and there are atypical food hubs that can offer a more appealing ROI.   
Established, growing food hub businesses may wish to explore hybrid models of debt and 
equity financing, such as mezzanine financing.  Examples include subordinated debt, royalty 
financing, and warrants.  These provide alternatives to traditional debt financing, but typically 
involve less loss of control of the business than equity financing (Vermont Sustainable Jobs 
Fund, 2016).  Food hubs should not be afraid to seek capital, but should be cautious of risks and 
tradeoffs when deciding how to finance themselves.    
 
In this chapter we have explored recommendations for how food hub managers can take 
action on problems identified in their financial metrics.  The next and final chapter summarizes 
the findings of the study as well as our recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION  
6.1  Summary of Findings 
 
 This comparative case study has explored what key financial metrics and financial 
analysis can tell us about food hubs, and how financial analysis can be used by managers to 
make improvements in their businesses.  We have proposed a “dashboard” of key metrics for use 
by food hub managers, most of which we were able to utilize in our four case studies of food 
hubs.  In our analysis, we observed that the study hubs faced working capital constraints, labor 
efficiency concerns, high debt-asset ratios, and challenges with profitability.  Firm age had a 
large impact on labor costs, operating costs, and ultimately profitability.  While some food hubs 
broke even at levels below $1 million in sales, none were able to achieve positive profit in all 
years, even at sales levels well above $1 million, suggesting that all the hubs in the $500,000-
$2.5 million sales range were still in a “breakeven” phase of growth.  Grant funding helped 
support food hub expenses, sometimes offsetting negative profits, but did not play a major role 
for three out of four hubs.  Grants may have assisted with cash flow, although this was difficult 
to show using our data. 
We also observed some general characteristics across the four food hub businesses.  They 
tended to own few long-term assets relative to current assets.  They tended to use current 
liabilities as sources of financing, more so than other wholesale businesses, and made heavy use 
of interest-free sources of credit.  Modest owner equity and small total asset size left each firm 
vulnerable to insolvency in years of negative profit, and variations in current assets had a large 
impact on solvency.  However, probably because of bootstrapping techniques, including renting 
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and sharing equipment, the food hubs were usually more efficient in using their assets than the 
businesses reflected in benchmarks.   
Industry benchmarks turned out to provide a useful basis of comparison for Days 
Receivable, Labor to Sales Ratio, Gross Margin, and possibly Sales per Worker Equivalent, 
although these measures also needed to be analyzed within the context of each food hub’s own 
operating expenses and profitability.  We have discussed some reasons why the Sales per Worker 
Equivalent benchmark may not have been accurate.  Benchmarks were a bit less helpful for 
evaluating Days Payable, Days in Inventory, Asset Turnover and Return on Assets because of 
the differences between food hub and conventional industries and the unique nature of each 
hub’s business model.  These latter measures were more useful for evaluating each business’ 
performance against itself over time (trend analysis) and could also be useful to compare to 
internal targets (budget analysis).  Food hubs’ recordkeeping decisions, especially regarding 
depreciation and whether to track inventory, had a large impact on most of the measures.  Such 
decisions must be taken into consideration when conducting financial analysis, and adjustments 
may be needed.  
Finally, literature reviews and interviews regarding common problems faced by food 
hubs revealed practical actions that managers can take to improve their metrics.  For example, 
strategies to improve cash flow include cash flow budgeting, careful management of Accounts 
Receivable, rapid inventory turnover, and obtaining a lines of credit.  Gross margins can be 
improved by emphasizing higher-margin outlets and product lines and by carefully monitoring 
whether targets are being achieved.  Price negotiation with farmers can be made more effective 
by meeting farmers needs’ other than price, including fast payment, market intelligence, 
marketing of seconds, production planning assistance, and reliability.  Price negotiation with 
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customers is more effective when food hubs understand what their customers value, come to 
negotiations already knowing whether their prices are “low” or “high,” deliver reliable service, 
and match the right farmers with the right customers.  Labor efficiency can by improved by 
instituting training, using standard operating procedures with shared goals and objectives, and 
reducing staff turnover.  This may require looking closely at the work climate and the potentially 
damaging tradeoffs involved in paying staff at below-market rates. Solvency can be improved by 
selling off unproductive assets or by securing charitable funding for investments in fixed assets.  
Food hubs are advised to create a plan for building equity over time as their business grows, and 
to carefully consider the tradeoffs involved in different sources of capital, including investor 
equity and mezzanine financing.  These recommendations, also reflected in our Managers’ 
Guide to Food Hub Financial Metrics, will hopefully help food hub managers to take action after 
analyzing their businesses. 
   
6.2  Limitations of the Study 
 Probably the largest limitation of our study was our inability to secure monthly financial 
statements and balance sheets.  The balance sheets we received from food hubs were all dated 
December 31, meaning that they told us nothing about seasonal cycles in current assets and 
current liabilities.  Similarly, the income statements all reflected an entire years’ worth of sales 
and did not allow analysis of sales in individual months or quarters.  It is reasonable to expect 
that food hub financial statements would look drastically different at different times of year 
along with variations in seasonal food sales and inventory stocks.  In the “real world,” measures 
such as Days Payable and Receivable are most useful for managerial decision-making when 
calculated based on weekly or monthly figures, but we could not replicate that situation in our 
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metrics.  We also could not compare high-season and low-season values for measures that 
depend on seasonally variable figures.  
The difficulty in obtaining feedback from case study hubs was another limitation.  In the 
process of doing our analyses, we provided 20-25 page reports and tables of key metrics to each 
of the case study hubs and requested feedback on whether our analyses made sense.  Food Hub 
Managers are busy people, though, and while all of the food hub managers confirmed receipt of 
their reports, we only received substantive feedback from one manager.  This limited our ability 
to learn whether there was wrong or unhelpful information in our analyses.  To confirm that we 
were not too far off-track, we did secure some feedback on our Managers’ Guide to Food Hub 
Financial Metrics from two other food hub managers unrelated to the study.  However, due to 
confidentiality issues, they could not assist with our individual financial analyses.  Among other 
things, our experience speaks to the potential inaccessibility of dense, number-heavy written 
reports for actively engaged managers.  There are probably ways to more efficiently summarize 
and deliver financial information to food hubs, which we did not have time to explore.  It also 
speaks to the possible value of providing stipends to research participants in exchange for their 
review of findings, which we were not able to do. 
Finally, the small number and limited range of participants in our case studies were 
limitations.  In conducting a comparative case study, we did not seek to calculate statistically 
significant numerical results or to treat our participants as a representative sample of all food 
hubs.  Rather, we sought a deep exploration of four food hubs that varied in some key aspects: 
age, geographic location, business structure, brokerage vs. ownership models, and hybrid vs. 
wholesale-only marketing outlets.  Given the limited time and funding available for the study, it 
made sense to study several “hybrid” (mixed wholesale and retail) food hubs since they offer the 
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opportunity to explore two different business models in one.  Still, our comparison would have 
been strengthened by comparing at least one “retail-only” hub and perhaps additional 
“wholesale-only” cases against the food hubs already participating in our study.  Since not all of 
the hybrid models in our study collected program-specific data for their wholesale and retail 
programs, incorporating retail-only hubs would have allowed a better comparison of the financial 
aspects of different business models. 
 
6.3  Suggestions for Future Research 
In general, there appears to be a need for more case studies that look specifically at the 
financial aspects of food hub businesses, and not just at the qualitative aspects of their business 
models.  In previous studies some emphasis has been placed on the profitability or sales volume 
of particular food hub cases, but very little quantitative information exists on how food hubs 
capitalize themselves, manage cash flow, and draw profit from various aspects of their 
operations.  We have attempted to help fill this void, but additional financial case studies of other 
food hubs would provide educational value and would help deepen the conversation.  In 
particular, it would be helpful to see a financial case study that looks at changes in the financial 
position of food hubs throughout the fiscal year, identifying the different kinds of challenges 
(and opportunities) that arise at different times of year. 
Additionally, there has been some inconsistency in the literature in defining and 
evaluating the so-called “viability” of food hub enterprises, and the methods used to do so have 
not always been easily replicable.  In the author’s opinion, one practical way to resolve this 
would be to agree on a consistent methodology for food hub measurement and to create a 
common chart of accounts that could be used by food hub managers to do their recordkeeping 
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consistently with one another.  Even better would be a centralized, web-based system that would 
collect food hub managers’ data on an ongoing basis and confidentially report their own key 
metrics back to them, while also compiling benchmarks on a national scale.  In one stroke this 
would solve the problem of delivering valuable self-evaluation information to managers while 
also efficiently calculating benchmarks, without having to manually request data from managers 
each year.  Some efforts to explore creating or funding such a database have been made by the 
Wallace Center at Winrock International, and it would be helpful both to managers and to 
researchers if the idea were to move forward. 
In terms of benchmarking, if future iterations of the national Food Hub Benchmarking 
Study are conducted, it would be useful to see more metrics calculated separately for different 
subgroups of participants:  particularly wholesale, retail and hybrid models.  Additionally, food 
hub managers appear to be interested in more operational benchmarks from other food hubs.  
Some of the metrics that managers have mentioned include inventory holding costs, revenue 
dollars per staff hour on the packing line, revenue dollars per distribution mile, variable costs per 
case, and customer retention rates.  A first step towards such benchmarks might be to conduct 
another comparative case study similar to the present one, testing a “dashboard” of operational 
efficiency metrics on several example hubs.   
On a more theoretical note, future research could continue our exploration of whether 
food hubs do in fact suffer from limited access to capital, or simply behave in a selective manner 
when accepting sources of capital.  Such research could investigate how food hub managers 
access and evaluate different sources of capital, including institutional loans, grants, external 
investors, co-op members, and internal sources.  Understanding how food hub managers think  
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about sources of capital might help lenders and other food hub supporters to better design 
financial instruments that could meet the needs of food hubs without jeopardizing their 
commitment to values. 
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LETTER FROM INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
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APPENDIX B 
CRITERIA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY 
 
Screening criteria for initial set of interviewees: 
• Regardless of business structure, must have a profit motive or a desire to break even 
• Must have been in existence 3-11 years 
• Must deal primarily with local food 
• Must be selling at least some wholesale 
• Must be actively marketing under a shared brand attached to the end product 
• Must deal with product directly and be directly involved in meeting some kind of product 
standards, such as: 
• Grading 
• Quality inspection 
• GAP / HACCP or other food safety standard 
• Processing 
• Packing 
Additional selection criteria for study participants: 
• Must have reached breakeven or show evidence of moving toward breakeven 
• Must keep good financial records and have at least 3 fiscal years of past records 
• Geographic diversity 
• Variation in business structures 
• Willingness to collaborate on the study 
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APPENDIX C 
FOOD HUB INTERVIEW TEMPLATE 
 
Food Hub Name 
Names of people interviewed 
Locations visited 
 
1.  History 
a) Please give a general history of the food hub. 
2.  Marketing outlets – how they work 
a) How did you decide on the right mix of outlets?  What are your goals for your mix of 
outlets? 
b) Describe each outlet, its % of your total sales, and how it works. 
3.  Distribution Systems 
a) How does your food travel from place to place? 
b) If you are using 3rd party trucking or collaborating with distribution companies, how does 
that work? 
c) What is your weekly schedule of accepting orders, filling them and delivering them? 
4.  Growth Since Inception / Profitability 
a) What are your annual revenues? 
b) What were your revenues each year since you started?  (How do these reflect your 
growth, good years and bad years, key decisions, etc.) 
c) Are you making a profit? 
i. …after paying your workers and owners? 
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ii. …how much did owners get paid last year and how much was “sweat equity?” 
d) If you have not broken even, at what sales level do you think you will? 
5.  Pricing & Margins 
a) What are your average gross margins for your whole food hub, and for each of its outlets 
(e.g. wholesale, CSA) 
b) (What are our margins for each product line? E.g. meat, produce) 
c) How do you arrive at the price you will charge to customers? 
d) How do you arrive at the price you will pay to farmers? 
e) (Do all farmers receive the same price for the same item? 
6.  Capital 
a) What were your sources of capital in the beginning?   
b) And since then?   
c) (Do you have investors?  Why or why not?) 
7.  Technology 
a) Do you have a sales platform?  Which one?  How do you like it and why? 
b) Do you take orders online or over the phone? 
8.  QuickbooksTM & Accounting Systems 
a) What records do you look at regularly to manage costs and know whether you are 
operating efficiently? 
b) What challenges do you have in this area?  What training or IT needs? 
c) How long have you been keeping detailed financial records with your current system? 
9.  Seasonality  
a) How is your cash flow in winter? How do you manage these changes? 
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10. Personnel and Management Team
a) What are your staff positions and their responsibilities?
b) Are all staff paid?
c) (What are staff paid?)
d) (Do you offer benefits?)
11. Equipment & Infrastructure
a) What equipment do you use?
b) (How did you decide whether to rent or own?)
c) (What were your most challenging decisions about capital investments and why?)
12. Production planning / farmer relationships
a) Do you meet with your farmers to do production planning? How does it work?
13. Traceability & Inventory
a) What systems do you have for traceability?  How integrated are they with your other
systems (e.g QuickbooksTM, marketing platform)
a. (Do you use SKU numbers?  Do you track lot numbers?)
b) Are your farmers and facility GAP certified?  Do your buyers require this?
c) Do you have a system for managing inventory?
14. Reflection and Future Plans
a) What do you wish you’d known when you started managing a food hub?
b) Who was most helpful with tools and training?
c) What are your goals for the food hub?
